ORIGIN/ACTION.

EA-6

PMR: 1	REA 1	AF
ARA	EUR 5	RE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E 4	P 7	IO
L	FBO	AID
3/16 1		
AGR 10	COM 10	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY 3	CIA 2C	NAVY 5
OSD 33	USIA 10	NSA 3
NSC 6		

1967 MAR 20 AM 11 12

COPYFLO-PBR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 17 CHICOM-FR
XR POL CHICOM

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-1464 NO.

UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State-WASHINGTON

FROM : American Embassy-PARIS DATE: March 17, 1967

SUBJECT : Chinese Communist Embassy Official Speaks Publicly in Paris

REF :

Speaking before a group of students at one of France's top business schools (Ecole Superieure de Sciences Economiques et Commerciales), Mr. Chang Shih-chen, Cultural Attache at the Chinese Communist Embassy in Paris, stated that it may take decades for the Cultural Revolution to erase bourgeois revisionism in China. The Chinese Embassy spokesman admitted that revisionist forces opposing the Cultural Revolution are still strong but insisted that the situation of the Cultural Revolution is excellent. According to Mr. Chang Shih-chen, the Cultural Revolution in China will last tens of years and if need be a century because it is a question of creating a new world and liquidating the bourgeois ideology anchored in man. He added that the Cultural Revolution is a domestic Chinese phenomenon and cannot be exported any more than any other revolutions can. Nevertheless, it has opened a new approach in the international communist movement and might serve as example to the world proletariat. He also stated that President Mao Tse-tung personally started and directed the Cultural Revolution.

Mr. Chang Shih-chen replied to all but one question asked by the students. He sidestepped the question concerning the future of Franco-Chinese relations.

On the battle of wall posters which has taken place in China, the Chinese official said that they should not be taken literally. The majority of the Chinese leaders have been criticized in these posters but this does not mean that these leaders are in disgrace.

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☑ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:JGDean:td:3/16/67

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:RFunkhouser

Clearances:

0064

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/04

If the criticism was justified, those who were the target of the attacks usually made their "autocritique." Chang said that only a handful of party officials who have been attracted by capitalism are seriously accused. He thought that at the present time the Cultural Revolution has entered a new phase; while the movement started in schools and the villages, it now has spread to factories and to the farmers.

As for the impact of the Cultural Revolution on agricultural production, the Cultural Attache expressed the view that it did not affect output. Quite to the contrary, he said that the Cultural Revolution has given a new impulse to agricultural and industrial production as well as to scientific research. The speaker claimed that in 1966 industrial production attained all production goals and even surpassed the production of 1965 by 20 per cent. In agriculture, the grain harvest and the cotton harvest have been the best since 1949. To illustrate the remarkable progress in science and technology, Chang pointed to the three successful nuclear explosions during 1966, as well as achievements in the production of synthetic gasoline and the synthesis of insulin.

He also briefly mentioned that the Canton Fair will be held as scheduled next month and that China will display this year more articles which can be exported than ever before.

COMMENT: Chang's speech did not receive extensive coverage in the French press and the above information is largely based on an AFP ticker item dated March 15. The AFP journalist who attended the meeting noted that the Chinese diplomat had asked the press not to quote him directly but to report on his speech in a way which would merely convey the broad lines of what he said.

It is also worth noting that this is the first time that a Chinese Communist official has made a public speech in Paris since the Cultural Revolution began last year.

BOHLEN

0065
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

46 POL CHICOM Tokyo

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

CORRECTION ISSUED
3-19-67 12 NOON MGG

UNCLASSIFIED

45
Action

NNNNVZCZCMJB746A869
EA RR RUEHC
Info DE RUALOT 6621 0761005
ZNR UUUUU
SS R 171000Z MAR 67
GPM FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO - CORRECTED PAGE ONE
SP TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
SC INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
SAH RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
L STATE GRNC
H BT
EUR UNCLAS TOKYO 6621
IO
P 1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SELECTED ITEMS REPORTED BY JAPANESE
CU REPORTERS IN PEKING.
USIA
NSC 2. SAMEJIMA (NIHON KEIZAI), MARCH 15: CHANNEL FOR CONVEYING
INR ORDERS FROM PARTY CENTRAL IS INCREASINGLY THROUGH PLA.
CIA MILITARY REPS CURRENTLY BEING ASSIGNED TO COMMITTEES AND
NSA SUBCOMMITTEES ON ALL LEVELS OF CCP STRUCTURE. MAINCURRENT
DOD FACTION NOW EXERCISING CALM JUDGMENT AS OPPOSED TO IMPATIENT
NIC APPROACH AT TIME OF GENERAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST LIU AND TENG.
AGDA
RSR

017368
1967 MAR 17 AM 9 4

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6621 UNCLAS
3. TAKADA (MAINICHI), MARCH 16: TAKADA SPECULATES PARTY CENTRAL NOW HOLDING POLITBURO CONFERENCE AND CENTRAL MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE MEETING ON POLICY TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS REAL POWER FACTION. SPECULATION BASED ON LEAFLET POSTED IN PEKING MARCH 16 BY REBEL CORPS OF EIGHTH MACHINE-BUILDING MINISTRY REPORTED SPEECH GIVEN AT PEKING UNVERSITY MARCH 14 BY NIEH YUAN-TZU. MAIN POINTS OF NIEH'S SPEECH WERE:

A. CULTURAL REVOLUTION NOW ENTERING FINAL STAGE OF POWER SEIZURE STRUGGLES, WHICH ARE FIERCE, BUT CURRENT SITUATION VERY FAVORABLE TO MAIN-CURRENT FACTION.
B. RE PROBLEM OF SCREENING LEADERS, REAL POWER FACTION IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PRESENT MODERATE POLICY TOWARDS LEADERS TO SUPPORT CONSERVATIVES. THERE ARE STRUGGLES EVEN IN CURRENT MEETINGS OF POLITBURO AND CENTRAL MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE WHICH CANNOT BE QUIET MEETINGS. IN UNITED ACTION COMMITTEE (SECONDARY SCHOOL RED GUARD ORGANIZATION DENOUNCED AS ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY) CONSERVATIVES ALSO VERY ACTIVE.

UNCLASSIFIED

0066

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

POL CH-1 CONG

TELEGRAM Department of State

UNCLASSIFIED

017368

1967 MAR 17 AM 9 4

EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
IO
P
CU
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
RSR

NNNNVZCZCMJB749A869
RR RUEHC
DE RUALOT 6621 0761005
ZNR UUUUU
R 171000Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 6621

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SELECTED ITEMS REPORTED BY JAPANESE REPORTERS IN PEKING.

2. SAMEJIMA (NIHON KEIZAI), MARCH 15: CHANNEL FOR CONVEYING ORDERS FROM PARTY CENTRAL IS INCREASINGLY THROUGH PLA. MILITARY REPS CURRENTLY BEING ASSIGNED TO COMMITTEES AND SUBCOMMITTEES ON ALL LEVELS OF CCP STRUCTURE. MAIN CURRENT FACTION NOW EXERCISING CALM JUDGMENT AS OPPOSED TO IMPATIENT APPROACH AT TIME OF GENERAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST LIU AND TENG.

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6621 UNCLAS

3. TAKADA (MAINICHI), MARCH 16: TAKADA SPECULATES PARTY CENTRAL NOW HOLDING POLITBURO CONFERENCE AND CENTRAL MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE MEETING ON POLICY TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS REAL POWER FACTION. SPECULATION BASED ON LEAFLET POSTED IN PEKING MARCH 16 BY REBEL CORPS OF EIGHTH MACHINE-BUILDING MINISTRY REPORTED SPEECH GIVEN AT PEKING UNVERSITY MARCH 14 BY NIEH YUAN-TZU. MAIN POINTS OF NIEH'S SPEECH WERE:

A. CULTURAL REVOLUTION NOW ENTERING FINAL STAGE OF POWER SECFRE STDJKOUS; WHICH ARE FIERCE, BUT CURRENT SITUATION VERY FAVORABLE TO MAIN-CURRENT FACTION.
B. RE PROBLEM OF SCREENING LEADERS, REAL POWER FACTION IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PRESENT MODERATE POLICY TOWARDS LEADERS TO SUPPORT CONSERVATIVES. THERE ARE STRUGGLES EVEN IN CURRENT MEETINGS OF POLITBURO AND CENTRAL MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE WHICH CANNOT BE QUIET MEETINGS. IN UNITED ACTION COMMITTEE (SECONDARY SCHOOL RED GUARD ORGANIZATION DENOUNCED AS ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY) CONSERVATIVES ALSO VERY ACTIVE.

UNCLASSIFIED

0067

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

PAGE 3 RUALOT 6621 UNCLAS
C. EVEN THOUGH TAN DEFENDED IN PAST BY CHIANG CHING AND PARTY CENTRAL, HE MUST BE OVERTHROWN, BECAUSE HE CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S DEFENSE WHILE CONTINUING TO CARRY OUT REACTIONARY LINE.

D. OTHERS WHOM CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEFENDED IN PAST SHOULD ALSO BE WATCHED CAREFULLY. JOHNSON
BT
(*) AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

0068

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POL CHICOM

45

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG 6515 3-17-67

Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
NEA
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
RSR

PP RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6515 0760945
ZNY CCCCC
P R 170914Z MAR 67
FM AMCONGEN HONGKONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDN
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NW DELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUABAB/FBIS OKINAWA
STATE GRNC
BT

017358

1967 MAR 17 AM 9 45

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 6515

SUBJECT: PLA ROLE IN BORDER-MINORITY AREAS.

1. RECENT REPORTS FROM BORDER-MINORITY REGIONS INDICATE TIGHT GRIP ON CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS BY LOCAL PLA UNITS. THEIR SENSITIVE DEFENSE AND MINORITY ISSUES PROBABLY CONTRIBUTE TO MILITARY'S GROWING DOMINANCE.

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 6515 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WHILE RED GUARD/REVOLUTIONARY REBEL ATTACKS ON PROVINCIAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL HAVE ABATED, PRESENT POSITION AND INFLUENCE THOSE INDIVIDUALS NOT CLEAR.

2. URUMCHI RADIO MARCH 12 CARRIED SPEECHES BY SINKIANG MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS KUO PENG AND CHIN CHENG (PHONETIC) AT CITY RALLY PLEDGING IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTY CENTRAL INSTRUCTIONS. SPEECHES, WHICH GENERALLY REITERATED CURRENT POLICIES ON 3-WAY ALLIANCE AND ON AGRICULTURE, INCLUDED STATEMENT THAT "OUR REVOLUTIONARY LEADER OF SINKIANG" WANG EN-MAO AND OTHER SINKIANG PLA FIGURES HAD TRAVELED TO PEKING FOR MEETING WITH MAO. INDICATION THAT WANG, VETERAN PARTY-MILIATRY LEADER IN SINKIANG, HELD IN PUBLIC ESTEEM DESPITE EARLIER VIOLENT CRITICISM OF HIM BY REVOLUTIONARY REBELS AND RED GUARDS, APPEARS CONFIRM SPECULATION (HK 5873) THAT PARTY CENTRAL DIRECTIVE OF FEBRUARY ON HANDLING MOVEMENT IN SINKIANG WAS CONSEQUENCE OF WANG'S TRIP TO PEKING AND WAS INTENDED PERMIT LOCAL MILITARY

CONFIDENTIAL

1

0069

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

FORCES RETAIN CONTROL IN AREA. FURTHER CONFIRMATION SEEN IN SINKIANG PARTY NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT ARMY HAS TAKEN OVER AND IS SUPERVISING REGION'S TRANSPORT AND PUBLIC

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 6515 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECURITY OPERATIONS (REUTER, MARCH 15).

3. IN OTHER BORDER-MINORITY AREAS, REPORTS ALSO INDICATE ARMY IN CHARGE AND TAKING MEASURES ENSURE ORDERLY SITUATION IN TSINGHAI, HSINING RADIO CONTINUES CHEER SUPPRESSION OF "18 AUG GROUP", WHICH APPARAENTLY HAD CONTROLLED TSINGHAI DAILY UNTIL PLA TOOK OVER PAPER AND ABOLISHED ORGANIZATION AS "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY" IN LATE FEB. LHASA RADIO'S PRAISE OF PLA ROLE IN REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE "AT CRUCIAL MOMENT" IN TIBET (MARCH 7) AND PLA PART IN INNER MONGOLIAN BROADCASTING STATION AND FACTORY "SEIZURES" (HUHEHOT RADIO MARCH 13; REUTERS MARCH 15) ALSO SUGGEST BORDER-MINORITY REGIONS LYING UNDER HEAVY PLA THUMB.

4. COMMENT: REPORTS OF PLA DOMINANCE HAVE BEEN PRECEDED AND ACCOMPANIED BY SIGNS OF MINORITY UNREST. REPORTS THAT SINKIANG MINORITIES WERE CAPITALIZING ON CULTURAL REVOLUTION CONFUSION CAME IN EARLY FEB (HK 5583) AND MOST RECENT TSINGHAI BROADCAST (HSINING RADIO MARCH 13) ADULATING PLA CHARGED THAT "18 AUG" GROUP HAD ATTEMPTED "INDICITE" MINORITY PEASANTS IN HSINING'S HINTERLAND. OCCURENCE SUCH

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 6515 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INCIDENTS IN REGIONS WHERE BORDER DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS AND DELICATE HAN-MINORITY RELATIONS ARE CONSTANT FACTORS UNDOUBTEDLY ADDED WEIGHT TO ARGUMENTS FAVORING REGIONS' LEADERSHIP IN THEIR DESIRE TO MINIMIZE CULTURAL REVOLUTION DISRUPTION, AN ATTITUDE WHICH POSTERS HAVE SPECIFICALLY ATTRIBUTED TO TIBET PARTY 1ST SECRETARY AND MILITARY COMMANDER CHANG KUO-HUA (FCH 7279).

5. FACT THAT BOTH WANG AND CHANG APPEAR TO HAVE SURVIVED DESPITE STRONG ATTACKS--PRESUMABLY MAOIST-INSPIRED--AGAINST THEM SUGGESTS SOME COMPROMISE AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT INVOLVED IN CASES OF TIBET AND SINKIANG.

0070

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

HOWEVER, SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES THESE AREAS TOGETHER WITH PARTICULARLY CLOSE INTER-RELATIONSHIP MILITARY, PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP PERTAINING THERE RAISES LIKELIHOOD THAT THSE INSTANCES MAYBE ATYPICAL IN TERMS GENERAL MAOIST HANDLING OF "OPPOSITION." NOR IS IT AT ALL CLEAR HOW MANY PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL SUBORDINATES OF CHANG AND WANG REMAIN IN PLACE. WHILE LOCAL PLA UNITS MAY BE SHIELDING AND FRONTING FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS, WE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT MAOISTS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DISLODGING SOME OF THEIR TARGETS OF ATTACK,

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 6515 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THOUGH TACITLY AGREEING, AT LEAST FOR PRESENT, TO CONTINUING ROLE FOR TOP PARTY-MILITARY LEADERS IN AREA.
GP-3 RICE
BT

0071

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

(3)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* POL CHICOM

49

Action

EA

Info

SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
SAL
EUR
NEA
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
E
AGR
RSR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

017143

1967 MAR 17 AM 6 49

HONG KONG 6524 3-17-67

VZCZCMJA915JDA233
PP RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6524 0761115
ZNY CCCCC
P R 171045Z MAR 67
FM AMCONGEN HONGKONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALCT/AMEMBASS TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC (PR 171045Z MAR 67)
RUABAB/FBIS OKINAWA
STATE GRNC
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HONG KONG 6524

SUBJECT: ARMY EDITORIAL ON MILITIA OMITS MENTION OF LIN PIAO.

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. THERE IS CONSPICUOUS ABSENCE OF LIN PIAO'S NAME IN NCNA ENGLISH AND CHINESE ACCOUNTS LIBERATION ARMY DAILY MARCH 16 EDITORIAL ON MILITIA ROLE IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION. LIN, IN PAST, HAS BEEN PROMINENTLY IDENTIFIED AS AUTHORIATIVE INTERPRETER OF MAO'S THOUGHT ON SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITIA AS WITNESSED BY HIS AUTHORSHIP OF "LONG LIVE PEOPLE'S WAR" AND ONE WOULD NORMALLY EXPECT REFERENCE TO HIM IN EDITORIAL BY PLA ORGAN ON THIS SUBJECT. MOVEOVER, EDITORIAL PROVIDED TWO TAILOR-MADE OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFERENCE TO HIM. ONE IS MENTION OF MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION, WHICH HE DIRECTS, AND THE OTHER IS CALL ON MILITIAL FOR GREATER EFFORT STUDY AND APPLY CREATIVELY MAO'S WORKS.

RECLASSIFIED BY NSC

(1)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

2. FROM SUBSTANTIVE ANGLE, EDIROAL REPRESENTS FOLLOW-UP OF RED FLAG LINE ON PARTICIPATION OF MILITIAL AS ELEMENT OF THREE-WAY ALLIANCE IN SEIZURES ON COMMUNE LEVEL AND BELOW. WHILE MILITIAL UNITS NORMALLY CONTROLLED BY PARTY COMMITTEE WITHIN COMMUNE, PLA INFLUENCE IN ORGANIZATION IS GREAT, SINCE PROVICINCIAL MILITARY DISTRICT SUPERVISES MILITIAL PROGRAM AND LOCAL MILITIAL LEADERS USUALLY DEMOBILIZED SERVICE MEN. WE ACCORDINGLY VIEW MILITIA'S NEW ROLE AS VEHICLE FOR EXTENSION PLA INFLUENCE DOWN TO

LOWEST LEVELS, A GIGANTIC TASK WHICH MILITARY MAY BE RELUCTANT OR UNABLE UNDERTAKE DIRECTLY. HOWEVER, TEMPORARY BAN ON "POWER SEIZURES" WITHIN PRODUCTION BRIGADES AND TEAMS AND MEMORIES OF ADVERSE PEASANT REACTION WHEN MILITIA DIRECTED FARM PRODUCTION DURING GREAT LEAP FORWARD MAY SERVE TO INHIBIT LARGER ROLE FOR MILITIAAT PRESENT TIME.
DECON 4/1/68 RICE
BT

0073

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/08

ORIGIN/ACTION

EA-6

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA 1	CU	INR 5
E	P 2	IO 5
L	FBO	AID 12
		S/P 1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 5
ARMY 3	CIA 20	NAVY 5
OSD 33	USIA 10	NSA 3
		NSC 6

PHK

1967 MAR 21 PM 12 10

COPYFLO-PBR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL CHICOM
XR POL 7 CHINAT

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-570 NO.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HANDLING INDICATOR

Action assigned
Action taken
Date of Action 3/28
Action Office Symbol
Name of Officer

TO : Department of State

INFO : TAIPEI
HONG KONG

FROM : Amembassy ANKARA

DATE: March 16, 1967

SUBJECT : Views of TAO Hsi-sheng on Political Developments in Communist China.

REF : TAIPEI Tel 2316

Enclosed is a memorandum summarizing the views of TAO Hsi-sheng on political developments in Mainland China as they were expressed during a private conversation with the reporting officer. The dispassionate and apparently objective manner in which Mr. Tao discussed recent events in Communist China was refreshing. Chinese Embassy Counselor SOONG Sin-jen, who was also present, was obviously entranced by Mr. Tao's presentation.

Mr. Tao made no attempt to predict the future but confined himself to saying that the cultural revolution was a tragedy for Mao and for China. He felt that the foreign press had concentrated too heavily on the antics of the Red Guards and too little on the background of the struggle itself.

HART

att

Enclosure: Memo "Views of Tao Hsi-sheng on Mainland China Developments."

Office of Asian Communist Affairs
MAR 2 1 1967
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Decontrolled following March 14, 1972.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:
DCM: EWMartin:dkc Mar. 14, 1967

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0074

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

Views of TAO Hsi-Sheng on Mainland China Developments

Mr. Tao Hsi-sheng who is publisher of the Chung Yang Jih Pao and a member of the Kuomintang Standing Committee, called on me at my home Sunday morning, March 12. He was accompanied by Mr. SOONG Sin-jen, Counselor, Chinese Embassy Ankara.

In response to several questions from me as to recent political developments on the Chinese Mainland, Mr. Tao expressed the following views:

MAO Tse-tung launched the cultural revolution in order to forestall a move to oust him from power by leading members of the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy who were dissatisfied with his policies.

Mao realized that his leadership was threatened following the failure of the attempted coup d'etat in Djarkarta September 30-October 1, 1965. In that same month another blow to Mao's policies had been dealt by Kosygin's successful intervention in the India-Pakistan war. Following these events, Mao left Peking for Shanghai in fear of a Khrushchev-style coup against him by the other members of the Politburo. From Shanghai he began to organize the cultural revolution of which the Red Guards were the principal instrument. It is significant, however, that only in places where the army has been in support of the cultural revolution have the Red Guards been able to seize power.

The struggle within the Chinese Communist leadership is not merely one for personal power but involves genuine differences over policy. Mao's opposition favors reconciliation with the Soviet Union, political settlement of the Viet-Nam war, and concentration on internal economic development of China with foreign assistance. Mao regards these views as "revisionist."

Mao has succeeded in breaking the Chinese Communist "party center" in Peking which he now controls, but he has not yet regained a monopoly of power in China, despite the control of the press and radio by pro-Mao forces.

Major policy decisions emanating from Peking must now be endorsed not only by the Communist Party Center but also by the Red Guards under the direction of Secret Service Chief Kang Sheng, by the government bureaucracy under the direction of Chou En-lai, and by the Army headed by Lin Piao. Chiang Ching, Mao Tse-tung's wife, has acted as principal liaison between Mao and the Red Guard, Mao being confined to his home much of the time for reasons of health. Chen Po-ta has been the chief theoretician of the cultural revolution.

0075

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

Lin Piao, who comes from the same hsien in Hupeh as Tao Hsi-sheng and is personally known to him, is weak both in health and in character. Mao has used him in order to get Army support for the cultural revolution. He is not the power behind a fading Mao.

On the other hand, Tao Chu, whose rise and fall was dramatic, is a strong character. His influence in Canton is at least partly responsible for the anti-Mao activities there.

Similarly, Peng Te-huai's influence in the Army in the Northwest is responsible for anti-Mao activities in that area, especially in Sinkiang.

Liu Po-cheng maintains personal influence in the military in the Southwest and Chen Yi in the East. Lin's stronghold is in the North which permitted him to surround Peking with troops while the Red Guards were making their initial demonstrations in that city.

Decontrolled following Mar. 14, 1972.

DCM: EWMartin:dko

0076

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 59
Box: 01959 Folder: 0001 Document: 3
Series:

Copies: 1 Pages: 1

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: POL-Political Aff. & Rel.
Document Date: 03-16-1967
Document Type: Telegram
From:
To: Amembassy Taipei

Subject:

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 33470
Withdrawn: 05-22-2003 by: Ray Hess

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 33470 01959 0001 3

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

ORIGIN/ACTION

EA-6

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
	2	5
L	FBO	AID
		12
SAH	S/S	S/P
1	15	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
23	10	3
		NSC
		6

RFK

1967 MAR 17 PM 4 53

COPYFLO-PBR

35

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

P&L Chicom

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-1457 NO. SECRET

HANDLING INDICATOR

Action assigned to ACA

Action Taken

Date of action 3/17

Action Office Symbol

Name of Officer

TO : Department of State

INFO : HONG KONG, MOSCOW

FROM : American Embassy, PARIS

DATE: March 30, 1967

SUBJECT : French Diplomat Discussion of Events in China

REF :

Pierre Cerles, French diplomat who is assigned as Counselor to Peking, told the reporting officer March 13 the following:

a) It was clear to foreign observers in Peking that Chou-En-Lai was playing the leading role in mediating between factions in China. However, Chou-En-Lai was careful not to get out in front; he signed orders in the name of Mao and, in the case of Army instructions, Lin Piao. For example, Peking orders to the Army to cease fighting in Sinkiang and to get out of Hunan were issued by Chou-En-Lai.

b) Chou-En-Lai may also be responsible for the current de-emphasis on the power struggle within the Chinese matriarchy. Russian diplomats quote the Chinese proverb that "When the concubines take over, the dynasty ends".

c) Chou-En-Lai was an hour and a half late in making his famous stadium speech which signaled the end of the blockade of the Soviet Embassy. Foreign observers thought that he had the aspect of a man who has just been in a hard-fought battle. Foreign colony Peking was surprised at subsequent Pravda attack but assumed that it was due simply to "time lag".

d) The only diplomats physically and intentionally injured by Chinese Red Guards had been the East Germans. The East Germans not only are considered to be the puppets of Moscow but also are extremely experienced and well-trained intelligence operators. Most common practice is for Chinese to pretend to strike foreigners but stop the blow in mid-air. Verbal insults and menancing actions were the rule.

FORM DS-323 4-62

SECRET

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☐ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:RFunkhouser:jel 3/14/67

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: Richard Funkhouser

Clearances:

0078

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

e) Soviet diplomats had been the best-informed foreigners in Peking with a staff of 250, all of whom were Chinese experts. Before the siége three teams of 35 each circulated daily in the city. Poster information to which Soviets wished the West to know about would be brought to the attention of appropriate correspondents.

f) Mongolian diplomats were also most effective and reportedly "passed"as Chinese by wearing local clothing.

g) Albanians who were of course favored Western diplomats were well informed, but also "lied". For example, Cerles had proof of prevarication when the Albanian Minister said that he had seen Lin Piao recently. The statement was contradicted by Albanian military attache. Chinese consider Albania to be larger and more important than France.

h) Rumanians were well represented but apparently isolated from both Chinese and Soviet intelligence. Neither like "neutrals".

i) Africans found life in Peking even more difficult than in Moscow. Chinese followed them in droves out of simple curiosity. This however applied to blond Western women as well, who,from Mrs. Cerles' personal experience, attracted more attention than animals in the Peking zoo.

j) Regarding Vietnam, it was obvious that the Chinese authorities sought to prevent peace talks, which would represent a "catastrophe" for Chinese foreign policy more serious than loss of position and face in Indonesia and in Algeria. Cerles opined that one reason for Soviet arms build-up in Algeria might have been to ensure elimination of Chinese influence.

k) Soviet diplomats rarely discussed the Vietnam issue. They had proof of Chinese harassment in their arms transshipments. These obstacles appeared to be more psychological and personal vis-a-vis Soviet personnel than intentional disruption of arms materiel shipments. Soviet pilots who made the regular Irkutsk-Peking-Kumming-Hanoi run suffered indignities at the Peking airport. Also the hundreds of young Soviet "civilian" personnel observed in the Peking airport on their way to Hanoi were restricted. Soviet diplomats ridiculed China as the "grand arriérè" of North Vietnam by saying that when all Vietnam is destroyed, they will be able to retreat into China to carry on"their" flight.

l) Foreign diplomats called to Foreign Office were sometimes summoned by "rebels" or Red Guards. Mongolian Chief of Mission refused to respond to call from "rebel" group for meeting at Foreign Office. Cerles stated that his last visit was attended by some 10 Chinese representatives, including Red Guards. When asked to whom he was speaking, Chinese spokesman stated abruptly that "we are all equal".

0079

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

m) The Soviet Embassy in Peking was a large self-contained area complete with tennis courts, pool, etc. Soviet women and children had left. Soviet diplomats "talked" when they were angry. Undying hatreds were being built up, particularly when Russians were called "cowardly". Chinese used psychological warfare on the Russians, e.g., during the siege the Chinese would set up a noisy clatter during the night outside the Embassy compound, but would start and stop it at irregular hours in order to prevent Russians from building up immunity to the racket.

n) The major difference between life for a Westerner in Moscow and Peking is that in the latter it is possible to have frequent conversations of substance with Russians (particularly when they are most angry with Chinese). Other differences favoring Peking are better living conditions, including housing, servants, food, etc. A major social disadvantage is the absence of any Western theatre.

BOHLEN

0 0 8 0

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

46 POL CHICOM

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* XR POL 15-1 CHICOM

Tokyo 6565 3-16-67

7 CONFIDENTIAL

Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
SAL
EUR
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC

NNNNVZCZCMJA555A602
RR RUEHC
DE RUALOT 6565D 0750845
ZNY CCCCC
R 160831Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT

015577

1967 MAR 16 AM 4 30

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 6565

1. DURING CONVERSATION WITH HASHIMOTO (DEPUTY CHIEF, CHINA SECTION) MARCH 16 WE ASKED FOR FONOFF VIEW OF RECENT ATTACKS UPON TAN CHEN-LIN, LI HSIEN-NIEN AND OTHERS AND SUGGESTED THAT THESE ATTACKS, TOGETHER WITH PNG-ING SOVIET OFFICIALS AND TRAIN INCIDENT, MIGHT BE INDICATIONS THAT CHOU EN-LAI HAS BECOME TARGET OF MAO-LIN GROUP.

2. HASHIMOTO THOUGHT NOT. HE THOUGHT PNG AND TRAIN INCIDENTS WERE MINOR AND DID NOT REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. FONOFF BELIEVES, HASHIMOTO SAID, THAT MAO-LIN GROUP ARE TRYING TO CALM THE SITUATION DOWN AND THAT THEY HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DO THIS AND COMPROMISE

RSR

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6565D C O N F I D E N T I A L
WITH TECHNOCRATS BECAUSE THEY HAVE COME TO REALIZE THEY CANNOT GOVERN COUNTRY WITHOUT THEM. MAO-LIN DESPERATELY NEED HELP OF ECONOMISTS AND ESPECIALLY THAT OF CHOU, WITHOUT WHOM THEY WOULD BE ALMOST UNABLE TO GOVERN. ATTACKS UPON TAN AND LI ARE DESIGNED PRIMARILY AS WARNING TO TECHNOCRATS AND ECONOMISTS THAT THEIR STATUS IS NOT SECURE UNLESS THEY GIVE MAO 100 PERCENT ALLEGIANCE, AND THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO CONTACT LIU-TENG WOULD RESULT IN DISMISSAL. HASHIMOTO ALSO SPECULATED THAT REGIME MUST BE LOOKING FOR YOUNGER LEADERS TO TAKE PLACES OF THESE MEN WHO HAVE HELD THESE POSITIONS FOR OVER TEN YEARS, IN EXPECTATION THAT YOUNGER MEN FROM RANKS OF MAO-LIN GROUP WOULD BE MORE SYMPATHETIC TO MAO'S AIMS BUT STILL BE COMPETENT. IN SHORT, CURRENT FONOFF ASSESSMENT IS THAT REGIME USING ATTACKS TO KEEP PEOPLE IN LINE WHOM THEY MUST USE TO KEEP COUNTRY GOING, AND THAT IT UNLIKELY ATTACKS SIGNAL ATTEMPT ON CHOU'S POSITION OR AUTHORITY. GP-3.
JOHNSON
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

MICROFILMED BY RS

(2)

0 0 8 1

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

46 POL CHICOM Tokyo 6569

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45 UNCLASSIFIED

Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
E
RSR

RR RUEHC
DE RUALOT 6569 0750933
ZNR UUUUU
R 160928Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WSHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 6569

1967 MAR 16 AM 6 59

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SELECTED ITEMS REPORTED BY JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS IN PEKING.

2. SAMEJIMA (NIHON KEIOAI), MARCH 15: MARCH 15, REVOLUTIONARY FACTION AT PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE OF CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ISSUED REPORT ON REVERSE CURRENT MOVEMENT WITH TAN CHEN-LIN AS MAIN TARGET. REPORT (1) ACCUSES TAN OF SENDING OPERATIONS TEAMS TO ORGANS AND SCHOOLS RELATED TO AGRICULTURE-FORESTRY SECTOR IN ORDER TO OPPRESS REVOLUTIONARY ACTION; (2) SAID RALLIES TO CRITICIZE TAN EMANATED FROM LIAISON

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6569 UNCLAS
STATION OF AGRICULTURE-FORESTRY SECTOR REVOLUTIONARY REBEL ORGANIZATIONS LED BY PEKING AGRICULTURE COLLEGE, INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE, AND CENTRAL METEOROLOGICAL OBSERVATORY; AND (3) SAID THAT ON JAN 8 CHOU EN-LAI CALLED UPON TAN TO MAKE SELF-CRITICISM AND URGED THAT FIVE VICE-PREMIERS NOT BE PUBLICLY ATTACKED UNTIL THEY HAVE HAD TIME TO MAKE SELF-CRITICISM. REPORT SAID TAN IGNORED THIS OPPORTUNITY AND INSTEAD ON JAN 16 ORDERED "FALSE POWERSEIZURES" AND HAD RED FLAG CORPS OF PEKING AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE (SUPPOSEDLY TAN-DOMINATED) ATTACK LIAISON STATION. AS RESULT, REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS DISSOLVED, AND REACTIONARY ORGANIZATION TOOK THEIR PLACE. SAMEJIMA SPECULATES THAT, ALTHOUGH TAN NOW BIGGEST TARGET AFTER LIU SHAO-CHI, TENG HSIAO-PING, AND TAO CHU, ATTACK AGAINST TAN IS DIFFERENT IN THAT OBJECT APPEARS TO BE TO CONVERT HIM TO MAO LINE RATHER THAN TOPPLING HIM OUTRIGHT.

3. NOGAMI (ASAHI), MARCH 15: ACCORDING TO TUNGFANGHUNG DATED MARCH 5, ORGAN OF TIENOMMMUNE, WHICH APPEARED IN PEKING MARCH 15, STRUGGLE RALLY AGAINST POWER FACTION HELD IN TIENTSIN FEB 26 WITH BACKING OF PLA. AMOUNT

UNCLASSIFIED

0082

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

'AGE 3 RUALOT 6569 UNCLAS
ANTI-PARTY ELEMENTS DRAGGED TO RALLY WERE: CHANG HUAI-SAN (FORMER SECRETARY OF SECRETARIAT OF TIENTSIN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE), SUNG CHING-I (FORMER SECRETARY OF SECRETARIAT OF MUNCIPAL COMMITTEE AND CONCURRENTLY VICE-MAYOR), LU TA (FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL OF MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND VICE-MAYOR), AND SHN CHING-TIEN (FORMER MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE STAFFING COMMITTEE MEMBER AND VICE-MAYOR). REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS AT RALLY INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF PLA, HU CHAO-HENG AND HSIEH USUEH-KUNG. HSIEH, FORMER SECRETARY OF NORTH CHINA BUREAU, IS NEW FIRST SECRETARY OF TIENTSIN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE RATHER THAN LI HSUEH-FENG, WHO WAS EARLIER REPORTED AS ACTIVE IN TIENTSIN. LI HAS BEEN SHARPLY CRITICIZED BY RED GUARDS. JOHNSON
BT

0083

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

46

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* P&L CHICOM

Tokyo 6570 3-16-67

49
Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
RSR

CONFIDENTIAL

R 160915Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE R
YC
BT

1967 MAR 16 AM 5 17

015625

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 6570

1. IN RESPONSE OUR QUESTION, HASHIMOTO (DEPUTY CHIEF, CHINA SECTION) DESCRIBED CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SITUATION FACED BY JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS IN PEKING.

2. HASHIMOTO SAID CHICOMS HAVE VERY CLEVERLY USED A DEVINE AND RULE POLICY TO GET JAPANESE PAPERS TO TONE DOWN THEIR COVERAGE OF CHINA. MAINICHI WAS PICKED OUT AS MOST FLAGARANT EXAMPLE OF PAPER OFFENDING CHICOM SENSITIVITIES. IT HAD PUBLISHED CARTOONS OF MAO AND HIS WIFE WHICH WERE DERISIVE IN NATURE AND HAD PUBLISHED ARTICLES BY OTA AND OTHER CRITICIS AFTER THEIR TOUR IN CHINA LAST FALL. GENERAL MAINICHI EDITORIAL TREATMENT WAS REGARDED BY CHICOMS, WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION, AS INSULTING AND HIGHLY CRITICAL. ACTUALLY, HASHIMOTO SAID, MAINICHI'S ATTITUDE NOT NOTICABLE DIFFERENT FROM ASAHI. YOMIURI AND OTHER PAPERS.

3. MAINICHI ASKED KENZO MATSUMURA (LDP DIET MEMBER) TO INTERCEDE WITH PEKING, BUT HE REFUSED TO DO SO BECAUSE HE AGREED WITH PEKING THAT MAINICH TREATMENT, ESPECIALLY CARTOONS, INSULTING.

4. MAINICHI CORRESPONDENT TAKADA HAS LITTLE SUPPORT AMONG HIS COLLEAGUES IN PEKING. COMPETITION IS SO FIERCE. AND CHICOMS HAVE PLAYED HAND SO WELL THAT OTHER JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RALLIED TO SUPPORT AND DO NOT CONSIDER THAT

THEIR OWN STATUS IS IN SERIOUS DANGER. THERE IS SOME CRITICISM THAT HE OVER-SENSATIONALIZED HIS REPORTING AND THAT HE REPORTED ALL PAPERS WHICH WERE CRITICAL OF REGIME AND NOT THOSE WHICH FAVORED REGIME. HASHIMOTO THOUGHT THAT WHILE THERE MIGHT BE SOME TRUTH TO THIS, HIS REPORTING NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM OTHER REPORTERS.

5. HASHIMOTO DID NOT KNOW CURRENT STATUS OF VISAS TAKADA OR OTHER CORRESPONDENTS BUT THOUGHT CHANCES WERE THAT TAKADA'S VISA WOULD NOT BE RENEWED AND THAT NO VISA WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR REPLACEMENT, LEAVING MAINICHI WITHOUT REPRESENTATION.
GP-3. JOHNSON
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(1)

0084

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POL CHICOM
XR POL CHICOM-US

4

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

POL 27 VIET S

HONG KONG 6466 3-16-67

01549

Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
RSR

NNNNVZCZCMJA518JDA042
RR RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUMJDH 6466 0750655
ZNY CCCCC
R 160627Z MAR 67
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

1967 MAR 16 AM 2 49

Pol 27 VS
Chron VS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONG KONG 6466

SUBJECT: PEKING DERIDES U.S. VIEWS ON CHINA, TOUTS INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

Cy-m 1-1. C-R
D of Chron

REF: A. HONG KONG'S 6425
B. HONG KONG'S 6424

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. IN LIGHT MAO'S FELT-NEED FOR DRASTIC MEASURES OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION TO ASSURE CHINA "NEVER CHANGES COLOR," IT NOT SURPRISING THAT PEKING HAS SHOWN GREAT SENSITIVITY TOWARD U.S. VIEWS ON LIKELIHOOD OF "PEACEFUL EVOLUTION" WITHIN CHINA EVER SINCE THEME FIRST ADVANCED IN DECEMBER, 1963. LATEST INSTANCE CONTAINED IN PEOPLE'S DAILY MAR 13 APOLOGIA FOR CULTURAL REVOLUTION WHICH ARGUES AT LENGTH THAT MOVEMENT HAS SMASHED US "FOND HOPES FOR CAPITALIST RESTORATION IN CHINA." ARTICLE ARGUES THAT IN FACE ALLEGED DEFEAT THIS HOPE, US "IN ADDITION TO GIVING CONTINUED SUPPORT TO OUR CLASS ENEMIES IN CHINA MAY LAUNCH WAR PROVOCATIONS AGAINST CHINESE PEOPLE." THIS UNCERTAIN ESTIMATE US INTENTIONS RATHER MILD AGAINST REGIME STATEMENTS THROUGHOUT EARLY 1966 (RENEWED IN COMMENT LAST NOVEMBER ON MANILA CONFERENCE) THAT US INTENDS EVENTUAL ATTACK AGAINST

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3

[redacted]

0085

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

CHINA. IT IS CONSISTENT HOWEVER WITH PEKING'S RECENT FAILURE LINK VIETNAM STRUGGLE TO CHINESE SECURITY (REF A) AND MAY REFLECT DECISION PUBLICLY DOWNGRADE POSSIBILITY OF WAR WITH US AT TIME WHEN PLA ENERGIES DIRECTED TOWARD DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.

2. REFERENCE TO US SUPPORT FOR CLASS ENEMIES UNDOUBTEDLY INTENDED TAR MAO'S DOMESTIC CRITICS WITH BRUSH OF COLLUSION WITH EXTERNAL ENEMIES. CHARGE OF COLLUSION ALSO HINTS AT POSSIBILITY THAT US PRONOUNCEMENTS ON CHINA HAVE BEEN UTILIZED BY THOSE WHO ARGUE AGAINST MAO'S FOREIGN POLICY. IN COURSE OF ARGUMENT, ARTICLE QUOTED UNSOURCED, BUT PRESUMABLY US REMARKS, EXPRESSING HOPE FOR VICTORY IN CHINA OF "PRAGMATISTS" AND "MODERATES." IT DESCRIBED SUCH ELEMENTS AS "THE HANDFUL OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY REVISIONISTS IN CHINA." PEKING TREATED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S OCT 17 REFERENCE TO "PRAGMATIC---SPIRIT" IN CHINA ALONG SIMILAR LINES, BUT TIMING PRESENT TREATMENT MAY BE OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE IN VIEW POSSIBLE VEILED MAOIST ATTACKS ON CHOU EN-LAI (REF B). LATTER FREQUENTLY DESCRIBED IN WESTERN PRESS AS PRAGMATIST AND MODERATE AND CHINESE POLITICAL ELITE CERTAINLY AWARE OF THIS.

3. ARTICLE IMPLICITYLY RECOGNIZES CULTURAL REVOLUTION'S ADVERSE IMPACT ABROAD, BUT FOR BENEFIT DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, ATTRIBUTES SUCH REACTION TO FEAR ON PART IMPERIALISTS AND REVISIONISTS OF MOVEMENT'S GLOBAL REVOLUTIONARY IMPACT. LATTER ASSUMPTION RESTS ON PREMISE INCREASINGLY ENTERTAINED IN CHICOM FOREIGN POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS AND CLEARLY BROUGHT HOME IN ARTICLE THAT CHINA HOLDS KEY TO DESTINY OF WORLD. THUS, ARTICLE PICTURES CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS HAVING "PREVENTED BIG REVERSE...IN WORLD HISTORY, IT HAS REOPENED CHANNEL LEADING TO COMMUNISM THAT WAS BLOCKED BY MODERN REVISIONISM AND ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND WORLD REVOLUTION TO A BRAND NEW STAGE," A SOMEWHAT MORE BLANTANT CLAIM TO IDEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION THAN ANY WE HAD NOTED PREVIOUSLY. ARTICLE SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTS THAT "REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE OF WORLD WILL BE EVER VICTORIOUS ONCE THEY ARMED WITH POWERFUL WEAPON OF THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG."

RICE
BT

0086

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* POL CHICOM

4

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

EA

Info

SS
GPM
SP
S
SAh
L
H
SAL
EUR
NEA
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA

RSR

ZNY CCCCC
P R 160810Z MAR 67 ZFG
FM AMCONGEN HONGKONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUABAB/FBIS OKINAWA
STATE GRNC
BT

0167 1
Mar. 16, 1967, 10:50 PM

HONG KONG 6476

3-16-67

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONGKONG 6476

REF: HON KONG'S 6424, 6466
SUBJECT: NEW ATTACKS ON LEADERSHIP FIGURES.

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. MARCH 14 AND 15 RALLIES AND WALL POSTERS ATTACKING LIU, TENG, TAO CHU AND A GROWING NUMBER OF ECONOMIC FIGURES APPEAR MAOIST EFFORT TO SHOW THAT CAMPAIGN AGAINST "HANDFUL" OF OPPONENTS WILL CONTINUE, ALBEIT IN MORE DISCIPLINED WAY. NEW OFFENSIVE, WHICH CLEARLY HAS HIGH-LEVEL SANCTION, CAN BE INTERPRETED AS CONCRETE APPLICATION OF WARNING IN RED FLAG NO. 5 EDITORIAL AGAINST ABANDONING CULTURAL REVOLUTION HALFWAY AND USE OF "THREE-WAY ALLIANCE" AS PRETEXT FOR COMPROMISE WITH OPPOSITION. ATTACKS APPEAR TO BE INSPIRED BY ELEMENTS OF MAOIST CAMP AND DESIGNED IN PART TO WEAKEN CHOU EN-LAIS'S POSITION AND OFFSET WHAT APPEARS, AT LEAST ON SURFACE, TO BE HIS GROWING INFLUENCE.

2. ANTI-CHOU BIAS OF NEW OFFENSIVE EVIDENT IN EXPAICDING LIST OF ECONOMIC FIGURES UNDER CRITICISM. ATTAKC SON TAN CHEN-LIN, REPUTEDLY PARTY'S TOP AGRICUTLRAL POLICYMAKER, (WHO SUPPOSEDLY "DECEIVED"CHOU) HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY POSTERS CRITICIZING PARTY ECONOMIST CHEN YUN, POLITBURO MEMBER AND FINANCE MINISTER LI HSIEN-NIEN, PETROLEUM MINISTER YU CHIU-LI, EIGHTH MACHINE BUILDING MINISTER CHEN CHENG-JEN, AMONG OTHERS. (OTHER POSSIBLE INDICATIONS OF ANTI-CHOU MOVES CITED REFTELS),

3. IN PAST, ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENTAL FIGURES, WHO PRESUMABLY

CONFIDENTIAL

1

0087

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

RESPONSIVE TO CHOU, HAVE OCCURED DURING PERIODS OF INTENSE DEBATE WITHIN LEADERSHIP OVER: 1. FUTURE COURSE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND 2. TREATMENT OF ERRANT LEADERSHIP CADRES. FIRST WAVE OF ATTACKS ON MINISTERIAL FIGURES TOOK PLACE IN LATE OCTOBER-EARLY NOVEMBER. THESE ACCOMPANIED BY ONSLAUGHT IN PUBLIC MEDIA AGAINST UNNAMED ADVOCATES OF COOUROMISE WITH CLASS ENEMIES, AND PROMULGATION OF PARTICULARLY HARSH LINE AGAINST OPPONENTS ("BEAT DROWNING WILD DOG TO DEATH," ETC.). SECOND WAVE OF ATTACKS ON MINISTERS OCCURRED LATE DECEMBER-EARLY JANUARY COINCIDENT WITH LAUNCHING OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION (CR) INTO FACTORIES AND FARMS AND WARNING THAT PRODUCTION REQUIRMENENTS CANNOT BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR IMPEDING THIS MOVEMENT.

4. IF PAST PATTERN HOLD TRUE, PRESENT WAVE OF ATTACKS IS INDICATION SUBSTANTIAL DISAGREEMENT EXISTS AT TOP LEVELS. ALTHOUGHT GENERAL COURSE OF POLICY FOR FUTURE IS PROBABLY IMPORTANT INGREDIENT OF CURRENT DISPUTE, INCLUDING PERHAPS DEGREE OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, THE RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND RED FLAG EDITORIAL LEAD US TO SUSPECT THAT TREATMENT OF TOP OPPONENTS IS A KEY ISSUE.

THROUGHOUT CULTURAL REVOLUTION, CHOU HAS CONSISTENTLY THOUGH GUARDEDLY ADVOCATED REHABILITATION AND REEMPLOYMENT OF THOSE WHO HAVE ADMITTED MISTAKES, AND DEPLORED PUBLIC HUMILIATION AND CRITICISM OF LEADING OPPONENTS OUTSIDE OF PARTY CHANNELS. MUCH OF WHAT HE HAS ADVOCATED HAS RECENTLY BECOME NATIONAL POLICY, ALTHOUGHT, DENUNCIATION RALLIES, POSTER AND CARTOON ATTACKS CONTINUED INTERMITTENTLY THROUGHTOUT FEBRUARY. JUDGING FROM EDITORIAL WARNING AND RECENT RESUMPTION OF DENUNCIATIONS AGAINST LIU, TENG AND TAO, EXTREME MAOISTS MAY FEAR THAT CHOU INTENT ON SAVING EVEN THOSE TOP FIGURES WHO EXTREME MAOISTS CONSIDER BEYOND PALE OF REDEMPTION. (FCH-7511 CONTAINED REPORT THAT HONG KONG LEFTIST PERSONALITIES, VISITING PEKING IN LATE FEBRUARY, HAD HEARD THAT CHOU HAD BEEN CRITICIZED BY CHIANG CHING FOR TRYING TO PROTECT LIU). RECENT RALLIES AND POSTERS THEREFORE SEEMS EFFORT TO REDUCE CHOUS'S LEVERAGE, AND PREVENT HIS SUBVERTING MANDATE TO RESTORE ORDER INTO THWARTING ONE OF THE MORE FEASIBLE MAOIST GOALS IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION, THE FINAL REMOVAL OF "A HANDFUL RANKING ENEMIES."

GP-3 RICE
BT

0088

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

ORIGIN ACTION
EA-6

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P 2	IO
L	S/P 1	AID
S/AH 1	S/AL 1	S/S 15
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 5
ARMY 3	CIA 20	NAVY 5
OSD 33	USIA 10	NSA 33
NSC 6	NIC 1	

1967 MAR 17 PM 2 12

COPYFLO-PBR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL CHICOM

FOR REFUSE ONLY

A-1220
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

Action assigned to
Action Taken
Date of Action 3/22
Action Office Symbol
Name of Officer, 1967

TO : Department of State

INFO : HONG KONG, TAIPEI

FROM : AmEmbassy TOKYO

DATE: March 15, 1967

SUBJECT : Japanese Foreign Ministry Papers concerning China

REF :

During Assistant Secretary Bundy's call on Asia Bureau Director Ogawa on March 2, Mr. Ogawa handed Mr. Bundy two papers which he had written on the subject of the Cultural Revolution in China, one dated December 28 and the other February 22. Brief summaries of these papers are provided in the enclosures. Complete translations have not been made because of the shortage of personnel qualified to translate confidential material. Similarly, in Enclosure 3 there is a summary of a Foreign Office paper which was passed to our Consulate General in Hong Kong and sent to Tokyo for translation. In this case also a full translation was not made because of the shortage of qualified personnel. Xerox copies of all the Japanese originals are enclosed.

JOHNSON

Enclosures:
1. "Views regarding the Great Cultural Revolution and the Red Guards"
2. "Analysis of the Great Cultural Revolution's Past Stages and Future Trends"
3. "Report on Communist China"
4. Two copies of Japanese text of "Views regarding the Great Cultural Revolution and the Red Guards" (Department only)
5. Two copies of Japanese text of "Analysis of the Great Cultural Revolution's Past Stages and Future Trends" (Department only)
6. Two copies of Japanese text of "Report on Communist China" (Department only)

GROUP 3--Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL--JMFarrior/k 3/14/67

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL--JOZurhellen

Clearances: POL--LMPurnell

0089

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure No. 1
A-1220 from Tokyo

VIEWS REGARDING THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE RED GUARDS
(Asia Bureau Director Ogawa, 28 December 1966)

1. Until the start of the Great Cultural Revolution, the top leaders of Communist China were united. Liu Shao-ch'i agreed with others that revisionist tendencies among leaders at medium level and below must be stamped out. However, Liu advocated a moderate implementation course; Mao urged a radical course. When the 11th plenary session of the CCP's Central Committee adopted Mao's policies, the Red Guards were born, but their movement ended in failure, and the need for a scapegoat led to Liu's denunciation.

2. Although the Red Guards' recent attacks on Liu have given the impression that their mission is succeeding, the writer believes that their criticism of Liu at this stage when he is already in disgrace is an admission of failure.

3. There is a strong possibility that Mao and Lin will accept Liu's self-criticism, which signifies a compromise of a sort, and clamp down on the Red Guards. However, if the situation becomes worse, they may make Liu the scapegoat to protect themselves. At any rate, the Red Guards, although they will remain, will be restricted greatly.

4. Mao and Lin may lose their influence to some extent, but Liu's comeback is doubtful. Chou En-lai will probably emerge as the chief mediator.

(Note: The writer wrote the main part of this article before the news of Liu Shao-ch'i's self-criticism. Only a few additions were made after this event. The writer indicated the possibility of compromise, but he believes that the radical faction leaders are now divided about the implementation method. There is also a strong possibility that Mao has lost his self-command and that confusion will increase.)

0090

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure No. 2
A-1220 from Tokyo

ANALYSIS OF THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION'S PAST STAGES AND FUTURE TRENDS
(Asia Bureau Director Ogawa, 22 February 1967)

1. The Great Cultural Revolution's five stages are:

First stage: This stage started in October 1965 with criticisms of art and literature and came to a close with the dismissal of P'eng Chen in early June 1966.

Second stage: In June 1966 the radical and the realist factions collided over the methods of conducting the revolution. At the 11th plenary session of the CCP's Central Committee in early August, the radical faction emerged as victor.

Third stage: The Red Guards' activities from August to middle October 1966 resulted in the destruction of the existing Party organization and breakdown of production and transportation. Liu Shao-ch'i's self-criticism, probably made as a compromise gesture, failed in its purpose because of Madame Chiang Ch'ing's opposition.

Fourth stage: The period from October to the end of December 1966 may be termed the vacillation stage. T'ao Chu was dropped from the radical faction because of his compromising attitude.

Fifth stage: There was a call for joint management by revolutionists, People's Liberation Army, and the good leaders to correct the damage done by "people's management." The Army, in spite of the order to support the revolution, did not intervene to any great extent.

2. The writer believes that the present stage is the crucial stage. The following possibilities exist:

a. Complete victory of the radical faction
b. Complete defeat of the radical faction
c. Compromise between the radical and the realist factions
d. Intervention by the People's Liberation Army

3. The prevailing opinion is that the radical faction is now victorious. However, its failure to expand the revolution to the production field made necessary the revision of the "people's management." It must now decide whether to enforce its radical policies or to compromise. Its complete defeat is improbable, but its compromise with the realist faction can be surmised. However, the return to power of Liu Shao-ch'i cannot be expected. Chou En-lai will probably play a bigger role in the future.

CONFIDENTIAL

0091

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

CONFIDENTIAL

4. If the confusion continues to intensify, the intervention of the People's Liberation Army can be expected. If Lin Piao still has a grasp over the Army as a whole, the Army will act as one unit. However, if not, the Army may split into two factions, and the ensuing struggle may lead to a civil war.

5. The writer believes that there is a strong possibility of compromise.

0092

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure No. 3
A-1220 from Tokyo

REPORT ON COMMUNIST CHINA
(Probable Date: December 1966)

1. An unnamed Japanese repatriate who recently returned from Shantung Province, where he had been working for the last seventeen years as senior electric technician for the economic committee in Hui-min Special District, reported on the situation in Communist China.

2. He reported on the failure of the Great Leap Forward Policy, the Cultural Revolution and the 4-purification movement, the Third Five-Year Plan (only figures for the initial year-1966 were given to the lower echelons), preparations for war, Sheng-li oilfields, petroleum situation, electric power situation (90 per cent of rural areas in Shantung Province still use oil lamps for light) and technical standard (senior technicians are so few that they are treated like gods).

3. The petroleum deposit at the Sheng-li oilfields, according to this report, is the largest in the Far East and even larger than the oilfields of Iran and Iraq. Located in Hui-min Special District, this oil-producing area extends 100 kilometers from north to south and 150 kilometers from east to west. The administrative center for developing the oilfields is at Tung-ying. The oil is transported in tanker lorries (about 3,000 of these lorries are reportedly in use) from Tung-ying to Hsin-tien Station on the Chiao-Tsinan line, and from there it is shipped to Tsingtao by tanker cars and then to Shanghai by 10,000-ton tankers. A refinery plant is slated for construction north of Chang-tien. In Tung-ying alone there are 80,000 workers engaged in oil production.

CONFIDENTIAL

0093

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

A-1220 from Tokyo
Enclosure 4

CONFIDENTIAL

秘
無期限

文化大革命と紅衛兵についての一観察

66.12.28
小川アジア局長

いわゆる文化大革命が顕在化してからすでに9カ月、紅衛兵が出現してから4カ月を経た今日、この問題を巡る謎は依然として多く、未だに日一日と変化しており決定的な判断を下すのにためらわざるを得ない。

最近劉少奇の自己批判なるものが報ぜられ、ある程度の手掛りをあたえるが、これらのこれまでに得られた材料から私がかねて考えていたことをまとめてあえて行なつたのがこの推論である。この推論は多くの通説と異なるところが多く、決して自信のあるものではないが、一つの見方として提示するものである。叱正を得たい。

本稿の要旨は次のとおり。

文化大革命の発端までは中共最高幹部の間に意見の相違はなかつた。劉少奇等が修正主義的

0094

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

傾向を持つていたことはない。むしろ、中堅幹部以下にいわゆる修正主義的傾向が生じていたので、劉を含む最高幹部間ではこれが矯正運動を行なうべき点で一致していた。

しかしどのような形で矯正運動を行なうべきかという点で意見が分れ、毛、林の過激急進的矯正方法案に対し劉等は漸進的方法を主張した。この論争は結局毛の裁断により十一中全会で前者が採択され、爾後劉等は消極的傍観者に廻つた。急進矯正の手段として紅衛兵運動が行なわれたが、実効あがらず紅衛兵運動は失敗に直面している。

失敗の責任が劉に転嫁されんとしており、紅衛兵運動は収束の段階に入る可能性が多い。

1. 最高幹部間に対立は存在したか。

現在殆ど確立された通説は最高幹部の7人乃至10人の間に基本問題（思想、経済政策対ソ態度、対ヴィエトナム戦態度）について激しい意見の対立があつて、これが今回の文

0095

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

化大革命、紅衛兵問題の原因であるとしている。その一方は劉少奇、鄧小平（彭真はもとより）でこのグループがいわゆる、資本主義的、修正主義的動向を有し、これに対して毛沢東、林彪の一派が激しく攻撃をかけたのが今回の一連の事件であるとしている。この論者は恐らく最近の劉少奇の自己批判をもこの論拠を支えるものと見るであろう。私はこれについて疑問を抱くものである。第一に最高幹部の間に激しい対立が存在したか。

今回の問題が起るまでその徴候は全く見られない。誰と誰が仲が悪いとか、誰は何派であるとかいう噂は時々あるが、それは過去20年来常にあつたことであり、特に最近甚しかつたということはなく、これを裏付ける現象は全くない。むしろ中共最高幹部は毛沢東を中心に一糸乱れない体制をとつていた。事件が起つてからの毛・林あるいは主流派の言論のみによつて直ちに激しい対立があつたと推

0096

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

論するのは根拠薄弱である。劉少奇の告白にもこれを示唆するものはない。

第二にして最高幹部の中に（例えば彭真、劉少奇、鄧小平）資本主義的傾向、修正主義的傾向を支持したものがいたか。

問題と思われる人物の過去の言動を詳細に調べてみてもその証拠はあがらない。論者はこれらのものの過去の論文、談話の片言隻句をとらえてその傾向なりとするものもあるが、これらのことは他の指導者も同様のことを言つているのであり、無理なこじつけであり、せいぜいこじつければそうもとれるという程のものである。むしろ、彼等の言論の圧倒的重点は、毛と全く同一の考え方を示している。従つて、最高幹部７－１０人の内に基本的に資本主義的、修正主義的考えをもつた者がいたとは考えられない。

0097

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

劉少奇の告白は、過去においていくつかの誤りを犯し、右翼日和見主義の誤りも犯したとのべており、あたかも、劉は毛と対立する修正主義的考えを持つていたとの論を助ける如く見られるが劉の告白の主要点は文化大革命が発生してからの方法論の誤りをみとめたところが重点であり過去の誤りを認めている部分はいわばこれの理屈付けとなつている。（この点は重要であり後に詳述する。）

2. しからばこのような考え（以下必しも適当な用語ではないが便宜上〝修正主義〟とよぶ）を持ちだした者が中共部内にいなかつたかと言えばそれはそうではない。中堅幹部以下には相当多くのものがこの傾向を持ちだしていたことが考えられる。何故このような傾向が生じたかという点については既に多くの論者が論じており、私もつとに同意しているが、大躍進の失敗から調整期、向上期を通じ、実際に行政の衝に当り、実際に党務を実施して

0098

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/09

いるものが現実の問題に逢着してより現実的な合理的な政策の必要を痛感し出していたことは過去の諸施策より見ても明かである。行政においては中央の部長級、省県行政の責任者、党においては中央の党務の実施担当者、中央地方局の担当者、省県の書記、企業責任者等にこの傾向が生じつつあつたものと思う。

彼らは中央の雲の上にあつて、大理想と理論のみを論じていられる最高幹部とは異つた感覚を持ち出していたであろう。

特に昨年1965年という年は、第三次5カ年計画の策定あり、ヴィエトナム戦争が急速に激化に向い、一方ソ連は中共の動向を無視して着々と平和共存と自由化に向いつつある状態であり実際に民衆に接して政務、党務を担当する中堅幹部の考え、言動あるいは中央最高指導者への献策にもこの傾向が現れた可能性があり、65年後半にいたつて最高幹部はかかるものの矯正のための行動の必要を

0099

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

感じたものと思われる。

3. 中央地方の実務担当者のこのような傾向を矯正せんとする考えにおいて最高幹部の間に意見の不一致はなかつたと思われる。意見の相違を来したのはその矯正の方法についてであると考えられる。

昨年（６５年）後半一連の重要会議が開かれ、毛沢東自ら後に文化大革命と呼ばれるようになつた社会主義教育強化の運動にのりだした。この時期から本年（６６年）８月に到る期間において如何にして中堅幹部以下にみなぎつてきた〝修正主義〟的傾向を是正するかについての論議が行なわれたかに違いない。毛沢東、林彪はあらゆる過激な手段を用いて一気にこの傾向を打破することを主張し、後に次第に脱落し批判されることになる劉少奇（そしてはじめは彭真も）等は必ずしも過激な新しい手段を使わずとも既存の秩序を強化することによりこれを達成すべしとの立場を

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

とつたものと思われる。

文芸界を矯正の第1においた点までは異論はなかつた。文芸界矯正の過程において北京市党委が当然対象となり、市長、第一書記たる彭真の責任の問題が生じる。彭真は恐らく部下をかばう場合に自らの勢望権力を過信したおそれがある。勢い彭真に対する批判が生じ、彭真を如何にするかが論議となつた。急速な過激な方法を求める毛・林は彭真の更正もやむを得ずと論じたであろうし、漸進的矯正を考える劉、鄧等はそこまでせずともと論じたであろう。この辺から意見の相違は大きくなる。劉少奇は工作班なるものを組織して矯正を行なおうとした。毛・林（多分林彪であろう。毛沢東は南方に静養していた）はこれをなまぬるいとして、後に紅衛兵と呼ばれる方法を考えたが、結局工作班（組）を派遣して地方幹部を矯正せんとすることになつたのは両者の一応の妥協（むしろ漸進矯正派に

0101

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/05

対する急進矯正派の妥協）であつたと見られる。工作班は各地に派遣されたがその効果はあまりあがらない。急進矯正派の主張は再び次第に強くなり、紅衛兵計画の実現を主張する。漸進矯正派は依然賛成しないがその声は次第に弱くなる。南方にあつた毛沢東は7月18日北京にかえつて、急進矯正派の紅衛兵案の採用を決定し、中央委員会全体会議（十一中全会）を開いて決定に持ちこもうとした。

この会議（8月1日～11日）において恐らくは最後の大議論が行なわれたであろう。最高幹部が各々態度を表明し、毛・林の主張が大勢を制した。漸進矯正派はこれに賛成しなかつたが、党を割ることを欲せず、これ以上の反対を行なわずしていわば消極的傍観者の立場に廻つたものと思われる。会議決定の中には急進矯正派が漸進矯正派の意見をある程度とり入れたと見えるいくつかがみえる。

0102

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

以上の推移は今回の劉少奇の告白によつてもほぼ裏付けることが出来ると思う。これ以後中央委員政治局員の上位の序列の公表が変動し（林が毛につぐものと認められ、劉は2位から8位となつた）、劉が公式場面に消極的な態度で姿を見せるという場面が繰返されるが、これは毛・林と劉が決定的に対立したというよりも、劉が消極的支持しか与えず傍観者に廻つた立場を象徴しているものである。（基本問題で激しい対立があり、又方法論についても党を割る程決定的に対立したのであれば、劉は8位にすら留ることはあり得ず又爾後公式の場面に現われることもあり得なかつたであろう。）

周恩来が去る9月小坂善太郎氏一行に対して、「一旦決定がなされれば右方針に反対していた者もこの決定に服し、同決定方針を推進して来た者がその後でより重要な地位を占め、これに反対した者がより重要でない地位を占

0103
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/09

めることになるのは当然である。」と語つていることはこの真相を伝えるものと思う。又去る11月陶鋳の演説と称する壁新聞が劉少奇を非難して十一中全会（8月1～11日）以前の50日の行動を非難しているのは前記のことを指すものと考えられる。

4. かくして急進矯正派は紅衛兵計画を実施に移した。しからば紅衛兵のねらいは何であつたか。実務担当の実力者に問題があるので、既存の組織を通じての矯正はむづかしい。そこで、急進矯正派が新しい方法で学生のエネルギーを動員し、外部からショックを与える必要を感じたとする通説は概ねそのとおりと思う。紅衛兵の攻撃が地方幹部に対して激しかつた点から見てもこれはうなづける。一方、毛沢東としては将来の革命の推進力となるべき学生に自覚を促し、直接革命運動の体験を得させ、百家争鳴を行なわせて自ら革命のきびしさを味わせようとしたと思われ、これに基づ

0104
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

いて将来の学生、学校制度の大改革（革命、国防、生産への直結）の契機としようと考えたとも思われる。（この点は紅衛兵出現直後私が感じた点であり、現在まで少しづつその動きが見えるが、来年3月学校が下半期に入る頃行なわれる可能性ありと考えている。）

しからば一体紅衛兵は現在までに何をなしとげたか。一ことで言えば殆んど何も出来なかつたと言える。若干の街路の改名などつまらぬことをやつたが大部分は実施されなかつた。幹部批判も行なわれ、特に地方担当者を軒並みに批判したがその結果粛清ないし交替が行なわれたとの報は少ない。

むしろ紅衛兵の行動は一般大衆、労働者農民の反感を買い仲間うちの対立を生じ、輸送、生産の阻害を来した面の方がはるかに大きい。（唯一の成果は、千数百万の学生が、大旅行をして毛沢東の姿に直接接したということで

0105
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/09

あろう。このことは将来学制改革など行なおうとする時の布石となるかもしれない。）

5. 以上から見て、急進矯正派の目した直接の目的、即ち〝修正主義〟矯正という点は達せられず、その点では4カ月にわたる紅衛兵運動は失敗であつたと見られざるを得ない。

ごく最近において紅衛兵の批判が劉少奇、鄧小平に集中された点及び劉の告白が報道された点が注目される。一般にはこれをもつて毛・林及び紅衛兵運動が成功してその当初からの目的をいよいよ達しようとしているものと見ているが私はこの見方に疑問を持つ。

紅衛兵運動が順調に進んでいるなら、毛・林にしても紅衛兵にしても今更劉少奇等を取りあげる必要はないものである。彼等の主流からの脱落隠退はすでに8月にもなつておりその地位のあり方も決つたものであり、紅衛兵運動が成功しているのであればこの段階で

0106
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/05

とくに追討ちする必要はないはずである。

紅衛兵運動がうまく行つていないからこそ毛・林はその失敗の責任を劉少奇等に転嫁せんとしているものと考える。即ち毛・林としては紅衛兵が失敗であつたことを認めるわけにはいかないので、劉等が紅衛兵運動に消極的であつたことが周知の事実となつていることを利用し、紅衛兵の鋒先を劉等に向けさせ過去一貫して彼等が悪者であつたと批判させて問題を収めようとしている如く考えられる。

従つて最近の劉、鄧批判は紅衛兵運動拡大のためではなく、むしろ収束のための手段であるのではあるまいかと考える。

劉の自己批判において劉は文化大革命の実施の方法を誤つたことを認めた形をとつている。しかし劉の告白の中には紅衛兵運動に賛成するようなことは一言も触れていない。

紅衛兵の失敗が明らかとなつた現在、劉が紅衛兵に反対であつたことを明らかにするだ

0107
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

けではむしろ彼の立場が正しかつたことを示すだけである。急進矯正派としては、どうしても彼が昔から基本的に誤つた考えをもつていてそれ故に今回の〝誤ち〟(紅衛兵反対の)を犯したという理屈をとらざるを得なかつたであろう。劉は今回の〝方法の誤ち〟を公けにすることにより逆説的に自己の立場の正しさを表明することが出来、そのためには心にもない〝過去の誤ち〟を付加することに甘んじたのではないかと考える。(もし彼の過去の行為が誤ちであるならば長い間これに同意し又は黙認してきた毛を含むすべての最高幹部は皆同罪であるはずである。劉の告白のあつまいさはこの点をも指摘せんとしているものと見られる。

いずれにせよ劉がこのように自己批判をしたことは一種の妥協の示唆である。毛・林がこの妥協を利用して自らも妥協し手をやき出した紅衛兵運動を収束せしめる可能性が多分にある。その際には劉の政治

0108
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

的生命はある程度復活してこよう。しかし妥協がうまく進まない時には毛・林としてはどうしても劉を SCAPE*GOAT として完全に悪者として葬つて、自ら転身をはからざるを得ないかもしれない。そのいずれをとるかはここ当分の間にきまるであろう。

いずれにせよ、この一幕をもつて急進過激な矯正運動は後退し、漸進的矯正運動に立戻るのではないかと見られる。

紅衛兵運動の旗印は下すわけには行かないがその内容は大きく変化するであろう。その結果毛・林の勢威の後退は免れない。しかし劉少奇の復活も難しい。

その後の中央最高幹部の動きを予測するのは過早であるが、あるいは周恩来あたりがとりまとめの主役となるのではないかと考えられる。

0109

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/05

（後記）

本稿の骨幹は66年12月劉少奇の自己批判の報道以前に書いた。劉の自己批判が報道されて後最少限の加筆を行なつた。

爾後年末から1967年年頭にかけて、陶鋳批判その他さまざまな事象が起つているが、これらにより更に本稿に加筆することは行なわない。

これらの事象は本稿末段の結論すなわち紅衛兵運動の失敗を証明するものと思う。本稿では妥協の可能性を示唆したが、その過程において急進矯正派内部の足並が乱れ脱落者を生じその戦線が混乱におちいつているものと見られる。

今後起る事象も恐らくその結果であろう。毛沢東が自制心を失い混乱激化の可能性が強い。

（67年1月9日）

0110
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure 5
A-1220 from Tokyo

秘
無期限

文化大革命の経過の分析と今後の動向

67.2.22
小川アジア局長

中共文化大革命には依然として不明の点が多いが、現在までに判明してきた事態に基き、過去の経緯を分析し、それに基いてこれからの動向を推測したのが本稿である。一部前稿と重複する点もある。

前稿同様必ずしも自信のあるものでないが諸批判を得たい。

0111

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

1. 文化大革命の従来の経過を次のように5期に分けて分析できる。

第1期	1965.10～1966.6初頭	論争初期
第2期	1966.6～1966.8初頭	論争激化期
第3期	1966.8～1966.10中旬	急進最盛期
第4期	1966.10～1966.12末	逡巡期
第5期	1967.1初頭～現在	再攻勢期

第1期（65.10～66.6 彭真解任まで）

大躍進失敗に伴い周知のような事情から起つた1962年来の社会主義教育強化運動が、1965年という年（即ち、第三次5カ年計画を翌年にひかえ、ヴィエトナム戦争が急速に激化し、外交では退潮が目立ち、中ソ関係はソ連の自信をゆるがせるに至らないという情況の年）に更に飛躍的強化を必要とした。

10月各種重要会議の行なわれた形跡があり、この辺から後に文化大革命と呼ばれる運動が強化された。最初に対象とし取り

0112
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/09

上げられたのが「魂の革命」に最も影響を与える文化、文芸関係者であり、呉晗、鄧拓などの「海瑞罷官」、「三家村札記」、「燕山夜話」が批判されだし、文芸の中心北京市関係者が総崩れとなつた。この責任を彭真まで及ぼすか否かについて恐らく最高指導者間に相当な論争があつたと思われるが、先進派の意見が通つて彭真は解任され、このあたりから急進論者としからざる者との意見の対立が大きくなつたと思われる。

第2期（66.6月～8月11中全会まで）

――この期の経過については概ね前稿において述べたとおりと思われる。――

彭真解任問題前後より意見対立が大きくなつた二つの流れは、この期において文化大革命の進め方について激突したと見られる。既存の党機構を使つて行なわんとする一派（以下現実派と呼ぶ、一般には劉鄧派

0113
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

と称される）と新しい過激な手段によるべしとする一派（急進派、通称毛林派）が論争し急進派は後に紅衛兵と呼ばれるようになつた運動を提起したであろう。しかし恐らく急進派が妥協して当初は現実派の施策が採用されいわゆる工作班（組）が各地へ派遣された。

しかるに工作班の効果はあまりあがらない。（恐らくは急進派が蔭から妨害していたかもしれない。）再び急進派の主張が強くなり、7月末には工作班活動を打切り新しい方法をとるべしとの主張が強く、毛沢東は南方から北京に帰つて実施を決断し、11中全会に持込んだ。11中全会において最後の激論があり、毛の決裁で急進派の論が勝を制し、現実派は消極的態度をとることとなる。林彪、陶鋳、江青夫人、陳伯達、康生が急進派の中心となり、劉少奇は党順位2から8へと下がり前稿詳述のとおり「推進した者がより重要な地位を占め、反対した者がより重要でない地位を占める」（周恩来の言葉）こととなつた。

0114

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

第三期（66.8.11中全会より10月中旬まで）

急進派がかねて計画していた紅衛兵が突如として出現する。その目的は既に知られている通り。8月9月10月と紅衛兵は猖獗を極めるが、鬼面人を驚かすだけで実際の効果はあがらない。紅衛兵が既存の党組織を破壊し、人事を覆した例は少い。むしろ大衆の反感を買い、労働者農民と紛争を起し生産、輸送を阻害する。

10月国慶節をすぎた頃から恐らくは急進派内部にも紅衛兵運動について疑問が生じ足並みが乱れ出した可能性がある。混乱の収拾、運動の転換のため現実派と妥協を必要とするとの議論が出だした可能性がある。

10月中旬重大工作会議が開かれたといわれており、劉少奇の自己批判もこの時期である。

劉の告白は妥協の気運をうけて出されたものかもしれない。

0115

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

しかし妥協の動きも結局急進派内の急進論者（江青はその1人であろう）によりつぶされて結実しなかつた。

第4期（10月中旬－12月末再攻勢開始まで）

第3期と第4期をわける必要はないかもしれない。いずれにせよ妥協がむづかしくなつてからあと、急進派内においてはなお議論がつづく。恐らくは陶鋳が弱気を出し運動の転換を主張したものと思われ遂に急進派から脱落する。（陶批判が現実に現われたのは12月末）急進派は結局強行突破以外に方法なしと決して再び運動の大飛躍をはかることとなる。

第5期（66.1月－現在まで）

文化大革命を大飛躍させて急速に工場、輸送機関、農村へ押し拡めようとする努力が開始された。このために各地で混乱が起つたこと一般に報ぜられている通りである、各単位での人民管理方式ということが称え

0116

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/05

られたが、後にこれの行過ぎが戒められ、旧幹部のなかでもよい者とは協力してゆくべきであると指摘され、現在は三位一体による管理（革命者、解放軍、旧幹部のよい者）が称えられている。

解放軍にも革命造反派支持の指令が出ているが現実に軍が介入した事例は未だ少い。

0117

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

2. 以上が現在までの運動の辿つた道と思われるが現在の第5期が急進派が完全な勝利に到達する最後の大攻撃であるのか、あるいはついに力つきて自ら壊滅する最後の火花であるのか未ださだかでないが、いづれにせよ現在は重大な時期のように思われる。今後の行方を推論すれば次の通り。

3. これからの事態の進み方には次の5の可能性が考えられる。

(イ) 急進派の完勝

(ロ) 急進派の完敗

(ハ) 急進派と現実派の妥協

(ニ) 軍の介入

{ (イ) 軍が一体として介入する場合
{ (ロ) 軍が両派に分裂して介入する場合

第一 (急進派の完勝)の可能性

現在の状態を急進派(通称毛林派)が優勢であつて現実派(劉、鄧派)に最後の一撃を加えんとしているものであると

0118

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

みる論者は依然として多いが、私はこの見方には組みし得ない。もし急進派が優勢を続けていたのなら何故大革命の生産部門への拡大を今まで行えなかつたのか、行なつてみて何故紛争が各地に起るのか、何故「人民管理」方式に手直しをせねばならぬのか。すべては昨夏以降急進派の計画がうまく進まず迂余曲折を経ていわば最後の神風突撃を行なつているように思えてならない。

急進派陣営からは闘士陶鋳は既に脱落し、林彪は11月以来姿を見せず、その名が引用されることすら稀である。(毛との不和説もあり、辺境工作に従事とも言われるが常識的に考えて病厚く活動が不自由なのではあるまいか。)毛を囲んで残るは夫人江青、秘書陳伯達とわづかに康生だけである。江青夫人のやりすぎに対する批判がぽつぽつと出だしている。

0119

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

解放軍に対する介入の指令が出ているが未だに大きく動く気配はなく肝甚の林彪は前記の通りである。全国に及ぶ工業、農業への大革命の拡大をはかる体制ではとてもあり得ないように見える。

第二　（急進派完敗）の可能性

第一にのべた推定が正しいとすれば急進派完敗の可能性があり得ると思われる。特に林彪が再起不能であり、江青夫人の批判でも高まれば、毛自身の心身への影響も起るべく、急進派は自壊の可能性なしとしない。

しかしながら現実派（劉、鄧派）は当初より何も好んで急進派（毛林派）を倒そうとしているわけではない。毛林派の冒走によつて過激な手段がとられ、その火の子をかぶつてやむを得ず反対していると考えるので、急進派の弱化につけ入つてこれを打倒すという積極的反攻は

0120
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/09

起らないであろう。又そのような全国組織もないと思う。従つて、急進派の弱化はその完敗に到る前に、攻撃が消滅するとともに第三の可能性即ち妥協が起つてくるのではあるまいか。

0121

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

第三（妥協）の可能性

第一、第二に述べた如き現況であるならば、急進派の攻撃の鈍りとともに妥協の可能性が大きく出てくるような気がする。最近伝えられている「人民管理」方式の手直し、よい旧幹部の尊重、生産重視の指令などはその萌しであるかもしれない。その際毛沢東の威信の低下は免れないが、妥協であるからには劉少奇が直ちに復活することも難かしく、周恩来の演ずる役割りが大きいであろう。

（周は依然毛・林派の側にたつているように見えるがその発言は現実派的なものの多いこと周知のとおりである。）

第四及び第五（軍の介入）の可能性

急進派がその計画を強行しようとして、妥協も起らず、混乱が続くと軍が介入してくる可能性がある。軍に対しては既に急進派を支持して必要あらば介入すべし

0122

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

との指令が出ているが、現在まで実際に介入した事例は二、三であり、いずれも大した規模のものではない模様である。

もし林彪が健在で全軍を把握しているのであれば軍は一体として介入することが出来よう。即ち、第4の(イ)の場合である。もつともこの場合でも地方において出先部隊が誰を一体支持すべきものであるかの判定にまどう場合が起るべく或る程度の混乱が起る可能性があり、更に果して全軍が林彪（又は誰かこれに代る者）の指令に一糸乱れず従つて全面的に統一行動がとれるかには疑問があり、その点もあつて軍は未だに静観の態度をとつているものと思う。この軍の不統一が極端になつて両派に分れて介入する場合が第4の(ロ)の場合で、この場合には各地において、或いは地方対地方で、軍の衝突が起り内乱に発展する可能性がある。

0123
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

以上のような各種の可能性を含む現段階は文化大革命にとつて極めて重大な段階と思われる。即ち、急進派としては、急進政策を強行拡大すべきか、方向転換して収束に向わせるかの岐路に立つているものと思う。

観察者の多数説は急進派は優勢であり、従つて拡大強行が成功すると見ているようであるが、私は、然らずして収束に向わざるを得ないのではないかと思つており、第三の妥協の可能性が強いように考える。

0124

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/09

The Following Pages Are the Best Available.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/13

Enclosure 6
A-1220 from Tokyo

戦前から山東省特務機関に勤務、戦後同省に残留し、1949年中共政府成立以来、ひきつづき本年9月まで、まる17年間、山東省恵民専区（別添地図参照）の経済委員会に上級技術者（電気関係）として勤続し、去る10月帰国した邦人某（特に名を秘す）は、今般当課を訪れ、同人が見聞した中共事情について大要下記のとおり語つた。

SECRET

SECRET

0126

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

中共の長期経済計画の過程における〝大躍進政策〟の蹉跌と内政の混乱、②農村における「四清運動」の概況、③「文化大革命」の見通し、④戦争準備の実情、⑤中国最大の規模をもつという「勝利油田」の開発状況と石油事情ならびに⑥技術水準等に関する諸点は、本人の長期にわたる実際の体験に裏付けられているだけに、かなりの信憑性があるものと認められる。

SECRET

0127

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/09

記

1. 大躍進政策の失敗

(1) 「人災」

第2次5カ年計画は、一応成功したものと公表されているが、内部においては失敗したことを公然と認めていた。山東省の工業は、当初の目標数字の60%しか達成できず、修正された数字をもつて一応100%達成したこととした。

その他の地域の当時の状態はつまびらかではないが、しかし災害の程度から見れば、山東よりましな地区が多く、そのうち上海市は良好であつたらしい。つまり、同市一帯が大きな災害を受けなかつたということは、楊子江下流地方の農業があまり大きな打撃を受けなかつたことを意味するものであろう。

59～62年当時の状況については、中共の公式の発表では「三年連続の自然災害」

0128
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/09

云云とされ、また外部においては天災5分人災5分といわれているが、中共内部の会議等における公式の批判では、公然と人災7分、天災3分とされている。一部幹部の間では人災8分、天災2分とさえ言われているほどで、当時山東省の「天災」の程度は、農民の古老に尋ねて見ても、また我々の目から見ても、普通毎年あり得る程度のものであつた。

あの時期に大きな〝災害〟を招致した真の原因は、〝反右派斗争〟、〝整風運動〟が相ついだあと、大きな機構改革を行い、機構改革の齎した混乱が収拾されないうちに、人民公社が〝雨後の筍〟のごとく出来上つていつたことにある。

0129

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/09

(2) 機構改革と人民公社の起した混乱

特に機構改革は、従来常時数百名を擁していた専区（省と県の中間にある行政単位）の機構を廃止したため、省の機構が大きくなつた反面、県以下の下部機構を掌握できなくなつたことが致命的欠陥となつた。

このため県から末端に至る指揮系統を混乱に陥し入れ、ますます農業軽視の傾向に拍車をかけた。その結果、第1次5カ年計画時代から蓄えた食糧、石炭等の諸物資を浪費し、"備蓄"を食い潰した。

人民公社の設置は、1957年頃毛沢東が河北、山東・・・湖南へと遊説中、党山東省委員会の席上でひと言、「今の状態では人民公社の方が好い」と語つた言葉に端を発したものである。当時毛沢東の考えは、人民公社はおおむね1省に1つを適当とし、逐次それを拡大して行こうとするものであつた。ところが山東省では、歴城市近郊に

0130
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

初めてできた「北園公社」を視察した地方の幹部達が、規模と組織方法等について上級機関から何らの具体的指示を受けることなく、各々担任地域で勝手に人民公社を作り上げてしまつた。（人民公社の組織方法等については、58年8月の北戴河会議ではじめて具体化、統一化されたものといわれている。）

かくして、僅か数カ月の間に、「人民公社は共産主義への橋渡し」等のキャッチ・フレーズの下で随処に〝雨後のたけのこ〟のように作られて行つた訳である。

当初の人民公社は、県を単位とするもの区を単位とするものなど、規模がまちまちで、その上、「大兵団作成」、「ただで飯が食えるシステム」、「生活の軍隊化」などといつた様々な指示が無暗やたらに出されたため、民衆がこれらの指示をどのように理解するかによつて多くの混乱した事態

0131
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

を招いた。

すなわち「生活の軍隊化」などの指示が出されるや、私有財産の没収が噂され、地区によつては私有財産没収も実際に行なわれたため、農民の多くは牛、馬、鶏などの家畜、家禽を処分、食用に潰してしまうなどして著るしく生産意欲を喪失した。他方、都市においても銀行預金の没収などが噂にのぼり、多くの幹部までが預金を引き出して呑み食いする有様であつた。

つまり、噂が噂を呼んで、大きな混乱を相次いで惹起させた訳である。

当時の状況に関し、農業面についてより詳細に述べれば、「密植法」は多量の肥料を必要とするにも拘らず、家畜の多くを食べたために堆肥が減少したところへもつてきて、通常の3倍もの種を播いた。

また、南方などの場所によつては適する「深耕法」を一律に実施したため、山東など

0132
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

においては肥沃度の低い土壌を耕地の表面に出すこととなり、農民は失敗するものと知りつつも命令に服従した。

0133

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

(3) 報告の水増し

当時は密植、深耕などで大幅な食糧増産を競い合つていたので、全省公社幹部の報告会などの席上、各公社幹部は競つて水増し報告を行ない、視察が行なわれる前夜、脱穀機の下に預め脱穀済みの小麦を入れておくようなことなどが頻繁に行なわれたらしい。かかる傾向は、党省委員会党県委員会直轄の農場など、党の目の届く所において特に顕著であり、これら党委員会の注意が行きわたらない地域の方が却つて割合い正直な報告を行なつていた。

(4) 飢饉

以上の様な幹部の水増し報告などによつて、山東省農民は自己の食い扶持すら供出させられることとなり、遂に慢性的饑饉、逃亡による労働力欠乏という現象を生ずるに至つた。日本のような国から常識的に考えて、どうして中共中央がかかる事態の発

0134
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

生を事前に予知出来なかつたが不可解であろうが、中共のような広大な国において、正確な地方情勢を掌握するまでには、早くて半年、遅ければ一年かかることはざらであることを思えば、納得行くことであろう。

公式の会議の席上、当時山東省全省で500万人の人口減少があつたものと報告されていた。

また、ある地方では約8カ月の間に1粒の穀物の配給のないところがあり、山東各地で2～3万人の餓死者を数えたとされている。

多くの若い者は親戚などを頼つて東北(満州)方面へ逃亡(昔から東北は山東人の出稼ぎが多い)農村地区は女、子供、年寄りがその大半を占めることとなり、そのうち特に40歳を超える者に餓死者が多かつた。中でも甚しいところでは、死者を引きずり出すのがせい一杯で、それを埋める気力もない有様であつた。

0135

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

(5) 党山東省委関係者の粛清

これら山東省の問題が中央に露呈されるや、舒同山東省党委第一書記らが更迭され後任には党安徽省委第一書記らが兼任することとなり、62年より63年に至る1年半の期間を費して舒同派の粛清が行なわれた。

これら被粛清者は、修正主義者として更迭されられたのではなく、機構改革の齎した混乱、人民公社の運営上の失敗、ニセの報告などの責任を追求されたため失脚したものである。

一部下級幹部らは、人民公社について何ら予備知識がなく、かつ、受身(「被動」)であつた旨述懐していた。従来、中共の諸政策は、実施に移される前に党の省委書記らが中央に召集されてその説明を受け、省では各県委書記、地区委書記らが集められその説明を聴くという具合に、政策実施に

0136
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

当たつては段階をおつて徹底されるのを常としていたが、人民公社に関しては党の県委、地区委らが勝手に指示を出したばかりでなく、雑誌「中国婦女」などを一読すれば判るとおり、当時中共中央の要人の中でも考えがまちまちであつた。

現在では、名前こそ人民公社であるが、生産隊（１５６戸）をその生産単位としており、人民公社と称しても実際は初級合作社と高級合作社との中間の形態に留つており、多くの権限は小隊に属している。

0137
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

2　文化大革命と農村の四清運動

(1)　四清運動の実情

中共は61.2年より経済調整期に入つたのであるが、調整の意味するところは経済の調整のみならず、思想統制、機構の再編成をも含むものであつた。そして、文化大革命の原因も大躍進など諸政策の失敗の引き起した混乱に端を発していると見られる。

すなわち、当時農業、工業方面に出現した資本主義的傾向、農民の人民公社そのものに対する疑惑、党内の批判勢力の伸長などが、文化革命の遠因と見られ、中共中央も相当長期間を費さなければ問題の解決が得られないことを熟知しているものと思われる。

中共において何か経済建設の始まる前には大きな政治運動が行なわれるところから、一般市民の間においても第3次5カ年計画実施を前に何らかの大々的な政治運動が起るものと噂されていたところである。

0138
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/09

現在なお、農村において四清運動が行なわれているが、四清運動とは農村における社会主義教育運動であり、当時不純な行為を行なつた幹部を糾すことを主目的とし、且つ59～62年に至る大躍進が失敗した時期、およびそれ以降の調整期の両期間にわたつて経済、政治、社会各方面に出現した様々な不正を糾明する運動である。

山東省において四清運動が開始されたのは、64年山東の斉東に10万人に上る同省の社会主義教育運動に参加する者を集めて会議を行なつたのが最初である。国務院某弁公庁秘書長の肩書で現れた王光美（劉少奇夫人）をはじめ、中央機関より多くの責任者、工作者が斉東に到着し、64年から65年春までのひと冬をかけて四清運動全般に関する講習を行なつた。

同会議に出席した者が各地に分散し、運動を推進することとなつたが、65年はひ

0139
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

とつの専区では一県だけで同運動を実施し、65年は1専区につき2県が四清運動の対象となつていた。このように、中共は、本運動を推進するに当つて、1県が終ればその四清運動に従事した者が2県に赴いて同運動を推進し、次は4つの県に及ぶと言うようなやりかたで次第に拡大して行く方針を採つており、当初5カ年を要すると言われた本運動も大体67年一杯で終る公算が強くなつている。

四清運動には、省、専区、県などの各機関より約半数の幹部、職員が狩り出され、人民公社の各生産隊について過去5年間にわたる収穫、分配などの実態を刻明に調べ上げ、この間の不正を逐一摘出して糾明している。

この運動は「貧農・下層中農協会」を中心に推進されており、省、専区、県など各級組織にすべて設置されている同協会が運動の実権を握つている。党の各級委員会の建物には「貧農・下層中農協会」の標札が党委員会の看板と並んでさがつている。

0140
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

(2) 四清運動の効果

以上のように、この運動の主眼は、まず第一に思想を正し清めることにあり、不良分子を批判して全体を教育することが大きな狙いである。ところで、この運動がどの程度の効果を発揮し、生産にプラスになるかどうかについてまだ何んとも判定し難いところであるが、少くとも中共当局は、それをプラスの方向にもつて行こうとして一生懸命やつていることは事実である。ただ一般の農民にとつては、生活の改善が最大の関心事であり、うまいことを幾ら言つても、飯が碌に喰えない様では、農民はついて来ない。

今や農村ではようやく産児制限が徹底しつつある。中共の人口増加率は、現在2%と言われているが、64年中央より、「4人までは仕方がないが、5人目の子供については配給、社会保障などを適用しない」

0141
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/09

との指示が出されてから半強制的に産児制限が行なわれ、中絶、避妊手術は無料で行なわれている。

また、邢台地震（66年3月河北省邢台地方の大地震、人畜に大被害あり、中共中央は急援対策に全力をあげた）があつた際「今夜12時に地震があるから家の中で眠らないように」との指示があり、当夜農村ではほとんどの者が堤防に上つて夜を明かすというひと幕があつた。このように、中共においては上からの命令が末端まで徹底するが、前述の人民公社の失敗などは、上からの指示が千遍一律に適用されるがために生じた混乱であり、このような誤りを再び繰返えさないとは限らない。

0142
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

(3) 文化大革命の見通し

人民公社運営上の失敗などの「人災」に端を発した今次文化大革命は、問題解決にはかなりの長期間を要するであろうが、党が軍隊を掌握し、国家の実権を握つていることから見て、やがて表面的には一応成功するものと思われる。

元来、中共における「修正主義」の思想は、都会のインテリだけでなく、一般農民の間にも根強いものがある。中共は制度を先行させ、人民の思想を変えようとしているが、如何に制度を改めても、農民の欲望を抑えることは容易でない。若い世代は毛沢東思想に順応する点で比較的問題はないが、地方の党幹部が現実に直面し、実際の政策を実行する段になると、必ずしも党の指令通りやれない場合がある。農村指導者としては、まず農民に食わせることを第一に考えなければならない。そこで毛思想学

0143
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

習運動がいささかでも弛緩すると、自由への欲求が生じ、修正主義がはびこつて来る。

５８年に金門馬祖を繞つて台湾海峡における緊張が伝えられた際、一部幹部の狼狽振りははなはだしく、中には戦争が起るとのことで荷物をまとめる者さえあつた。前述の邢台地震では死者３０万人のデマが飛んだ。このように、中共は表面安定しているようではあるが、何かあると民衆は大きな動揺を見せる。

今でも中共において字の読める人は限られており、全人口の８割を占める農民の半分は文盲である。そのため、上から下への命令が迅速に伝わる反面、噂が非常に早く、民衆はかかる「民間ニュース」と口伝えによつて物事を解釈しやすいので混乱を起し易い。報道機関の不完全なことも、この混乱を助長する一因である。

現在、幹部のほとんどの者は毛沢東選集

0144
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/05

を所持しているが、私の印象としては、同選集はアクセサリーのごときものであり、学習の時に必要な位で、真剣に読んでいる者は少なく、ましてや一般人が毛思想を理解することは困難である。

四清運動などのため現在、犯罪はあるにはあるが減少し、治安は安定しているが、「三反五反」運動から約10年後に四清運動を必要としたように、中共は今後も動揺一運動一動揺一運動を繰り返して行くのではなかろうか。

0145
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

(4) 党中央の問題

内輪の話では、劉少奇は党から指導される立場に立たされ、発言力が弱まつてきたといわれていたが、これは党と国家の区別が次第にはつきりしてきたため、国家主席としての劉の地位が相対的に弱まつたもので、劉が〝反毛派〟とは考えられない。彭真と陸定一は、詰め腹を切らされたといわれていた。

軍内部の問題については、新兵器による軍の再編成を主張する羅瑞卿と思想の優先を唱え人民戦争論を貫かんとする林彪の間に争いがあり、林彪らが勝つたものとされていた。

山東省における共産主義青年団の組織は文化大革命以来、壊滅状況となつていた。

(5) ナショナリズム的傾向

恵民専区のような田舎の下級幹部すら、遅かれ早かれアメリカと一戦を交えること

0146
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

は必至と考えているようであつた。中共国内で激しく叫ばれていた〝援越抗米〟のスローガンは、〝援越〟よりも〝抗米〟の響きが強く、〝抗米〟は中国自身のためとの意識に燃えているようであつた。これは、つきつめて言えば、ナショナリズムの傾向というほかない。

毛沢東が共産主義者の「国際主義」の手本として書いた「バッーンを記念する」と題する論文も、実際の学習会では、「外国人ですら中国人民のために尽したのに、中国人であるわれわれが、、、」云々との教育が行なわれ、機会あるごとに民族主義的主張を強くしている。

0147
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

3. 第3次5カ年計画

第3次5カ年計画期間における山東省の所要達成目標は、同計画の初年度、即ち、1966年度分の数字のみが明らかにされていただけであり、第2年度以降の数字、あるいは計画については何も下部機関に通達されていなかつた。初年度の数字については、残念ながら殆んど忘れてしまつた。

1964年の春、周恩来は第3期人民代表大会第1回会議で、1965年度の工業生産の伸び率を前年比11パーセント増とするよう提案したが、山東省及び北京で開かれた会議における私の見聞より推して、この提案は一応全国的な規模で達成されたと推定される。

最近の農業について見ると、綿、煙草等の所謂経済作物の生産は上昇しており、また米の生産も伸びているが、雑穀類の生産はどうも余り伸びていない模様である。今年の小麦の作柄については、山東省について見る限り平年作を上回っているように見受けられる。

0148
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

4　戦争準備と〝備蓄〟

山東省の人民公社では、65年の夏頃から各生産隊が〝備蓄〟（食糧の貯蔵）を行なつている。これは中央からの指令によつて実施しているもので、その目的は戦争と自然災害に備えるためだとされている。

工業面においても、同年夏頃から工業原料、資材の〝備蓄〟が行なわれている。すなわち、同年夏中共中央は各地方に指令を発し、工業用物資の凍結を行ない、3カ月間に亘り在庫品の徹底的な調査を行なつた。その結果、自由に制限なく使用することが出来るものと、出来ないものとが区分された。例えば鉄板については、3ミリ以下の薄手のものは従来どおり申請すれば申請量だけ貰えたが、それ以上の厚手のものは、必ず各専区の物資局の許可を要することとなつた。また鉄線類（針金等）の市販に厳禁され、セメントも極度に制限された。

0149
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

電力関係では５０～１，０００ＫＷの容量の小型発電機を何時でも使用出来るよう整備しておくよう、との指令が中央から出された。

この他に、主要幹線道路の整備も行なわれている。これも〝備戦〟のためで、道路と橋梁を含め全国的に進められている。道路の両側と空地には植樹が奨励されているが、これは空爆を避けるためで、朝鮮戦争時の体験に基づくものであると言われている。

因みに、６５年以来、恵民専区から約２０万人、山東全省から約１００万人の労働者が雲南省方面へ送られたが、これは北ヴィエトナム等に通ずる軍用道路開設のためといわれていた。

なお、沿岸大部市にある一部工場（例えば青島の紡績工場や上海の機械工場など）の奥地移転は事実であり、済南市の工場でも恵民専区に移されたものがある。山東省では、新設工場はなるべく奥地に作ることを原則としている。

0150
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

5. 勝利油田

(1) 勝利油田とは、山東省恵民専区の東営を中心にほぼ半径を画いた線内の南北約100キロ、東西約150キロの範囲にまたがる広大な油田地帯である（別添地図参照）。油田開発の管理機関はおおむね東営に集中している。一般に新聞報道等では勝利油田と称しているが、部内では機密保持上番号(9233)を使用していた。黄河の流域にあるこの地方は、昔は海で、今は堆積地帯となつているが、海岸線に近いほど油量が多いといわれる。技術者の話によると恵民専区の中の久山鎮、旧無棣、流波、龍桑浜、王判鎮、大郭家、孫家鎮、桓台、広饒、羊角溝の各地点を結ぶ地域内には多量の油が産出するという。埋蔵量は東洋一で東北の大慶油田よりも多く、中近東のイラン、イラクの油田より大きいといわれていた。

(2) 油田の技術者の話によれば、同油田の油

0151
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/09

はパラフィン（臘分）が少ないため粘度が低く、大慶の油よりも良質で、原油を濾化すればそのまま２００～３００馬力の低速のディーゼル・エンジン用として使用出来る。同油田のボーリングの成績は山東省の地質が削岩しやすいことも手伝つて、大慶のそれよりも優秀である。現在開発が最も進んでいる東営附近の油井のうち最も深いものは3,３００メートルもある。これは、その油井の櫓（ソ連製）の高さが４５メートルもあることから間違いないことと思う。現在中共では3,０００メートル以上のボーリングを行なうことは、そう困難なことではない。同油田地帯にはガスも噴出するが、現在のところ、工業用にも家庭用にも利用されず、みすみす噴出するにまかせている。

(3) 勝利油田の油は、東営から膠済線の辛店駅に運ばれ、そこから青島まで汽車輸送し、青島からタンカーで上海の精油所に送られる。また辛店から済

0152
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

南の方に向け輸送されるものもあるが、輸送先は分らない。東営一辛店駅の間の道路はアスファルトで舗装され、約3,000台の油槽車（タンク．ローリー）が往来しているというから、その輸送量はまことに尨大というほかない。

青島一上海間の輸送には1万トン級のタンカーが充てられており、その隻数もかなりの数に上るといわれている。しかし現在の勝利油田からの採油量は、これらタンカーの輸送能力を上廻つているのではないかと思われる。（中共の造船関係の技術者から聞いた話であるが、青島一上海間を往復するこれらのタンカーは、大連造船所で建造されたものである。現在中共のタンカー建造の方針は、上限を1,5000トン級とし、小さく、多く作る方針であるとされている趣。）

0153
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

(4) 勝利油田の建設工事は、第1期工事を完成、現在第2期の工事に入つている。将来張店の北側に精油所をつくる予定で、その敷地も決定している。

この勝利油田には、65年朱徳も視察に来たほどであり、東営だけで8万人の労働者（そのうち2～3万人は大慶油田から来た）が働いているといわれる。東営には北京石油学院の分校も設けられている。

0154

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

6. 石油事情

最近中共は、石油の自給自足体制が基本的に出来たといつているが、これは大慶油田の開発についで勝利油田の開発が進んだことにより可能となつたものであろう。航空用ガソリン、同モビール油（M2～1程度のもの）は、以前はソ連よりの輸入に頼つていたため中ソ関係の悪化に伴い、2年間程入手出来なかつたが、最近ではほぼ自給自足出来るようになつた。そしてこれら石油製品の質はソ連のものと同水準であるといわれる。

生産量については中央の発表がなくわからないが、従来購入に際し当局から厳重な監査を受けていたモビール油、石油、ディーゼル油に対する統制が1、2年前から緩和されている。現在も勿論石油製品は統制の中にくみ入れられているが、必要量はかなり自由に購入出来るようになつている。上海、蘭州等の大型精油所も拡張されている模様であり、中共の石油工業はいわば黎明期を経て一定の軌道に乗つた状態にあると言えよう。

0155
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

7. 電力事情

山東省の大型火力発電所は南定、黄台、新泰、韓庄、青島の5カ処にある。従来、発電所の発電機のうち容量2万KW程度までのものはソ連製かチエコ製であつたが、最近5万KW以上のものまでが国産化されている。

当初、中共の発電所建設方針は、小規模のものを各地に多く作るということであつたが、小型発電所は不経済な点が多いため、大型発電所建設に力を入れるようになつた。(例えば大型発電所の場合、電力1KWHに対する基本建設の費用は小型のそれより3分の1も廉くなる。)

大型発電所と電力消費地域は高圧線で結び、従来の小型発電所は段々とこわされている。恵民専区だけで12の小型発電所があつたが、現在操業しているものは、そのうちの5つ位である。

このような"大きくまとめる"という電気

0156
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

事業面での政策は、山東省一省にとどまるものではなく、全国的な傾向ということができる。

現在山東省農村の９０パーセント以上の地域は依然ランプ生活を送つている。第３次５カ年計画の期間、山東省の点灯戸数を総戸数の１８パーセントまで引き上げるよう計画されているが、現況は０.８パーセント、即ち、１００軒に一軒以下の割合であり、この計画の実現には相当な困難が伴うものと思われる。

高圧線の架設費用は国家が負担するが、農村の電力消費地域の低圧線の架設費は、人民公社の生産隊が負担することとなつている。しかし生産隊に過重な負担となる場合が多く、これが農村の電化を妨げる一つの隘路となつている。

0157
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

8. 技術水準

(1) 山東省にある機械工場の製品、殊にミル旋盤機械は、その精度から言つて世界的な水準に達していると思われる。最近機械設備はほとんど中共国産品で間に合うようになつている。発電機についてみると、中共国産の5万KW容量のものはソ連製の2万KWのものより性能がよい。電気関係者の話では、目下ハルピンで50万KWの発電機を試作しているということである。

調整時期（1962～65年）以来、ボルトを専門に製造する工場、ベアリングを専門に製造する工場という風に、工場の「専業化」が行なわれた結果、各部品の全国的な規格化、統一化（第一機械工業部が決めた標準規格によつており、大部分はソ連の規格による）が大体実現し、最近では所謂〝部品の交換性〟が効くようになつた。現在ではボルト一本が足りないために全体の

0158
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

工程を遅らせたり、部品を入手するためわざわざ遠くにまで出かける必要が少なくなつた。

(2) 現在機械類は大抵1年以内に模倣、量産に乗り出せる体制が出来ており、私の見た範囲ではヤンマーの小型軽量トラクター、米国製のブルトーザーの模造品が量産されている。

この模倣に関連して次のような話があつた。

山東省長主催の会議席上聞いた話であるが、倉紡のビニロン・プラントを購入した際、日本側はプラントの青写真の提供、組立てはすべて承諾したが、一番肝心のノズル（NOZZLE華文では噴糸口）の部分の加工法をどうしても教えなかつたので、中共は已むなく繊維研究所の技術陣を動員して研究したとされている。また山東省で開かれたある会議の席上、鄧小平が行なつた経済

0159
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/05

報告を読ませてもらつたが、鄧はその中で、日紡のビニロン・プラントの輸入が実現すれば、中共の4分の1の人口の衣料問題が解決されると強調していた。当時日紡のビニロン・プラントの輸入には、中共は非常に乗気になつていて、この輸入はいかなる犠牲を払つても解決するとの中央からの内部通達があつたということを聞いたことがある。

(3) 中共工業生産の欠陥は、(1)工場内における管理職員数は2%に制限されているにもかかわらず、実際は5～6%という状況で冗員が多く、そのため人件費がかさむこと (2)機械の性能にむらがあり、そのため生産過程にもむらが生じてくることなどである。しかし、このような欠陥は最近次第に改められ、生産性は向上している。例えば博山のモーター工場では、以前1人の労働者が4.5KW容量のモーター1台の製作に8.

0160

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/05

5日必要としたのに、最近では5～6日に短縮されている。一時生産中止を噂されていた長春の第一自動車工場の4トン積みのトラック「解放」号の年間生産量は最近では20,000～25,000台といわれている。ただ、この場合1台の価格が12,500元（1元＝150円）となり、製作費が問題とされよう。

なお、山東省の電力の価格を挙げると、原価は1KWH＝0.004元のところ、工業用電力0.05元（7.5円）、農業用0.11元（16.5円）、一般家庭用0.14元（21円）であつて、日本の電力価格より高い（注 日本の電力価格は工業用3.79円、農業用4.81円、一般家庭用12.09円）。

9. その他

(1) 中共の技術関係者の話では第1回、第2回の原爆実験の威力はそれぞれTNT火薬3万トン、7万トンに相当するものである

0161
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

とのことである。

(2) 中共の工場には1～2級程度の初級の技術者が沢山いるが、7、8級になると少なく、まるで神様のような取扱いを受ける。

0162

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 916000
By dt NARA Date 7/10/05

E910

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



46 POL CHICOM Tokyo 653 3-15-67

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

7

UNCLASSIFIED

014384

1967 MAR 15 AM 5 36

Action EA
Info SS GPM SP SC SAH L H EUR IO P USIA NSC INR CA NSA DOD NIC RSR

R 150940Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 6539

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SELECTED ITEMS REPORTED BY JAPANESE REPORTERS IN PEKING.

2. SAMEJIMA (NIHON KEIZAI), MARCH 14: WALL PAPER POSTED BY LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE OF RED GUARD CONGRESS IN PEKING MARCH 14 CALLED TAN CHEN-LIN LEADER OF REVERSE CURRENT AGAINST CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN AGRICULTURE-FORESTRY SECTOR. ALSO ON MARCH 14 ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN PEKING SHOUTING SLOGANS OF OPPOSITION TO TAN, AND MANY POSTERS APPEARED CALLING FOR HIS OVERTHROW. WALL POSTERS ALSO SAY THAT CHOU EN-LAI HAD OFFERED TAN OPPORTUNITY FOR SELF-CRITICISM BUT TAN HAD DECEIVED CHOU. SAMEJIMA REPORTS THAT FEELING IN PEKING IS THAT, EVEN IF TAN BECOMES SECOND TAO CHU, CHOU WILL NOT BE AFFECTED.

3. TANAKA (TOKYO SHIMBUN), MARCH 14: IN MARCH 14 DEMONSTRATION AGAINST TAN, CROWDS SHOUTED, "OVERTHROW LIU, TENG, AND TAO," AND, ACCORDING TO ONE WALL POSTER, A RESPONSIBLE PERSON OF PARTY CENTER (PRESUMED TO BE CHOU) WITHDREW HIS STATEMENTS IN DEFENSE OF TAN.

4. TAKADA (MAINICHI), MARCH 14: PEKING COMMUNE (ORGAN OF RED GUARDS AT CENTRAL FINANCE AND MONETARY MANAGEMENT COLLEGE) REPORTED MARCH 14 ANNOUNCEMENT BY METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE RED GUARD REPRESENTATIVES CONGRESS OF ATTACK ON TAN. POSTERS CRITICIZING VICE-PREMIER LI HSIEN-NIEN AND METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY MINISTER LU TUNG HAVE ALSO APPEARED.

5. TANAKA (TOKYO SHIMBUN), MARCH 14: WALL PAPER POSTED BY RED ROCK COMBAT CORPS IN PEKING MARCH 14 REPORTED AUTHOR LO KUANG-PING (AUTHOR OF NOVEL "HUNGYEN (RED ROCK)") WAS KILLED BY REACTIONARY FACTION IN CHUNGKING. ANOTHER POSTER REPORTED THAT AT INSTRUCTION OF CHUNGKING MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, WHICH IS UNDER CONTROL OF "WICKED" LI CHING-CHUAN, FIRST SECRETARY OF SOUTHWEST CHINA BUREAU, RED GUARDS OF PEKING AERONAUTICAL COLLEGE RED FLAG CORPS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED LO KUANG-PING, AND HIS DEATH WAS REPORTED MARCH 10. JOHNSON
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

MICROFILMED BY RSR

(1)

0164

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

EA-6

RM/R	REP	AF
1		5
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
4	2	5
L	FBO	AID
	S/P	
	1	
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
33	10	3
		NSC
		6

FOM

1967 MAR 20 PM 1 02

COPYFLO-PBR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

35

Pol Chicom

FOR RM USE ONLY

A - 351 NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : Amcongeneral HONG KONG, Amembassy, TOKYO

RECEIVED MAR 27 1967 DEPT OF STATE

Action assigned to NEA

Action Taken 27 MAR 67

NEA/ISA BRANCH

Date of Action

Name of Officer

FROM : Amembassy ALGIERS

DATE: March 14, 1967

SUBJECT : Japanese Report on Economic Repercussions of Chicom Cultural Revolution

REF :

It is not clear why the Japanese Ambassador, Tatsuichi KOHNO, volunteered the enclosed "confidential" report on economic repercussions of the Red China cultural revolution. In any event, it is transmitted for appropriate analysis. The Ambassador identified the enclosure as official, as well as confidential, and asked that he be protected as a source.

JERNEGAN

Enclosure:
As stated (in French)

1967 MAR 22 PM 3 00

Office of Asian Communist Affairs
MAR 23 1967
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FORM DS-323 4-62

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☑ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: DCM: LHoffacker:ais 3/10/67

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: AMB: JDJernegan

0165

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

Enclosure No. 1 to
Algiers A-351

CONFIDENTIAL

EA

Le développement du mouvement des "Gardes Rouges" depuis Août dernier et l'évolution de la "Révolution Culturelle" de Décembre dernier causent beaucoup d'effets défavorables sur le transport, l'industrie et la production agricole de la Chine communiste.

Les maisons commerciales du Japon qui ont des affaires avec la Chine voient les organismes chinois du commerce extérieur réduire les heures de travail ou fermer les guichets à cause de la Révolution Culturelle depuis la mi-Décembre. On craint que les mauvais effets s'en fassent sentir vers la fin Mars de cette année.

On constate déjà, depuis l'été dernier, une diminution considérable de la vente des machines industrielles qui représente le deuxième rang des exportations de la Chine (28% de l'exportation) et l'exportation des produits chimiques est,également,beaucoup diminuée. L'importation de 30 mille tonnes de spath fluor nécessaires dans l'industrie de l'acier n'a pas été réalisée. Elle a été prévue pour le mois de Janvier.

On doute que 50 mille tonnes de minerai de fer soient exportées au Japon à partir de Mars prochain.

Les négociations commerciales pour 1968 et les années suivantes attendues vers Avril ou Mai seraient reportées à une date ultérieure.

Cependant, l'effet de la Révolution Culturelle ne figure pas encore sur les statistiques.

1966 Mois de l'année	Importations au Japon (en millions de dollars)	Exportations du Japon (en millions de dollars)	Total (en millions de dollars)
Août	26,7	25,1	51,8
Septembre	22,8	24,5	47,3
Octobre	24,8	25,8	50,6
Novembre	24,7	20,8	45,5
Décembre	24,3	25,1	49,4

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

0 1 6 6

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

Quelques indices des mauvais effets dûs à la Révolution culturelle :

1 - La livraison du ris et du soja beans n'est pas respectée (comme indiquée sur le contrat)

2 - La livraison des produits est retardée de plus en plus, et de plus, ces mêmes produits n'ont pas la qualité demandée.

3 - Depuis Décembre dernier, dans les ports chinois, les bateaux sont obligés de mouiller au large longtemps (normalement 2 jours d'estaries, depuis la fin décembre 4-5 jours surestaries)

4 - Un bateau japonais qui est allé à Chingtao pour charger du soja beans a été obligé d'aller à Tairen pour charger une autre qualité de soja beans.

5 - Une Compagnie de Navigation avait affrété un navire pour charger 5 mille tonnes de ris ; la Chine a demandé de diminuer la quantité de moitié ; de plus, l'envoi d'un autre bateau au mois de Février a été annulé.

6 - Le commerce extérieur de la Chine dépend du résultat des expositions internationales. Mais les prévisions ne sont pas brillantes :

1 - L'Exposition à Canton (du 15 Avril au 15 Mai)
2 - L'Exposition Industrielle du Danemark à Pékin (Mars)
3 - L'Exposition Industrielle de Suède à Pékin (Avril)

Les Suédois ont renoncé à l'Exposition, car les locaux où elle devait avoir lieu sont occupés par les Gardes Rouges.

0167
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

(3)

POL CHICOM

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

52

Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
AID
E
AGR
RSR
1

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNVZCZCMJB263JDA831
PP RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6423 0731123
ZNY CCCCC
P R 141057Z MAR 67
FM AMCONGEN HONGKONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASS MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMMABASSY NEWDELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUABAB/FBIS OKINAWA
STATE GRNC
BT

HONG KONG 6423

013340

1967 MAR 14 AM 8 0

3-14-67

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONGKONG 6423

SUBJECT: POWER SEIZURES IN COUNTRYSIDE.
PASS AGRICULTURE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIRECTIVE (DISCUSSED IN MARCH 13

PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL (FORBIDDING POWER SEIZURES IN PRODUCTION TEAMS AND BRIGADES DURING BUSY SPRING FARMING SEASON DESIGNED TO DAMP POLITICAL ACTIVITY AT BASIC LEVELS OF AGRICULTURE FOR TIME BEING. DIRECTIVE, IN EFFECT, GIVES BRATHER TO CADRES UNDER POLITICAL PRESSURE PREMITTING THEM TO CONCENTRATE ON PRODUCTION. DIRECTIVE ALSO REMOVES RATIONALE FOR TIME-CONSUMING POLITICAL MEETINGS, WHICH SHOLD ENABLE PEASANTRY AND CADRES TO GET MORE REST. AS IN PAST, MEETINGS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY PRESUMABLY IN TENDED TO RECOMMENCE ONCE BUSY SEASON OVER. IT NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHEN THIS WILL BE. ALTHOUGH EDITORIAL LIMITS MORATORIUM ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY TO SPRING FARMING BUSY SEASON." FROM NOW ON PRODUCTION DEMANDS ON PEASANTRY WILL NOT SLACKEN APPRECIABLY UNTIL AFTER FALL HARVEST.

2. FURTHERMORE, NATURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY TO BE RESUMED FAR FROM CLEAR. TERM "POWER SEIZURE" IN RECENT MONTHS SEMS TO HAVE CHANGED ITS MEANING FROM LITERAL DESCRIPTION OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0168

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

FORCIBLE OVERTHROW OF REGIME OPPONENTS TO SYMBOLIC DESCRIPTION OF ORGANIATAIONAL PROCESS INVOLVED IN FORMING PRO-VISIONAL GOVERNING BODIES. IN SHORT, A SUCCESSFUL "SEIZURE

OF POWER" IN A GIVEN AREA OR NNIT APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME SYNONYMOUS WITH CREATION OF "THREE-WAY ALLIANCE- ALONG LINES APPROVED BY MAOISTS. VIOLENCE AND FORCBILE REMOVAL OF OFFI-CIALS NEED NOT BE PART OF PROCESS.

3. MORATORIUM ON SEIZURES IN RUAL POWER STRUCTURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO APPLY TO COUNTRY LEVELS AND ABOVE. MARCH 12 PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL AND NEWS FEATURE URGING ESTABLISH-MENT OF AGRICULTURAL "FRONT LINE PRODUCTION COMMANDS" AT PROVINCE, DISTRICT, AND COUNTRY LEVELS DOES NOT PROHIBIT SEIZURES AT THESE LEVELS. CREATION "PRODUCTION COMMANDS," THOUGH DESIGNED SPECFICALLY TO DIRECT SPRING FARMWORK. BILLED AS LAYING FOUNDATION FOR -"THREE-WAY ALLANCES" AND BY IMPLICATION NEW " POWER SEIZURES" IN FUTURE. DECON 4/1/68 RICE BI

0169

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/05

(3)

POL CHICOM

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45
Action

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

VZCZCMJA111SPB211JDA819
RR RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6419 0731030
ZNY CCCCC
R 140950Z MAR 67
FM AMCONGEN HONGKONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUABAB/FBIS OKINAWA
STATE GRNC
BT

EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
SAB
EUR
NEA
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA

1967 MAR 14 AM 8 16

013388

HONG KONG 6419 3-14-67

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HONGKONG 6419

SUBJECT: TAN CHEN-LIN ATTACKED AGAIN

1. MAR 9 PEKING SLOGANS (REPORTED IN JAPANESE PRESS) DENOUNCE TAN CHEN-LIN, POLITBURO MEMBER, VICE-PREMIER, AND STATE COUNCIL AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY DIRECTOR, AS

RSR

"RINGLEADER OF THOSE WHO DESTROYED CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN AGRICULTURAL CIRCLES," MAKING TAN FIRST PROMINENT TARGET TO BE ADDED SINCE JANUARY.

2. TAN HAD BEEN CIRICITIZED, BRIEFLY, IN BOTH OCT AND EARLY JAN WAVES OF ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENTAL FIGURES. HE CONTINUED TO APPEAR PUBLICLY THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD. HIS LAST RECORDED APPEARANCE BEING ON JAN 14. ATTACKS ON HIM CEASED AFTER CHOU EN-LAI'S JAN 11 STATEMENT TO RED GUARDS WHICH INCLUDED HIM AMONG SIX VICE-PREMIERS WHO WERE ALL "DOING FINE", AND SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM FURTHER HARASSMENT, A CONCLUSION, CHOU SAID, WHICH WAS "THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED" BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP. HOWEVER, RESUMPTION OF ATTACKS MAR 9 GIVES SIGN OF BEING AT DIRECTION OF LEADERSHIP SINCE PRINTED POSTERS REPORTEDLY WENT UP "ALL AT ONCE" IN DOWNTOWN PEKING AND

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1

0170

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

CHARGES INVOLVE NATIONAL ISSUES RATHER THAN LOCAL RED GUARD OR "REVOLUTIONARY REBEL" GRIEVANCES. NEW ATTACK ON TAN COMES AT TIME WHEN LIST OF ENEMIES SEEMS TO BE DIMINISHING TO SMALLER GROUP OF SELECTED TARGETS.

3. MOST INTRIGUING ASPECT IS RELATIONSHIP THIS ATTACK ON TAN, IF AUTHORIZED, TO STANDING OF CHOU EN-LAI. POSTERS REPORTEDLY DELCARED TAN GUILTY OF "DECEIVING PREMIER CHOU", A PHRASE WHICH OSTENSIBLY RELIEVES CHOU OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ELEVATES HIM IN THIS RESPECT TO LEVEL OF MAO AND LIN PIAO, (THE ONLY OTHERS, AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, SAID TO HAVE BEEN "DECEIVED" BY EARLIER TARGETS OF RED GUARD CRITICISM). HOWEVER, CHOU HAS BEEN OUTSPOKEN IN HIS DEFENSE OF SENIOR PARTY CADRES, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO WORK WITH HIM, AND IN ADVOCATING LENIENT TREATMENT FOR THOSE WHO ERRED. THUS, UNLESS CHARGE OF DECEPTION LITERALLY TRUE, CHOU WOULD PROBABLY DEPLORE ATTACKS ON ONE OF HIS VICE-PREMIERS (A DEPARTMENT IN WHICH HE HAS ALREADY COMPLAINED OF BEING SHORT-HANDED) AND MIGHT INTERPRET ATTACK AS UNDERMINING HIS OWN POSITION.

4. REASONS FOR ATTACK ON TAN CAN ONLY BE GUESSED AT. HE MAY HAVE BECOME VULNERABLE BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH LIU SHAO-CHI AND TENG HISAO-PING IN PAST. MOREOVER, TAN IS LONG-TIME MEMBER OF PARTY SECRETARIAT, WHICH HAS SUFFERED DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGH PERCENTAGE OF CASUALTIES IN COURSE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION. RICE
BT

0 1 7 1

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

CSM 1-1 CHICOM-USSR

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

XR PO', CHICOM

53

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action
EA
Info
RS
GTS
SP
SC
SAM
L
H
SAR
EUR
NEA
IO
P
USIA
NSC
CIA
NSA
DOD
NSC
ACDA

RSR

MMNVZCZCMJA123JDA636
RR RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJOH 6424 0751145
ZNY CCCCC
R 141620Z MAR 67
FM AMCONGEN HONGKONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

1 3 7
1967 MAR 14 AM 8:26

HONG KONG 6424

3-14-67

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HONGKONG 6424
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REFS: HONGKONG (A) 6421 AND (B) 6419

1. I DOUBT THAT CHOU EN LAI, WHO SIGNALED TURNING OFF OF SIEGE AGAINST SOVIET EMBASSY, WOULD HAVE FAVORED CHICOM ACTION DECLARING TWO SOVIET DIPLOMATS PERSONA NON GRATE (REF A). THE DELAY IN THIS REACTION TO FIRING OF SOVIET EMBASSY'S CHINESE EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THAT THOSE WHO OPPOSE HIM AND WHO WOULD HAVE WANTED ASSAULT ON SINO-SOVIET STATE RELATIONS TO CONTINUE, WERE STYMIED FOR SOME TIME BY CHOU, WHOSE INFLUENCE THEREAFTER HAD CONTINUED ON THE RISE.

2. PNG ACTION COUPLED WITH PROTEST ABOUT TRAIN INCIDENT (WHICH OCCURRED AT BORDER DISTANT FROM PEKING AND WHICH MOST PROBABLY WAS MINOR AFFAIR) SUGGESTS THOSE OPPONENTS NOW HAVE REGAINED SOME GROUND.

3. IMPRESSION THAT CHOU HAS LOST SOME GROUND FORTIFIED BY RENEWED POSTER ATTACKS ON TAN CHEN-LIN (REF B). CHOU LAST MONTH WAS REPORTED DEFENDING TAN, AS ONE OF SIX AMONG EIGHTEEN VICE PREMIERS STILL ON THE JOB WHOSE SERVICES WERE BADLY NEEDED. ACCORDINGLY IT IS PROBABLE THAT CHOU IS THE ULTIMATE TARGET OF CURRENT ATTACKS ON HIS VICE PREMIER.
RICE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MICROFILMED BY RS/L

0172

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

46

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POL CHICOM

Tokyo 6498 3-14-67

51
Action

UNCLASSIFIED

013642
1967 MAR 14 PM 12 08

EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
IO
P
CU
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
E
COM
RSR

NNNNVZCZCMJB294A279ALA270
RR RUEHC
DE RUALOT 6498 0731202
ZNR UUUUU
R 141152Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 6498

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SELECTED ITEMS REPORTED BY JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS IN PEKING.

2. SHIBATA (SANEKI), MARCH 12: WALL POSTER IN PEKING MARCH 12 SAID PEKING DAILY TAKEN OVER BY LIBERATION ARMY. PEKING DAILY HAD BEEN SEIZED BY RED FLAG COMBAT CORPS OF PEKING AERONAUTICAL COLLEGE ON JAN 20. THIS WAS CRITICIZED BY SOME OTHER REBEL ORGANIZATIONS AS FALSE SEIZURE. SHIBATA PRESUMED THAT LIBERATION ARMY TOOK OVER PEKING DAILY ON BASIS OF PARTY CENTER'S POLICY TO PROHIBIT OUTSIDE UNITS FROM SEIZING PUBLIC ORGANIZATION. SHIBATA EXPECTED THAT SEIZURE WOULD STRENGTHEN POSITION OF PUBLIC SECURITY MINISTER HSIEH FU-CHIH.

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6498 UNCLAS

3. TAKADA (MAINICHI), MARCH 13: MANY WALL POSTERS HAVE APPEARED IN PEKING CRITICIZING TAN CHEN-LIN, VICE-PREMIER; CHEN CHENG-JEN, 8TH MACHINE-BUILDING MINISTER; YU CHIU-LI, PETROLEUM INDUSTRY MINISTER; AND SUN CHENG, PUBLIC HEALTH VICE-MINISTER, INDICATING OFFENSIVE AGAINST LEADERS OF NEW POWER STRUCTURE. CHOU EN-LAI HAD SPOKEN FOR TAN CHEN-LIN AND YU CHIU-LI AT BEGINNING OF YEAR, BUT, ACCORDING TO WALL PAPER POSTED BY RED GUARDS OF CHINGHUA UNIVERSITY MARCH13, CHI PEN-YU OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION SMALL GROUP HAS WITHDRAWN ALL DEFENSES PREVIOUSLY MADE OF TAN CHEN-LIN BY PARTY CENTER. MAIN CRITICISM AGAINST TAN CHEN-LIN WAS THAT HE CAUSED REBEL FACTIONS TO SPLIT AND TO BE PITTED AGAINST ONE ANOTHER.

4. NOGAMI (ASAHI), MARCH 13, TELEPHONIC REPORT:
A. HSIAO PAO--MANY KINDS OF SMALL PAPERS (HSIAO PAO) SELLING WELL IN PEKING. WRITTEN IN EASILY UNDERSTANDABLE WAY AND ARE INCREASINGLY POPULAR AS NEWS-CONVEYING ORGANS.

UNCLASSIFIED

(1)

0173

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

B. ALLIANCE OF THREE FORCES--ALLIANCE OF THREE FORCES WILL STILL BE DIFFICULT; E.G., IN PEKING 7TH MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY MINISTRY IS SPLIT BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 16 ORGAN AND SEPTEMBER 15

PAGE 3 RUALOT 6498 UNCLAS
ORGAN AND IS NOT WORKING SMOOTHLY. SUCH SPLITS ARE DISCOURAGING RETURN OF LEADERS TO THEIR FORMER WORKSHOPS. FOR INSTANCE, IF A LEADER RETURNS TO SEPT 16 ORGAN, HE WILL BE ATTACKED BY SEPT 15 GROUP.

C. CLASHES BETWEEN MAIN AND ANTI-MAINSTREAM FACTIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN TIBET AND HONAN PROVINCES, BUT CAN PROBABLY SAY NOW THAT SEIZURE OF POWER HAS NOW BEEN CARRIED OUT THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. ARMY HAS STEPPED IN WHERE REVOLUTIONARY REBEL FACTION COULD NOT MANAGE AFFAIRS ON ITS OWN; E.G., AFTER SEIZURE OF PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU IN PEKING BY RED GUARDS WHEN THEY PROVED INCAPABLE OF ADMINISTERING BUREAU'S RESPONSIBILITIES.

D. ABUNDANCE OF VEGETABLES, SUCH AS CABBAGE, SPINACH, AND FRUIT IN PEKING. IF YOUNG PEOPLE COMING TO CITIES FOR INTERCHANGE OF EXPERIENCES DO NOT RETURN TO COUNTRYSIDE, THERE COULD BE LABOR SHORTAGE ON FARMS, BUT ARMY AND RED GUARDS (AT ARMY'S URGING) ARE SUPPLYING LABOR, SO LITTLE ANXIETY ON THIS SCORE.

PAGE 4 RUALOT 6498 UNCLAS
E. ROLE OF CHOU EN-LAI--ALTHOUGH CHOU IS MORE IN LIMELIGHT NOW, HE ALWAYS HAS PLAYED IMPORTANT ROLE IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION. NEXT ONE OR TWO MONTHS EXPECTED TO BE CRUCIAL IN HIS EFFORTS RESTORE ORDER. JOHNSON
BT

0174

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

The Following Pages Are the Best Available.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

46 POL CHICOM Tokyo 6455 3/13-67

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

012059

1967 MAR 13 AM 5 59

51
Action

EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
IO
P
CU
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
RSR

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNVZCZCMJA870A055V OTA946
RR RUEHC
DE RUALOT 6455 0720952
ZNR UUUUU
R 130947Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 6455

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SELECTED ITEMS REPORTED BY JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS IN PEKING.

2. NOGAMI (ASAHI), MARCH 10: ACCORDING TO THIRD EDITION OF RED GUARD PAPER ENTITLED "BULLETIN OF STRUGGLE AGAINST TAO CHU" STRUGGLE RALLY AGAINST TAO HELD FEB 25 AT PEOPLE'S STADIUM WITH 100,000 PERSONS PRESENT. TAO HIMSELF NOT PRESENT, BUT NUMBER OF HIS FOLLOWERS WERE DRAGGED OUT, INCLUDING YUNG WEN-TAO, HSIAO WANG-TUNG, KUO YING-CHIU, CHIEN HSN-CHUNG, CHI YEN-MING, HSIUNG FU, AND JUNG KAO-TANG.

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6455 UNCLAS

3. SHIBATA (SANKEI), MARCH 11: RALLY AGAINST TAN CHEN-LIN HELD MARCH 11 AT MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE. TAN ACCUSED OF SUPPRESSING CULTURAL REVOLUTION WITHIN AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY SECTORS AND FOR FALSELY BRANDING REVOLUTIONARY FACTION AS BEING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY AND CARRYING OUT WHITE TERRORISM SINCE FEBRUARY. SHIBATA COMMENTED THAT DECLARATIONS WITHIN AGRICULTURE-FORESTRY MINISTRY CONCERNING SEIZING OF POWER WHICH APPEARED AFTER ABOUT MID-JANUARY APPARENTLY NOW REGARDED AS FALSE SEIZURE OF POWER.

4. TAKADA (MAINICHI), MARCH 11: CENTRAL COMMITTEE NOTIFICATION CONCERNING POWER SEIZURE DURING PLOWING SEASON POSTED MARCH 11. ACCORDING THIS NOTIFICATION, PRODUCTION UNITS SHOULD NOT ENGAGE IN SEIZING POWER DURING PLOWING SEASON. IN UNITS WHERE LEADERSHIP NOT DETERMINED, POOR FARMERS AND LOWER MIDDLE-CLASS FARMERS SHOULD LEAD IN ESTABLISHMENT OF PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE GROUPS WHICH WOULD SETTLE LEADERSHIP QUESTION. ALMOST ALL VILLAGE LEADERS ARE EITHER GOOD OR

UNCLASSIFIED

(1)

0176

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/04

RELATIVELY GOOD, AND THOSE WHO COMMITTED MISTAKES SHOULD BE HELPED AND THEIR ILLNESS CURED. HOWEVER, NECESSARY TO BE ALERT SO THAT FORMER LEADERS WHO WERE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WILL NOT RESUME THEIR POSTS.

PAGE 3 RUALOT 6455 UNCLAS
5. KYODO, MARCH 9; WORKERS' DAILY, FORMERLY ACFTU ORGAN, RESUMED PUBLICATION MARCH 9.

6. KYODO, (TOKYO) MARCH 13: ACCORDING TO SOURCES IN JAPAN INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROMOTION COUNCIL (FRIENDLY FIRM ORGANIZATION), WHICH NOW HAS DELEGATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA, NAN HAN-CHEN COMMITTED SUICIDE END OF JANUARY. ACCORDING THIS SOURCE, NAN HAD OPPOSED REVOLUTIONISTS WITHIN OWN ORGANIZATION AND REFUSED TO CONDUCT SELF-CRITICISM. KYODO NOTED THAT FEB 27 JAPAN-CHINA TRADE PLAN NOT SIGNED BY NAN AS WOULD HAVE BEEN NORMAL. JOHNSON
BT

0177

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 67-69 Central/POL

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 76-24

DATE: 3/12/67 MSG NO.: A-487 TYPE: AI

FROM: Copenhagen TO: State

SUBJECT: Danish report on Chinese development

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ✓ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

_____ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

0178

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

	EUR	FE
EA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
S/S	S/P	G/PM
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA
		NSC

1967 MAR 14 PM 3 12

COPYFLO-PBR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL CHICOM

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-530 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN | PRIORITY HANDLING INDICATOR

Office of Asian Communist Affairs
MAR 17 1967
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO : Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPT OF STATE
MAR 14 3 35 PM 1967
ANALYSIS BRANCH

INFO: CANBERRA, NEW DELHI, TAIPEI, TOKYO

S/AH

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: March 10, 1967

SUBJECT : Chang Chun-chiao Discusses the Shanghai "Commune"

REF :

POL CHICOM
EA

Enclosed is a quotation taken from a letter written by Mr. Jerome Hunter, a language teacher in Shanghai, to a friend in Hong Kong. Mr. Hunter, whose views on the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai were reported several weeks ago (HK's A-482, February 17, 1967) describes Chang Chun-chiao's speech at a Shanghai meeting February 24, as seen on television. In this speech, Chang, a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee and apparently the leading Party representative in Shanghai, conveyed the substance of several conversations with Mao. Mr. Hunter's account of the speech is similar to what has been reported in Peking posters (Mainichi March 4). The letter's interest lies in Mr. Hunter's portrayal of the atmosphere of the city and the mood conveyed by Chang as he "laughed" away the goals of the "January Revolution".

ASW (RN)
WHITING

Action Assigned to A/CA
Action Taken
Date of Action 3/22
Action Symbol A/CA
Action Officer
Name of Officer

Enclosure: all N.W.

As stated.

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
In Out

FORM DS-323

Drafted by: POL/CM:CHill:3/9/67:jt

Contents and Classification Approved by: RDNethercut

Clearances:

0179

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

Extract of Letter from Mr. Jerome Hunter

"Shanghai quiet now, though wild enough when we arrived. A lot of squabbling between groups within the Commune. Big-character posters asking why the People's Daily had not mentioned the founding of the Commune, why Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan (new mayor and vice) had gone to Peking. Answer came in a televised speech by Chang when he got back. Chairman Mao had granted him no less than three interviews, explaining that Shanghai could not be called a Commune yet for lack of the 'Triple Unity' of rebel leaders, leading cadres and the army. Also, said the Chairman, the changing of names was of no value in itself, and might only confuse people. If Shanghai called herself Commune, every other city would want the name too. This could stifle the class struggle, by imposing too sudden a unity. Another thing, if every city became a Commune, China herself would have to become The People's Commune of China, a name which foreigners might not accept.

"Chang talked for two hours, in a delightful blend of non-official humour and near-doubletalk, leaving us with no idea why what was presumably his idea (he being a member of the Cultural Revolution (CR) group) was not accepted by Peking. Is there some difference of opinion between Chang and Yao in Shanghai and the other Big Six in Peking?

"Anyway, it seems the CR is finished here - the struggle part of it at least. The other two parts - criticism and reform - will go on for quite a while, but will be less exciting than what has happened so far.

"So now we have a Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, which is not the same thing as a Commune, but will apparently have to do for the time being. Interesting that Chang said in his speech that students alone could not possibly take power. Most of them hadn't even graduated, he laughed, so how could they run a city? He himself knew precious little about finance and agriculture, and was having quite a job to handle everything. How could an inexperienced worker or student even run a factory, much less a city or a province?

0180

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

"Inference being that the pressure is off the leading cadres, even those who have made mistakes, and that their talents are necessary if Shanghai is to progress. The army too is indispensable. Nothing can be achieved revolution-wise without it.

"So those who go round putting up 'Down-with-everything!' slogans - which means those who are silly enough to attack Chang and the CR group - are making a big mistake...."

0181

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

EA-6

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR 5	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P 2	IO 5
L	FBO	AID
S/S 15	S/P 1	G/PM 1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 5
ARMY 3	CIA 20	NAVY 5
OSD 33	USIA 10	NSA 3
		NSC 6

PHK RJD DD

1967 MAR 14 PM 3 12

COPYFLO-PBR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

20

POL CHICOM

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-530 NO.

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN 1

PRIORITY HANDLING INDICATOR

RECEIVED MAR 1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO : Department of State

INFO: CANBERRA, NEW DELHI, TAIPEI, TOKYO

S/AH 1

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: March 10, 1967

SUBJECT : Chang Chun-chiao Discusses the Shanghai "Commune"

REF :

POL CHICOM EA

Enclosed is a quotation taken from a letter written by Mr. Jerome Hunter, a language teacher in Shanghai, to a friend in Hong Kong. Mr. Hunter, whose views on the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai were reported several weeks ago (HK's A-482, February 17, 1967) describes Chang Chun-chiao's speech at a Shanghai meeting February 24, as seen on television. In this speech, Chang, a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee and apparently the leading Party representative in Shanghai, conveyed the substance of several conversations with Mao. Mr. Hunter's account of the speech is similar to what has been reported in Peking posters (Mainichi March 4). The letter's interest lies in Mr. Hunter's portrayal of the atmosphere of the city and the mood conveyed by Chang as he "laughed" away the goals of the "January Revolution".

ASW (RJD)
WHITING

Enclosure: as stated.

As stated.

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

FORM DS-323 1-62

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL/CM:CHill:3/9/67:jt

Contents and Classification Approved by: RONethercut

Clearances:

0182

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

Extract of Letter from Mr. Jerome Hunter

"Shanghai quiet now, though wild enough when we arrived. A lot of squabbling between groups within the Commune. Big-character posters asking why the People's Daily had not mentioned the founding of the Commune, why Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan (new mayor and vice) had gone to Peking. Answer came in a televised speech by Chang when he got back. Chairman Mao had granted him no less than three interviews, explaining that Shanghai could not be called a Commune yet for lack of the 'Triple Unity' of rebel leaders, leading cadres and the army. Also, said the Chairman, the changing of names was of no value in itself, and might only confuse people. If Shanghai called herself Commune, every other city would want the name too. This could stifle the class struggle, by imposing too sudden a unity. Another thing, if every city became a Commune, China herself would have to become The People's Commune of China, a name which foreigners might not accept.

"Chang talked for two hours, in a delightful blend of non-official humour and near-doubletalk, leaving us with no idea why what was presumably his idea (he being a member of the Cultural Revolution (CR) group) was not accepted by Peking. Is there some difference of opinion between Chang and Yao in Shanghai and the other Big Six in Peking?

"Anyway, it seems the CR is finished here - the struggle part of it at least. The other two parts - criticism and reform - will go on for quite a while, but will be less exciting than what has happened so far.

"So now we have a Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, which is not the same thing as a Commune, but will apparently have to do for the time being. Interesting that Chang said in his speech that students alone could not possibly take power. Most of them hadn't even graduated, he laughed, so how could they run a city? He himself knew precious little about finance and agriculture, and was having quite a job to handle everything. How could an inexperienced worker or student even run a factory, much less a city or a province?

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

"Inference being that the pressure is off the leading cadres, even those who have made mistakes, and that their talents are necessary if Shanghai is to progress. The army too is indispensable. Nothing can be achieved revolution-wise without it.

"So those who go round putting up 'Down-with-everything!' slogans - which means those who are silly enough to attack Chang and the CR group - are making a big mistake...."

0184

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

POL CHICOM - JAPAN

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

XR POL CHICOM

Tokyo 6416 3-10-67

CONFIDENTIAL

50
Action

EA NNNNVZCZCMJB765A635VV OTA741
RR RUEHC
Info DE RUALOT 6416 Ø690955
ZNY CCCCC
SS R 100933Z MAR 67
GPM FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
SP TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
SC INFO RUHJDH/AMCONGEN HONG KONG
SAH RUASIP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
L STATE GRNC
H BT
IO C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 6416
P
CU 1. ISHIBASHI (CHIEF, CHINA SECTION) INFORMED EMBOFF
USIA MARCH 10 THAT SUN PING-HUA'S STATEMENTS OF MARCH 6 IN
NSC WHICH HE CONDEMNED PRO-JCP MEMBERS OF JAPAN-CHINA
INR FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION FOR HURTING OVERSEAS CHINESE
CIA STUDENTS AND JAPANESE POLICE FOR INACTION EXCEEDED THE
NSA BOUNDS OF HIS LIMITATION UPON HIS ACTIVITIES IN TOKYO.
DOD HE SAID HE HAD CALLED OKUBO (L-T LIAISON OFFICER) AND ASKED OKUBO
NIC TO TELL SUN HE SHOULD BE MORE CAREFUL AND PRUDENT AND NOT MAKE SUCH
STATEMENTS. IKUBO DID SO, AND SO DID L-T TRADE OFFICE
CHIEF OKAZAKI. OKAZAKI SAID SUN APPEARED VERY EXCITED
AND TALKED ABOUT NINE INJURED STUDENTS, ONE OF WHOM
INJURED BADLY. HOWEVER, OKAZAKI QUIETED HIM DOWN, AND
RSR ISHIBASHI THOUGHT THAT INCIDENT HAD ABOUT BLEOWN OVER,
ALTHOUGH POLICE HAD TOLD HIM ON MARCH 10 THAT CONSIDER-
ABLE TENSION STILL EXISTS BETWEEN CHINESE STUDENTS AND
JCFA MEMBERS.

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6416 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. OKAZAKI DOUBTED THAT SUN'S STATEMENTS WERE MADE ON SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM PEKING, BUT THOUGHT PERHAPS THERE HAD BEEN "INVISIBLE INSTRUCTIONS" IN THAT SUN PROBELY WOULD HAVE BEEN SEVERELY CRITICIZED IF HE HAD MADE NO STATEMENT. ISHIBASHI VENTURED NO OPINION AS TO WHETHER INCIDENT INSTIGATED BY PEKING OR WHETHER XKHIS INCIDENT, TOGETHER WITH PRESSURE ON JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS, WAS PART OF STRONGER PEKING ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPAN.

GP-3 JOHNSON
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

010116
1967 MAR 10 AM 7 30

RECEIVED BY S/S

9

0185

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

46

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

P&L CHICOM

Tokyo 3/12 67 64 44

89-81

UNCLASSIFIED

0 1 0 6 4
1967 MAR 10 PM 1 58

Action
EA
Info
EUR
NEA
P
CU
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
E
AGR
RSR

RR RUEHC
DE RUALOT 6414 0691025
ZNR UUUUU
R 090950Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 6414

1. FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF SELECTED ITEMS REPORTED BY JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS IN PEKING.

2. NOGAMI (ASAHI), MARCH 10: NOTIFICATION NO. 4 ISSUED MARCH 9 BY RED GUARD CONGRESS HAD FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. EXCHANGE OR SALE OF SECRET DOCUMENTS CONCERNING CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CCP NOT PERMITTED.

B. POSTING OF REFERENCE MATERIALS CONCERNING INTERNAL PARTY AFFAIRS IN PUBLIC PLACES OR PRINTING OF SUCH MATERIALS IS FORBIDDEN.

C. PRINTING OR POSTING CONTENTS OF SPEECHES DELIVERED BY PARTY LEADERS BEFORE OFFICIALLY MADE PUBLIC IS FORBIDDEN.

D. SECRET COMMUNICATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTS DETRIMENTAL TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION WILL BE STRICTLY PUNISHED.

NOGAMI DREW FROM THIS THAT WALL NEWSPAPERS CONVEYING IMPORTANT NEWS CONCERNING INTERNAL PARTY AFFAIRS WILL DISAPPEAR.

3. SEKI (YOMIURI), MARCH 9: SLOGANS ATTACKING TAN CHEN-LIN POSTED MARCH 9. SLOGANS STATED THAT TAN TOOK INITIATIVE IN DESTROYING CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, THAT HE DECEIVED PREMIER CHOU, THAT HE REGARDED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION AS COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FACTION, AND STATED THAT HE SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY LIQUIDATED AND "BURNED TO DEATH." SEKI NOTED THAT TAN, TOGETHER WITH

MICROFILMED BY RS/R
1

0 1 8 6

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

OTHER VICE-PREMIERS, HAD BEEN SHARPLY CRITICIZED IN EARLY JANUARY BUT HAD BEEN SAVED BY CHOU, WHO WARNED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE CRITICISM.

4. KYODO, MARCH 8: ACCORDING TO PAPER POSTED MARCH 7 BY CAPITAL WORKERS' REVOLUTIONARY REBELS, COMMITTEE OF REVOLUTIONARY REBEL FACTION FOR SEIZING POWER IS OPERATING UNDER LEADERSHIP OF HSIEH FU-CHIH. COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN IS LI SSU-

PAGE 3 RUALOT 6414 UNCLAS
TUNG, A COAL MINE WORKER, AND VICE-CHAIRMEN ARE NIEH YUAN-TZU OF PEKING UNIVERSITY AND CHIEN TA-FU OF TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY.

5. TAKADA (MAINICHI), MARCH 8: WALL PAPER POSTED MARCH 8 BY CAPITAL RESISTANCE CORPS ON BASIS OF MATERIALS SUPPLIED BY RED GUARDS OF PEKING INDUSTRIAL ACADEMY DESCRIBED SPEECH WHICH MAO GAVE TO 10TH PLENUM IN SEPTEMBER 1962. THIS SPEECH WAS ONE IN WHICH MAO FIRST EXPLAINED ROOTS OF SINO-SOVIET CONTROVERSY. MAO SAID THAT IN 1945 STALIN OPPOSED WAR AGAINST CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND DID NOT WISH TO SIGN SINO-SOVIET TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND ONLY CAME TO TRUST CHINA AFTER CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN KOREAN WAR. HE ALSO SAID THAT IN 1958 KHRUSHCHEV PROPOSED JOINT SINO-SOVIET FLEET, IN THIS WAY TRYING TO OBTAIN CONTROL OF CHINESE COASTS, AND NEXT YEAR SUPPORTED INDIANS IN SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE. MAO ACKNOWLEDGED INTERNAL MISTAKES IN 1959 AND '60 AND REEMPHASIZED FEAR THAT REVISIONISM COULD LEAD TO CAPITALISM IN CHINA. JOHNSON
BT

0187

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* POL CHICOM

49

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0102 11 HONG KONG 6352
1967 MAR 10 AM 9 02

Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
NEA
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
RSR

VZCZCMJA384JDA486
PP RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6352 0691218
ZNY CCCCC
P R 101122Z MAR 67
FM AMCONGEN HONGKONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUASTP/AMCMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUABAB/FBIS OKINAWA
STATE GRNC
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONGKONG 6352

SUBJ: NEW EDITORIAL GUIDANCE ON THREE WAY ALLIANCE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. SUMMARY. IN COURSE OF REAFFIRMING "THREE WAY ALLIANCE" BETWEEN MASSES, CADRES AND PLA AS MAO-APPROVED FORMULA FOR NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMING BODIES IN MAINLAND CHINA, RED FLAG NO. 5 LEAD EDITORIAL SPELLS OUT FAULTS THAT HAVE EMERGED IN EACH SEGMENT OF TRIANGLE DURING PAST MONTH. THESE ARE 1) TENDENCY TO IGNORE REVOLUTIONARY MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND USE THEM ONLY AS WINDOW DRESSING IN NEW "ALLIANCES"; 2) INDISCRIMINATE INVITATION OF CADRES INTO ALLIANCE, INCLUDING SOME WHO HAVE NOT REPENTED, AND ATTEMPT TO USE ALLIANCE AS PRETEXT FOR COMPROMISE WITH CLASS ENEMIES, AND 3) ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT BY MILITARY UNITS CALLED IN TO SUPPORT MAOISTS, CAUSING RESENTMENT AT THEIR ROLE. FAULTS APPEAR STEM LARGELY FROM POLICIES PROMULGATED IN EARLY FEBRUARY DESIGNED TO DISCIPLINE MASS ORGANIZATIONS, GAIN SUPPORT OF CADRES AND BACK MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION (REFTEL). BY DISCUSSING THESE ERRORS AND DEMANDING THEIR CORRECTION, REGIME APPEARS ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT DRIFT

1

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0188

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

TOWARD MODERATION FROM GOING TOO FAR. AT SAME TIME, EDITORIAL STRONGLY REAFFIRMS "THREE-WAY ALLIANCE", RECOGNIZES MASS ORGANIZATION ERRORS, PROMISES LENIENCY TOWARD CORRECT CADRES, AND REQUIRES MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN ALLIANCE AT EVERY LEVEL, AND IN EVERY UNIT.

2. LIKE SO MANY OTHERS OF ITS KIND, EDITORIAL PRESENTS CANDID LIST OF PROBLEMS BUT ONLY VAGUEST OF SOLUTIONS. IT DOES NOT SPECIFY WHAT KIND OF ROLE TO GIVE MASSES. IT DOES NOT SPECIFY HOW ONE TELLS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REVOLUTIONARY CADRES AND CLASS ENEMIES AMONG FUNCTIONARIES WHO HAVE RECENTLY DECLARED SUPPORT. PATIENT EXPLANATIONS OF ERROR BY "REAL" LEFTISTS TO PLA UNITS WHO ARE BACKING THE "WRONG" PEOPLE WOULD HARDLY SEEM PRACTICAL IN HEAT OF MOMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN PLA (OR ANYONE ELSE) MAY NOT BE ABLE TO TELL REVOLUTIONARIES AND OPPONENTS APART. EDITORIAL, THEREFORE, NOT LIKELY TO DISPEL CONFUSION WHICH PLAGUES MAINLAND POLITICS, BUT TO ADD TO IT.

DECON 4/1/68

RICE
BT

0189

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POL CHICOM

50
Action

EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
SAB
EUR
NEA
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC

RSR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

VZCZCMJA112JDA313
PP RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUMJDH 6312 0681025
ZNY CCCCC
P R 090906Z MAR 67
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
STATE GRNC
BT

008782
1967 MAR 9 AM 6 08

HONG KONG 6312

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONG KONG 6312

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA: CARTOON BLACK LIST.

1. CONGEN TRANSMITTING COPY OF CARTOON DEPICTING 39 "SHAMEFUL FIGURES" DENOUNCED DURING CULTURAL REVOLUTION (A-527). CARTOON HAD APPEARED IN FEB 22 ISSUE OF A PEKING RED GUARD NEWSPAPER AND, ACCORDING JAPANESE AND BRITISH SOURCES, WAS ON SALE AT PEKING POST OFFICES, SUGGESTING SOME DREGREE OF OFFICIAL BACKING. CARTOON, WHICH SHOWS PALANQUIN PROCESSION BEARING LIU SHAO-CHI AND TENG HSIAO-PING, REPRESENTS LATEST EFFORT TO RIDICULE MAO'S OPPONENTS. THIS GROUP, WIDE IN COMPASS BUT LIMITED IN NUMBER, MAY REPRESENT MAOIST EFFORT TO FOCUS UPON TRUE "ENEMIES" AND DELINEATE THEM FROM THOSE WHO ARE MERELY "MISTAKEN" AND CAPABLE OF REHABILITATION.

2. IF SO, CARTOON IS STRIKING BOTH FOR ITS INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS. AMONG THOSE DEPICTED AS FREAKS AND MONSTERS WERE REGIONAL PARTY BOSSES LI CHING-CHUAN (SOUTHWEST), LIU LAN-TAO (NORTHWEST) AND WANG JEN-CHUNG (CENTRAL-SOUTH). HOWEVER, LI HSUEH-FENG AND ULANFU IN NORTH CHINA, BOTH OF WHOM HAVE BEEN OUT OF SIGHT LONG TIME AND UNDER STRONG RED GUARD ATTACK, WERE NOT INCLUDED. (OMISSION OF LI BOLSTERS POSTER ACCOUNTS, ATTRIBUTED TO CHOU EN-LAI, THAT LI BEING RESTORED TO ACTIVE PARTY SERVICE.) EX-MARSHAL HO LUNG WAS CARICATURED, CHU TEH WAS NOT, ALTHOGH BOTH CAME UNDER ATTACK AND WERE REPORTEDLY CRITICIZED BY OTHER PARTY LEADERS AT SAME TIME. FINALLY, FORMER CCP VICE-CHAIRMAN AND LEADING ECONOMIST, CHEN YUN, WHO REPORTEDLY DENOUNCED AND "DRAGGED OUT" BY RED GUARDS, WAS NOT INCLUDED IN CARTOON.

DECON-4/1/68
WHITING
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACQUIRED BY NSA

1

0190

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

1/le P&L CHICOM Tokyo

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

50 UNCLASSIFIED

009028
1967 MAR 9 AM 8 48

Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
IO
P
USIA
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
NSC
RSR

VV EUB300PEC701
RR RUEHC
DE RUALOT 6371 0680922
ZNR UUUUU
R 090902Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 6371

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF ITEMS SELECTED FROM REPORTS OF JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS IN PEKING.

2. SAMEJIMA (NIHON KEIZAI), MARCH 8: ACCORDING TO WALL PAPER POSTED MARCH 8, PUBLIC SECIRITY MINISTER HSIEH FU-CHIH HAS CALLED UPON FACTORY WORKERS AND GOVT EMPLOYEES IN PEKING TO ORGANIZE, AND ALREADY REPS OF 27 ORGANIZATIONS HAVE FORMED COMMITTEE OF REVOLUTIONARY REBEL FACTION FOR SEIZING POWER. SAME WALL PAPER SAID THAT 150 ORGANIZATIONS IN PEKING HAVE BEEN NAMED TO BE UNDER CONTRL OF NEW CITY ORGANIZATION. SAMEJIMA COMMENTED THAT, EVER SINCE RED GUARD MERGER ON FEB 22, THERE HAS BEEN TREND TOWARD UNITY OF VARIOWS LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS. HE ALSO COMMENTED

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6371 UNCLAS
THAT, AFTER REHABI
LITATION OF WU TE AND KAO YANG-WEN AS "REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS," NEW POWER STRUCTURE IN PEKING IS BEGINNING TO DEVELOP, AND ORDER IS BEING RESTORED UNDER TRIPARTITE FORMULA. SAMEJIMA THOUGHT THAT, IF PARTY CENTER CONSIDERS REORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH MINISTRY SUCCESSFUL, PATTERN MAY BE REPEATED IN OTHER MINISTRIES. JOHNSON
BT

MISFILED BY POL

(1)

UNCLASSIFIED

0191

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

(11)

SCI 3 PAK (JA)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

XR POL CHICOM

Rawalpindi 3313

45

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (1)

Action
NEA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
EA
EUR
IO
P
CU
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
SCI
ICA
AID
RSR

NNNNVV QVA136GMA242
CP RUEHC RUMJDH
DE RUQVGM 3313 0671215
ZNY CCCCC
R 081136Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONGKONG
STATE GRNC
BT

007725 1967 MAR 8 AM 9 25

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE RAWALPINDI 3313

FOLLOWING TEL RECEIVED FROM KARACHI REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.

KARACHI 4704

SUBJ: CHICOM SCIENTISTS

REF: LAHORE 1932

1. LIU MEB-YING, LEADER CHINESE DELEGATION TO ALL PAKISTAN SCIENCE CONFERENCE, HYDERABAD, ENGAGED IN PROPAGANDIZING THERE SIMILAR TO THAT IN LAHORE. ACCORDING TO "HURRIYAT", WHICH ORDINARILY NOT CRITICAL CHINESE, DELEGATION "TALKED LESS ABOUT SCIENCE AND MORE ABOUT POLITICS" AND SPENT MUCH TIME DISTRIBUTING "SEEDS OF MAO'S THOUGHTS". FLUENCY OF URDU INTERPRETER, LIU CHEN OF CHINESE EMBASSY, REPORTED TO HAVE HAD IMPRESSIVE IMPACT.

2. AS IN LAHORE, LIU MENG-YING QUOTED FROM HYDERABAD AS DEPLORING MISREPRESENTATION OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION BY HOSTILE, WESTERN-DOMINATED PRESS. CLAIMED CHINA NOW COMPLETING IDEOLOGICAL PHASE OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION WHERE SOVIET UNION ET AL HAD BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE ONLY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STAGES.
DECON FOL MAR 7 1968. CARGO.
BT

SCI 3 PAK (JA)

(3)

MICROFILMED BY RS/R

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0192

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

46 Pol CHICOM - JAPAN

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

XR Pol CHICOM

45

CONFIDENTIAL

007507

1967 MAR 8 AM 6 18

EA
NNNNVZCZCMJB343A164
RR RUEHC
DE RUALOT 6346D 0670930
SS ZNY CCCCC
GPM R 080915Z MAR 67
SP FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
SC TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
SAH INFO RUMJDH/AMCONGEN HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
H C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 6346
EUR
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA

1. DURING DISCUSSION OF CHI NA MARCH 8, TAJIMA (CHINA SECTION, FONOFF) CONFIRMED PRESS REPORTS THAT SUN PING-HUA, CHIEF OF L-T OFFICE IN TOKYO, ON MARCH 6 HAD COMMENTED ON FIGHT WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN ABOUT 20 CHINESE STUDENTS AND PRO-JCP CHINA JAPAN FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION ON MARCH 2-3. ACCORDING TO PRESS, POLICE SAID THAT FIGHT WAS CAUSED WHEN PRO-JCP ASSOCIATION MEMBER TORE DOWN WALL POSTERS WHICH CHINESE STUDENTS HAS POSTED IN BUILDING WHICH SERVED BOTH AS DORMITORY AND ASSOCIATION HEADQUARTERS. IN MEETING HELD MARCH 6 BY PRO-PEKING ORTHODOX HEADQUARTERS OF JAPAN-CHINA FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION, JAPAN-CHINA CULTURAL EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, AND JAPAN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

RSR

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6346D C O N F I D E N T I A L
PROMOTION ASSOCIATION, SUN SAID THAT HANDFUL OF JAPANESE REVISIONISTS HAD BETRAYED JAPANESE PEOPLE, HAD BECOME PAWN OF SOVIET REVISIONISTS AND SHAMEFUL BETRAYER OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. HE ADDED THAT INCIDENT HAD OCCURRED WITH JAPANESE POLICE PRESENT BUT POLICE HAD DONE NOTHING, AND DEMANDED THAT JAPANESE GOVT IMMEDIATELY PUNISH THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR INCIDENT. PRESS REPORTED THAT PRO-PEKING LDP DIET MEMBER TOKUMA UTSUNOMIYA AT SAME MEETING SAID THAT, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF GOVT PARTY, HE SINCERELY APOLIGIZED FOR INCIDENT AND WOULD CALL UPON GOVT TO SEE THAT SUCH INCIDENT DOES NOT RECUR.

2. IN DISCUSSING STUDENT FIGHT INCIDENT, TAJIMA SAID THAT IT WAS SYMPTOMATIC OF SPLITS TAKING PLACE WITHIN NUMBER OF LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS IN JAPAN, INCLUDING ACADEMIC INSTITUTES AND TRADING ASSOCIATIONS, ALTHOUGH

CONFIDENTIAL

0193

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

AC Pol Chron

Tokyo 6347 3-8-67

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43
Action

CONFIDENTIAL

007528

1967 MAR 8 AM 6 39

EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
AID
RSR

NNNNVZCZCMJA866A165
RR RUEHC
DE RUALOT 6347D 0670940N
ZNY CCCCC
R 080920Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONGEN HONG KONG
RUASIP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 6347

1. DURING DISCUSSION OF CHINA MARCH 8, TAJIMA (CHINA SECTION, FONOFF) COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT POSTER ATTACKS AGAINST CHU TE LAST MONTH WERE INDIRECT RESULT OF REORGANIZATION OF REVOLUTIONARY SMALL GROUP IN ARMY IN EARLY JANUARY WHEN HSU HSIANG-CHIEN EMERGED AS ITS CHAIRMAN. TAJIMA SAID THAT FONOFF HAS FAIRLY RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT LIN PIAO OPPOSED EXTENSION OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION INTO ARMY. TAJIMA SPECULATED THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE LIN CONSIDERED ARMY WITHIN HIS OWN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, WAS COFIDENT OF IT, AND DID NOT WISH TO SEE IT FACTIONALIZED BY CULTURAL REVOLUTION. CONTROVERSY RESULTED IN REORGANIZATION OF SMALL GROUP. WHILE HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT POSITION CHU TE MAY HAVE TAKEN IN THIS CONNECTION, TAJIMA SPECULATED THAT CHU AND HO LUNG MAY HAVE COME UNDER CRITICISM FOR THEIR ROLE IN OTHER PROBLEMS WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN ONLY INDIRECTLY RELATED TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

2. TAJIMA SPECULATED THAT DECISION TO FORM THREE-WAY ALLIANCE IN PEKING MAY HAVE BEEN RESULT OF TRIAL AND ERROR. COMMUNE SYSTEM HAD BEEN TRIED IN SHANGHAI AND FOUND WANTING. THREE-WAY ALLIANCE SYSTEM HAD BEEN TRIED IN HEILUNGKIANG AND FOUND RARELY SATISFACTORY. TAJIMA THOUGHT THAT THIS REPRESENTED COMPROMISE BETWEEN RADICAL GROUPS AND SOME OF THOSE IN POWER, BUT SAID IT COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED DEFEAT FOR MAO.

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

1

0194

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

3. CONCERNING CHOU'S ROLE, TAJIMA THOUGHT THAT CHOU UNDERSTANDS MAO'S OBJECTIVES AND HIS MANNER OF ACHIEVING THEM AND SYMPATHIZED WITH MAO'S AIDM. FOR THIS REASON HE HAS SUPPORTED CULTURAL REVOLUTION. ON OTHER HAND, HE PROBABLY FORESAW GRAVE PROBLEMS AND CONFUSIONS WHICH WOULD ATTEND CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND SOUGHT PROPER TIMING AND MEANS TO ADJUST SITUATION. CHOU IS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN MAO'S PRESTIGE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO BRING ORDER TO DIFFICULT SITUATION.

GP-3 OSBORN
BT

0195

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

46 POL CHICOM Tokyo 4334 3/8/67

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45

UNCLASSIFIED

Action
EA

Info
EUR
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
RSR

RR RUEHC
DE RUALOT 6334 0671010
ZNR UUUUU
R 080935Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 6334

007648

1967 MAR 8 AM 8 14

1. FOLLOWING IS SELECTED FROM REPORTS OF JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS IN PEKING.

2. SHIBATA (SANKEI), MARCH 7: ACCORDING TO ORGAN OF REBEL FACTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH MINISTRY APPEARING IN PEKING MARCH 7, REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED WITHIN PUBLIC HEALTH MINISTRY IN FEB 28. IT WAS FIRST SUCH COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED AFTER REBEL FACTION HAD SEIZED POWER WITHIN ANY PARTY OR GOVT ORGAN AT NATIONAL LEVEL. NOTEWORTHY THAT SUN CHENG, WHO ON FEB 12 WAS CRITICIZED AT STRUGGLE RALLY AS BELONGING TO TAO CHU FACTION, WAS INCLUDED WITHIN REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AS REVOLUTIONARY LEADER. ALSO INCLUDED AS REVOLUTIONARY LEADER WAS WANG CHUNG-HSIN.
OSBORN
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

0196

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POL CHICOM

45 Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
SAB
EUR
NEA
IO
P
CU
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
RSR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

VZCZCMJB214JDA357
PP RUDTCR RUENC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6248 0661015
ZNY CCCCC
P R 071502Z MAR 67
FM AMCONGEN HONGKONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJIO/AMEMBASSY BAGUIO
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSYL LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUASAB/FBIS OKINAWA
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC HAWAII
STATE GRNC
BT

006324
1967 MAR 7 AM 7 53

PRIORITY

HONG KONG 6248 3-7-67

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONGKONG 6248

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

BAGUIO FOR RICE

SUBJ: DEVELOPMENTS IN RED GUARD MOVEMENT; PEKING CONGRESS ESTABLISHED, NATIONAL ALLIANCE URGED

1. FEB 22 PEKING RED GUARD RALLY INAUGURATING "ALLIANCE OF THE THREE UNIVERSITY LEVEL RED GUARD HEADQUARTERS IN CAPITAL REPRESENTS SIGNIFICANT STEP IN BRINGING CAPITAL RED GUARD MOVEMENT UNDER MORE EFFECTIVE CENTRAL CONTROL. IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO EVENT UNDERSCORED BY APPEARANCE AND SPEECHES AT RALLY BY CCHOU EN-LAI, CHEN PO-TA, KANG SHENG, AND MADAME MAO, AS WELL AS MASSIVE IF BELATED PROPAGANDA PLAY IN CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL MEDIA. RELEASE OF RALLY ACCOUNTS AND DOCUMENTS MAY HAVE BEEN DELAYED TO COINCIDE WITH REOPENING OF MIDDLE SCHOOLS MAR 1, ENSURING MAXIMUM IMPACT ON MAJORITY OF RED GUARDS AT TIME WHEN THEY BEING REMOVED FROM CENTRAL ARENA OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MICROFILMED BY RDS

1

0197

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

2. CREATION OF CONGRESS OF RED GUARDS OF PEKING UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES AS PERMANENT INSTITUTION WITH STANDING COMMITTEE, APPEARS INTENDED TO SET EXAMPLE FOR RED GUARDS IN OTHER CITIES. ACCORDING TO MAR 4 NCNA, ONE OF YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE CAPITAL MAILING RALLY WAS "PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR REVOLUTIONARY GREAT ALLIANCE OF SHANGHAI RED GUARDS", SUGGESTING THAT SHANGHAI MAY SOON SET UP SIMILAR ORGANIZATION. OPEN LETTER FROM PEKING RALLY TO RED GUARDS THROUGHOUT COUNTRY URGED FORMATION OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. REGIME MAY AIM AT PERMANENT INSTITUTIONS OF RED GUARD ALLIANCE IN PRINCIPAL POPULATION CENTERS TO SERVE AS BUILDING BLOCKS FOR NATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

3. EFFECT OF THESE ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATIONS, IF IMPLEMENTED, ON EFFFECTIVENESS OF RED GUARD MOVMEMENT DIFFICULT TO GAUGE. FORMATION OF PEKING CONGRESS CLEARLY REPRESENTS ATTEMPT TO BRING DISPARATE AND FRACTIOUS RED GUARD HEADQUARTERS UNDER UNIFIED CONTROL. RALLY DECLARATION ENDORSED CULTURAL REVOLUTION CONCEPTS OF "EXTENSIVE DEMOCRACY" AND PARIS COMMUNE-TYPE ELECTIONS, BUT DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL, INHERENT IN NEW SET-UP, WILL PRESUMABLY DAMPEN SENSE OF INVOLVEMENT AND SNUFF OUT SOME OF THE ELAN THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED RED GUARD MOVEMENT UP TO NOW. ON OTHER HAND, IT WILL REDUCE FACTIONALISM WHICH ROBBED MOVEMENT OF LASTING EFFECT AS POLITICAL WEAPON.

NEW STRUCTURE ALSO FACILITATES REACTIVATION RED GUARDS AT FUTURE DATE, IF DESIRED.

4. NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE TO APPRAISE IDEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ESTABLISHMENT CONGRESS AND REFERENCE TO PROPOSED PARIS COMMUNE-STYLE ELECTIONS. MAO HAS REPORTEDLY DISAPPROVED USE OF "COMMUNE" TERMINOLOGY FOR REVOLUTIONARY ORGANS. HOWEVER, CONGRESS PUBLICITY MAY KEEP "PARIS COMMUNE" VCONCEPT ALIVE, ALBEIT AT LOWER LEVEL.

DECON 3/7/68

WHITING
BT

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

0 1 9 8

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* POL CHICOM
XR EDU 9 CHICOM

45
Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
SAB
EUR
NEA
IO
P
CU
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA

RSR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNVZCZCMJB216JDA058
PP RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6254 0661100
ZNY CCCCC
P R 071019Z MAR 67
FM AMCONGEN HONGKONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJIO/AMEMBASSY BAGUIO
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUABAB/FBIS OKINAWA
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC HAWAII
STATE GRNC
BT

006348
1967 MAR 7 AM 7 59
PRIORITY

HONG KONG 6254 3-7-67

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONGKONG 6254

SUBJ: PROBLEMS IN RESUMPTION OF PRIMARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL EDUCATION.

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

BAGUIO FOR RICE

1. MARCH 7 PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL "MIDDLE AND PRIMARY SCHOOLS RESUME CLASSES AND MAKE REVOLUTION" PROVIDES FIRST

VIDENT IN REGIME MEDIA THAT MIDDLE SCHOOLS, INCLUDING UPPER AND LOWER LEVELS AND HALF-WORK HALF-STUDY INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN REOPENED.

2. EDITORIAL ALSO FURTHERS IMPRESSION GAINED FROM PROVINCIAL BROADCASTS OF RECENT WEEKS THAT RESPONSE TO ORDER HAS BEEN FAR FROM UNIFORM, WITH MANY STUDENTS AND TEACHERS STAYING AWAY. JUDGING FROM BROADCASTS AND EDITORIALS, REASONS FOR ABSENTEEISM VARY. SOME TEACHERS AND STUDENTS ARE FAR FROM HOME ON REVOLUTIONARY TRAVELS, AND HAVE EITHER NOT BEEN ABLE TO RETURN OR ARE RELUCTANT TO ABANDON REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE. OTHERS FEAR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES WHEN THEY RETURN. PD

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MICROFILMED BY RECS

2

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

EDITORIAL SPECIFICALLY WARNS TEACHERS NOT TO "TURN SPEARHEAD OF REVOLUTION AGAINST STUDENTS", IMPLYING THAT TEACHERS WHO SUFFERED AT HANDS OF STUDENTS AT EARLIER STAGES OF CAMPAIGN WILL SEEK REVENGE WHEN THE BACK IN AUTHORITY. ON OTHER SIDE FEB 21 ANHWEI DAILY EDITORIAL ON RESUMPTION OF PRIMARY EDUCATION SAID TEACHERS WHO HAD BEEN CRITICIZED EARLIER FOR JOINING "CONSERVATIVE" ORGANIZATIONS WERE RELUCTANT TO RETURN BECAUSE THEY HAD NO PRESTIGE AMONG STUDENTS AND FEARED BEING "REBELLED AGAINST"

3. ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM HINDERING RESUMPTION OF EDUCATION IS CURRICULUM. INSTRUCTIONS IN EDITORIAL ARE VAGUE, GIVING PREDOMINANCE TO MAO STUDY, SUGGESTING THAT MATH, PHYSICS AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES BE TAKEN UP ONLY "WHEN NECESSARY", AND LEAVING DETAILED DECISIONS ON COURSE MANAGEMENT TO NEW SCHOOL CULTURAL REVOLUTION COMMITTEES WHICH HAVE YET TO BE ELECTED. SINCE LONG AWAITED EDUCATIONAL REFORM APPARENTLY STILL NOT READY, WE BELIEVE OPENING OF SCHOOLS FORCED IN ORDER TO GET RED GUARDS OFF THE STREETS.

4. UNTIL NEW CURRICULUM SET, STUDENTS PROMISED VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN TECHNIQUES OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION. EDITORIAL AND RECENT POSTERS MAINTAIN THAT ALL ASPECTS OF REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS APPLY IN SCHOOLS, INCLUDING SELF-RECTIFICATION, STRUGGLE AGAINST CLASS ENEMIES, FORMATION OF "THREE-WAY ALLIANCE", AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTION OF GOVERNING COMMITTEES. A COURSE IN THIS SUBJECT, WHICH, ACCORDING TO WALL POSTERS, WAS APPROVED BY MAO IN LETTER TO LIN PIAO, WAS APPARENTLY BASIS FOR REPORTS IN JAPANESE PRESS THAT "MILITARY TRAINING" WOULD BE GIVEN IN MIDDLE SCHOOLS.

5. REGIME ASSERTS BOURGEOIS IDEAS AND CLASS ENEMIES STILL TO BE ROOTED OUT OF SCHOOLS. HOWEVER, MOST OPPOSITION TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN SCHOOLS CERTAINLY OSSED IN COURSE RED GUARD MOVEMENT LAST SUMMER. MORE LIKELY REGIME HOPES TO PLACATE YOUNGSTERS BEING WITHDRAWN FROM THE REAL CAMPAIGN, WHILE TRAINING THEM FOR POSSIBLE USE IN A LATER STAGE.

6 IN ANY CASE, CONTINUED STRESS ON STRUGGLE, RECTIFICATION AND SEIZURE WITHIN SCHOOLS LIKELY TO PROLONG DOUBTS AND FEARS WHICH KEEPING MANY STUDENTS AND TEACHERS AWAY, AND WHICH HINDERING RESUMPTION OF EDUCATION IN MAINLAND.

DECON 3/1/68

WHITING
BT

0200

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

46 P&L CHICOM

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Tokyo 6297 3-7-67

UNCLASSIFIED

45
Action

VZCZCMJA632A977DJA393

EA
UR
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA

RR RUEHC RUEHIA
DE RUALOT 6297 0661216
ZNR UUUUU
R 070941Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 6297

0 0 6 3 3 8
1967 MAR 7 AM 7 56

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SELECTED ITEMS REPORTED BY JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS IN PEKING.

2. TAKADA (MAINICHI), MARCH 6: ACCORDING TO WALL PAPER POSTED MARCH 4, CHI PEN-YU ON FEB 19 MET WITH PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF RED GUARDS CONGRESS AND TOLD THEM THAT THERE WERE BOTH GOOD AND EVIL CHARACTERS AMONG FORMER LEADERS IN PEKING. EXAMPLE OF EVIL CHARACTER IS YUNG WEN-TAO, FORMERLY SECY OF PEKING MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND OF TAO CHU. RELATIVELY GOOD LEADERS INCLUDE WE TE, LIU CHIEN-HSUN, TING KUO-YU, KAO YUNG-WEN, AND LI CHING-CHUAN. TAKADA SPECULATED THAT PEKING MUNICIPAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE WILL BE HEADED BY

RSR

HSIEH FU-CHIH, ASSISTED BY CHI PEN-YU AND FIVE GOOD LEADERS NAMED ABOVE, HE THOUGHT THAT THREE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES COMPOSING NEW COMMITTEE WILL BE PEKING GARRISON HEADQUARTERS REPRESENTING PLA, PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR PEKING COMMUNE COMPOSED OF WORKERS AND FARMERS, AND RED GUARDS CONGRESS.

3. SHIBATA (SANKEI), MARCH 5: ON MARCH 5 SLOGAN PUT UP AT PEKING MUNICIPAL PARTY COMMITTEE BUILDING AUTHORED BY WE TE AND FOUR OTHER GOOD LEADERS NAMED IN PARAGRAPH ABOVE. SLOGAN READ, "RESOLUTELY SUPPORT PARTICIPATION IN TRIPARTITE UNITY." SHIBATA SPECULATED FROM THIS THAT ABOVE FIVE MEN WILL BE AMONG REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS IN PEKING REVOLUTIONARY MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE. HE ADDED THAT HSIEH FU-CHIH AND PEKING GUARD COMMANDER FU CHUNG-PI REPORTEDLY LEADING EFFORTS ESTABLISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE.

[redacted] UNCLASSIFIED

(1)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

4. SAMEJIMA (NIHON KEIZAI), MARCH 4: PLA CONTROL COMMITTEE OF PEKING MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU (PSB) MARCH 3 ISSUED FIRST NOTIFICAION, WHICH CONCERNED ORDER WITHIN PSB. PREFACE OF NOTIFICATION STATED IT WAS BEING ISSUED TO ESTABLISH ORDER WITHIN PSB AND PUBLIC SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, TO STRENGTHEN PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND DEFEND CULTURAL REVOLUTION BY

PAGE 3 RUALOT 6297 UNCLAS
CARRYING OUT DUTY OF ARMY CONTROL COMMITTEE. IT THEN STATED THAT ALL POLICE AGENCY, AND PSB RELATED OFFICES MUST OBSERVE REGULATIONS AND OBEY INSTRUCTIONS. LEADING EMPLOYEES MUST RETURN TO WORK WITHIN FIVE DAYS. THOSE WHO DO NOT DO SO OR LEAVE THEIR WORK WITHOUT PERMISSION WILL BE FIRED. POLICE AND PSB EMPLOYEES PROHIBITED FROM EXCHANGING EXPERIENCES WITH OUTSIDERS, AND MEMBERS OF MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY MASSES NOT PERMITTED INSIDE PSB TO EXCHANGE EXPERIENCES. REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION WITHIN PSB TO BE ORGANIZED BY ADMINISTRATION OF PSB. EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCES BETWEEN DEPARTMENTS AND SECTIONS OF HEADQUARTERS IS PERMITTED, BUT WITH BRANCH BUREAUS AND PROVINCIAL BUREAUS IS FORBIDDEN. LEADERS SEIZED IN EARLY STAGES OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION SHALL BE RELEASED, AND ALMOST ALL OF THEM SHALL BE REINSTATED IN THEIR FORMER POSITIONS AND SHALL NOT BE SUBJECTED TO FURTHER INVESTIGATION. LEADERS WHO COMMITTE SERIOUS ERRORS TO WORK UNDER SUPERVISION OF ARMY CONTROL COMMITTEE. NONE WILL BE SUBJECTED TO KANGAROO COURT WITHOUT COMMITTEE APPROVAL. OSBORN BT

0202

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

46 INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State Pol CHICOM

Tokyo 6263 3-6-67

UNCLASSIFIED

46
Action

VZCZCMJA336A727
RR RUEHC RUEHIA
DE RUALOT 6263 0651007
ZNR UUUUU
R 060922Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS TOKYO 6263

1967 MAR 06 0 4 9574 I

EA
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
P
CU
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
RSR

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SELECTED ITEMS REPORTED BY JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS IN PEKING.

2. SAMEJIMA (NIHON KEIZAI), MARCH 3: WALL PAPER PUT UP MARCH 3 BY TSINGHUA LEFTWINGERS SAID THAT MAO SUMMONED CHANG CHUN-CHIAO AND YAO WEN-YUAN FROM SHANGHAI AND MET WITH THEM THREE TIMES DURING PERIOD FEB 12-18. MAO STATED THAT SEIZURE OF POWER DEPENDENT UPON TRIPARTITE UNITY OF REPRESENTATIVES OF REVOLUTIONARY MASS ORGANIZATIONS, REPRESENTATIVES OF LOCAL RESIDENTS, AND REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS. REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF SHANSI CONSISTS OF 53 PER CENT REVOLUTIONARY MASSES, 27 PER CENT PLA, AND

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6263 UNCLAS
20 PER CENT LEADERS OF GOVT AND PARTY ORGANS. SHANGHAI SHOULD LEARN FROM THIS METHOD. (TAKADA, OF MAINICHI, IN HIS REPORT ADDED HERE THAT IN ADDITION MAO SAID PROBLEMS IN FUKIEN, KWEICHOW, AND INNER MONGOLIA NOT SERIOUS. MAO ALSO SAID THAT JANUARY REVOLUTION IN SHANGHAI ENDED IN VICTORY BUT THREE MONTHS OF FEB, MARCH, AND APRIL WILL BE MORE IMPORTANT.) SHANGHAI HAS DEMANDED THAT ALL TITLES BE ABOLISHED. THIS IS EXTREME ANARCHISM AND REACTIONARY. "CHIEFS" ARE NECESSARY. SLOGAN HAS APPEARED IN HUNAN CALLING FOR TOTAL REVISION OF PRESENT SYSTEM OF PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP, BUT THIS IS REACTIONARY. THOUGH MANY REQUESTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNES, CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL NOT RECOGNIZE ANY

UNCLASSIFIED

MICROFILMED BY SS/R

(1)

0203

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

COMMUNE OTHER THAN SHANGHAI, AND IT WOULD BE BETTER IF SHANGHAI WOULD RENAME ITSELF A REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE. PHRASE "OVERTHROW OBSTINATE ELEMENTS WHO UPHOLD BOURGEOIS REACTIONARY LINE" SHOULD NOT BE USED IN DOCUMENTS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE, BUT PHRASE "OVERTHROW HANDFUL OF REAL POWER ELEMENTS WALKING ROAD OF CAPITALISM WITHIN PARTY" IS NECESSARY. LIU SHAO-CHI'S "HOW TO BE A GOOD COMMUNIST"

PAGE 3 RUALOT 6263 UNCLAS
IS ANTI-MARXIST. OUR STRUGGLES SHOULD BE MORE CIVILIZED, AND METHODS SUCH AS "CURSHING THE DOG'S HEAD" AND "OVER-THROWING SO-AND-SO" SHOULD NOT BE CONTINUED.

3. TANAKA (TOKYO SHIMBUN), MARCH 5: WALL PAPERS IN PEKING MARKEDLY DECREASING DUE TO QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION. REVOLUTION IS BEING SHIFTED FROM STREETS TO WORKSHOPS, AND VIOLENT STRUGGLES ARE ENDED. PARTY CENTER IS NOW PROCEEDING TO ESTABLISH PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP THROUGH UNITY OF MASSES, PLA, AND REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS. MOVEMENT TOWARD SUCH COALITIONNOT EVEN. FOR EXAMPLE, IN PEKING STUDENT GROUPS ONLY RECENTLY UNITED AND STILL FAR FROM ACHIEVING UNITY WITH WORKERS AND FARMERS. IT HAS BEEN REALIZED THAT, IF ALL THE REAL POWER FACTION ARE DISMISSED, VARIOUS ORGANS WOULD STOP FUNCTIONING, AND STEPS HAVE THEREFORE BEEN TAKEN TO PROTECT AND SAVE SUCH LEADERS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT HSIEH FU-CHIH IS BEHIND MOVES TO GET WU TE AND LIU CHIEN-CHU TO COME BACK. SAME PHENOMENON APPEARING IN HEILUNGKIANG, SHANSI, AND SHANTUNG. IN VILLAGES TOO LEADERS ARE BEING PROTECTED WHILE FARMERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO PLOW. STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE TO

PAGE 4 RUALOT 6263 UNCLAS
ELIMINATE BOURGEOIS ELEMENTS AND MAKE PROLETARIAN REAL POWER FACTION MEMBERS PILLAR OF UNITY, BUT THIS WILL NOT BE EASY.
OSBORN
BT

0204

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

(11)

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

POL 7 US/GOLDBERG
XR POL 27 VIET S
XR POL CHICOM.

Action 86
SS
Info

SECRET

004748

1967 MAR 5 PM 9 18

Baguio 17

VZCZCMJA211I0A188
PP RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUMJIO 17A 0650115
ZNY SSSSS
P 060045Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY BAGUIO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NY
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUDTGR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T BAGUIO 017

L I M D I S

FOR USUN: AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG HAS NOT SEEN FOLLOWING REPORT ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT MARCOS AND MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.

BEGIN TEXT:

L I M D I S

SUBJECT: GOLBERG-MARCOS CONVERSATION

1. AMBASSADOR GOLDGERG, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR BLAIR

PAGE 2 RUMJIO 17A S E C R E T
AND DCM, MET FOR ALMOST AN HOUR LAST EVENING WITH PRESIDENT MARCOS. AFTER EXTENDING PERSONAL GREETINGS FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON, GOLDBERG REPORTED TO MARCOS THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM SAIGON AND WANTED TO PASS ON GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S HIGH OPINION OF GOOD WORK BEING PERFORMED BY PHILCAG IN SVN AND HOW MUCH PHILCAG SERVICES WERE NEEDED AND APPRECIATED. GOLDBERG WENT ON TO SAY HE WISHED ALSO TO PASS ON TO MARCOS HIS IMPRESSIONS OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING BOTH ON WAR FRONT AND ON PEACE FRONT.

2. WAR FRONT - REGARDING MILITARY SITUATION SVN GOLDGERG QUOTED WESTMORELAND EVALUATION THAT ALL ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS NOW UNDER CONTROL, WITH BOTH DRV UNITS AND VC BEING KEPT OFF BALANCE. IN HIS OPINION IT WOULD NEVERTHE LESS

SECRET

(3)

0205

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* POL CHICOM

Action
E..

Info
38
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
SAB
EUR
NEA
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
AID
E
RSR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNVZCZCMJA065SPA288JDA766
PP RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6175 0630725
ZNY CCCCC
P R 040524Z MAR 67
FM AMCONGEN HONGKONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTAET WASHDC
INFO RUMJIO/AMCONSUL BAGUIO
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSYS SAIGON
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUABFO/FBIS OKINAWA
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC HAWAII
STATE GRNC
BT

004610

PRIORITY

1967 MAR 4 PM 7 46

HONG KONG 6175 3-4-67

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONGKONG 6175

SUBJ: PEKING ENDORSES SHANTUNG POWER SEIZURE

BAGUIO FOR RICE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. PEKING MEDIA BELATEDLY GIVING BIG PLAY TO FEB 3 SHANTUNG "POWER SEIZURE". TREATMENT, INCLUDING PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL AND NCNA REPRINTS OF SHANTUNG REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE PRONOUNCMENTS, CONSITITUTES CAPITAL'S FIRST RATIFICATION OF MAJOR POWER SEIZURE IN OVER THREE WEEKS.

2. ACTIVE PLA POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN SHANTUNG AGGAIRS SUGGESTED BY FBIS SUMMARY RADIO TSINAN MAR 2 ACCOUNT OF THREE-LEVEL CADRE CONFERENCE. AT CONFERENCE "RESPONSIBLE PERSONS OF PLA TSINAN" REPORTED ON VISIT TO PEKING BY SHANTUNG REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE DELEGATION AND "CONVEYED IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS OF CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S MILITARY COMMISSION". LATTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MICROFILMED BY PS/M

1

0206

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/05

GROUP NOT PREVIOUSLY NOTED AS PURVEYOR OF POLITICAL QUOTE INSTRUCTIONS UNQUOTE FTO CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS.

3. REASON FOR PEKING'S DELAY NOT INDICATED BUT BUT PROBABLY DUE TO DISSATISFACTION WITH PREVIOUS SITUATION, AS SUGGESTED BY STATEMENT PD EDITORIAL THAT SHANTUNG SEIZURE HAD BEEN PLAGUED BY "SHAM " ACTIONS. IN ANY EVENT, PD EDITORIAL APPEARS INTENDED ESTABLISH

NATIONAL GROUND RULE THAT ONLY VALID SEIZURE OF POWER IS THAT WHICH CONDUCTED THROUGH INSTRUMENT OF "THREE-WAY ALLIANCE" IN WHICH PLA PLAYS MAJOR ROLE.

EDITORIAL BACKS THIS UP WITH INCREASINGLY PREVALENT WARNING AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY REBEL INITIATIVES.

4. OBVIOUS QUESTION UNANSWERABLE AT THIS TIME, NAMELY, DOES PEKING ATTENTION TO EARLIER SHANTUNG SEIZURE FORESHADOW RENEWED EFFORT AT SIMILAR TAKEOVERS ELSWWHERE. NONETHELESS THIS INTRIGUING DEVELOPMENT AMIDST WELTER OF INDICATORS CHOU EN-LAI MOVING TO DAMP DOWN REVOLUTIONARY REBELS AND RESTORE ATMOSPHERE OF NORMALCY TO SHAKEN ECONOMY.

WHITING
BT

0207

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

63

Inco food 17 Chicom

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

(2) Pol Chicom

CONFIDENTIAL

004387

NEW DELHI 12673 3/4/67

Action	
	NNNNVV GSA881SBA078
EA	RR RUALOT RUEHC RUMJDH RUMJGM RUQTDN
info	DE RUSPAE 12673 0630720
	ZNY CCCCC
SS	R 040603Z MAR 67
GPM	FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
SP	TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
SC	INFO RUMJDH/AMCONGEN HONG KONG
SAH	RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
I	RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
H	RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
SAB	STATE GRNC
NEA	FT
P	C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 12673
USIA	
NSC	PASS AGRICULTURE
INR	
CIA	REF: STATE 147123 CIRCULAR
NSA	
DOD	SUBJ: EVIDENCE OF DECREASED CHICOM FOOD EXPORTS.
AID	
STR	1. INDIA HAS NO SIGNIFICANT TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA, SO
E	WE HAVE ONLY SECOND-HAND INFO ON CHINESE FOOD EXPORTS.
AGR	
COM	2. MINISTRY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS RECENTLY QUERIED NUMBER OF
TRSY	INDIAN POSTS CONCERNING CHICOM FOREIGN TRADE, AS MEANS OF
RSR	ASSESSING "CULTURAL REVOLUTION". MINISTRY UNDERSTANDS
	JAPANESE WERE NERVOUS OVER POSSIBILITY OF INTERFERENCE WITH
	TRADE, BUT HAS NOT ACTUALLY EXPERIENCED REDUCTION AS RESULT
	MAINLAND TURMOIL. INDIAN CONSULATE HONG KONG THOUGHT
	MAINLAND EXPORTS UNAFFECTED BY "CULTURAL REVOLUTION", AND
	NOTED RISE IN EXPORTS TO HONG KONG (DELHI A-692, FEB 24)
	WHICH WOULD BE MOSTLY FOOD. ONLY KUWAIT REPORTED SOME
	TRADE DIFFICULTIES WITH CHINA, AND THESE APPARENTLY DID NOT
	APPT NOT INVOLVE FOOD.

3. VIETNAMESE CONSUL RECENTLY IN COLOMBO GOT IMPRESSION THAT CEYLONESE EXPECTED CHINESE WOULD CONTINUE SUPPLY RICE UNDER RICE-RUBBER BARTER DEAL. COLOMBO'S A-339, FEB 15 CONFIRMS.

4. WE ASSUME POSTS CONCERNED CAN AMPLIFY OR CORRECT THESE REMARKS.

POWLES

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

0208

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants:	Heishiro Ogawa	Director, Asian Bureau
	Fumihiko Togo	Director, North American Bureau
	Nobuyuki Nakashima	Deputy Director, North American Bureau
	Sumio Edamura	North American Section Chief
	William Bundy	
	David L. Osborn	Deputy Chief of Mission, Tokyo
	J. Owen Zurhellen	Counselor of Embassy
Date:	March 2, 1967	
Subject:	Situation in Communist China	

---

1. Mr. Bundy gave Mr. Ogawa a copy of an analysis of the situation in Communist China prepared by the Department of State. Mr. Bundy said that we were puzzled by Lin Piao's position, which seems to have weakened. He wondered whether the recent moves towards moderation in Peking represented a basic change in the ChiCom attitude or simply a tactical move to help get the spring planting underway.

2. Mr. Ogawa said the GOJ had noted in January the possibility that some action would be taken to facilitate the spring planting, but there may be more to the recent events than simply that. The "radical group" may be losing power and may feel that they will face a serious defeat if they do not compromise with the "reasonable group."

SECRET

POL:JO Zurhellen:mfd

0209

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/08

3. Mr. Bundy commented that the CCP had had deeper and stronger power than Mao and Lin had thought. We have not yet seen any serious overall effect of the cultural revolution in the economic field. He was wondering whether the cultural revolution had affected Japanese-Chicom trade and whether Mr. Ogawa had the January trade figures.

4. Mr. Ogawa said that he did not yet have the January figures. There had been a drop in trade at the end of the year, but this was normal. He did not know the trade level for January but thought it was about the same as December. Traders said some ships experienced delays in loading, changes in the grade of grain, soy beans, etc., but this was not serious. He would say that the cultural revolution had caused some trouble for trade, but not to a serious extent. The real effect would not have taken place until January, so if there were serious production difficulties this may be reflected in the February-March trade.

5. Mr. Ogawa continued that he wondered who was in the group supporting Mao. Lin had disappeared and Tao Chu was gone. Only Mrs. Mao appeared as a prominent Mao supporter. There may be new young radicals who are on Mao's side.

6. , Mr. Bundy said that we were watching the situation, but we have no clear view as to what outcome would be best from our point of view. If we say anything it would only help the opposite side. Ambassador Johnson's recent speech on Communist China had been as much as anyone could say on the subject, but was actually only a repetition of previous positions.

0210

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/05

This speech had been interpreted as meaning the U.S. hoped the party group would win, but this was incorrect. The Department's China Advisory Panel of the best experts in this field had met recently. We had no interest in disorder as such. All of the experts had agreed that the whole system in China was changing. There were differences of opinion, of course, but only on moderate lines. The experts were much more unified than before. There was agreement that Maoism could not bring economic prosperity. There was doubt that Lin could control the army. This was especially true in some provinces where the army commander there was the party leader.

7. Mr. Ogawa remarked that the Hong Kong press had reported that Mao had delegated authority to Chou, but he thought this was rather doubtful. Mr. Bundy said it was clear that Chou was active and his influence was on the side of moderation. He cares about keeping the country going, is pragmatic and wants to prevent chaos.

8. Mr. Ogawa said he felt that the chaos had not affected the administrative services of the Chinese Government. For instance, trade was continuing fairly normally. He asked whether the nuclear weapon developments program was continuing without hindrance.

9. Mr. Bundy said the nuclear program might be affected if the ChiCom Government got into serious problems in Sinkiang, but this was only the most remote speculation. It was our estimate that the nuclear program had not been affected. Chou was working hard to defend the outer

0211

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

areas of the government and he must be working doubly hard to defend inner sensitive areas such as the nuclear program. He doubted that the Red Guards had been active in the nuclear plants.

10. Mr. Ogawa asked whether North Vietnam had been psychologically affected by the events in Communist China. Mr. Bundy said that the diplomats say so but there is no evidence. He supposed Hanoi must be worried. There would be trouble if the events in China reached the stage of serious disruptions, but we think this had not happened. We doubt that Peking would deliberately cut off shipments to North Vietnam. However, if serious disorders took place this might affect shipments even if this was not deliberate government policy.

11. Mr. Togo remarked that he hoped that the chaos in Communist China would continute at least until the time of the election of the Governor of Tokyo scheduled for mid-April.

12. Mr. Ogawa asked about the possibility of peace talks on Vietnam. Mr. Bundy replied that the North Vietnamese had carried on a campaign to get the U.S. to stop the bombing but we had reaffirmed the need for reciprocal action. Hanoi had tried to weaken us but they knew this was not a realistic avenue to peace on their part. On the contrary, if we stopped the bombing and they stopped the infiltration of the North, this would be a very public thing and difficult for North Vietnam. It would be different if they envisaged modest steps to reduce the reciprocal level of hostilities. This would be alright, but to stop the bombing would be

0212

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

too dramatic. The serious arena for negotiations will be in the dark. The type of man whom Hanoi is sending to Moscow as its new ambassador may be an indication of whether there is a possibility that North Vietnam will use that channel.

13. Mr. Ogawa said that the new North Vietnamese Ambassador had arrived in Moscow about a week ago and that the Japanese Embassy was awaiting its first contact with him. Mr. Ogawa had recently heard that North Vietnamese diplomats had been told not to contact diplomats of countries supporting the U.S. The North Vietnamese representative in Laos had told a Japanese diplomat that he could no longer talk freely. Mr. Togo remarked that this had happened about a month ago.

14. Mr. Bundy noted that at the time of the January 28 Burchett interview the North Vietnamese had gone out of their way to call the article to the attention of sympathetic countries. He had not been aware that they had stopped talking to those friendly to the U.S.

15. The meeting then adjourned.

cc: FE:Mr. Welch
EA/J

POL:JOZurhellen:mfd

0213

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

3

POL CHICOM
14721

FOR OCI/T USE ONLY
MAR 2 8 14 PM '67

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

XR 16-3

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amconsul HONG KONG

STATE 147721

FOR PMU

FDD translating half dozen articles from Vols. I and II of "Collected Ref Materials on Great Cultural Revolution." Will forward four copies of each. These articles and any other translations we may do of material referred to in Hong Kong 4706 will be handled as "Confidential." Also please advise us immediately by return cable whether our translations of articles from the Red Guard newspapers should be treated as Unclassified or Official Use Only.

GP-1.

147721

RUSK

3

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
INR/P:RHEsser:bia 3/2/67	4686	INR/P:JEWalter

Clearances:

Operational - No clearance necessary

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0214

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

EA/P:JMadden:dr
(Drafting Office and Officer)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 2, 1967

SUBJECT: Luncheon conversation at "The Embers" Restaurant 1200 19th St., N.W. February 28, 1967

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Yuri Linkov. Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

Mr. James Madden, EA/P. Department of State

COPIES TO: SY (3 copies). EA/VN (2 copies), EUR/SOV (2 copies)
ACA EA/P

POL 27 VIET S
XR POL CHICOM-VIETN

Mr. Linkov called on February 27 and suggested luncheon on the 28th. The following subjects were discussed:

Viet-Nam. Linkov decried increased U.S. military actions against North Viet-Nam as "escalation" at a time when the North Vietnamese had indicated their willingness to consider negotiations. He suspected that the U.S. plans to escalate and pursue a military solution in Viet-Nam while supposedly searching for peace. Linkov said the Soviet Union would "certainly" match increased U.S. military actions against North Viet-Nam with increased Soviet military assistance to the North Vietnamese.

China. Linkov could offer nothing on the situation in China, noting that it is difficult to interpret the unreliable information coming out of China.

China and North Viet-Nam. Linkov was interested to know my analysis of the impact of the situation in China on the North Vietnamese and, particularly, whether I thought significant amounts of supplies from the Soviet Union to North Viet-Nam are being held up in China. I said I had noted accusations traded between the Soviet Union and the Chinese on the subject. but that he (Linkov) was certainly in a better position to comment on Soviet supply problems to North Viet-Nam. (Comment: Linkov appeared to be trying to ascertain my estimate on the extent that the supply problem might be exerting pressure on Hanoi to take a more flexible approach toward a negotiated settlement.)

CONFIDENTIAL

GPO 865871

0215

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* POL CHICOM
XR AGR 12 CHICOM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

47
Action
EA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
SAB
EUR
NEA
IO
P
CU
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
SIL
E
AGR
LAB
RSR

NRNNVZCZCOMJB574JDA550
RR RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6121 0611200
ZNY CCCCC
R 021624Z MAR 67
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTCR/AMEBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSNAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUABFB/FBIS OKINAWA
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

1967 MAR 10 01 AM 001950

HONG KONG 6121 3-2-67

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONG KONG 6121

REF: HONG KONG'S 6015

SUBJECT: PLA TAKES CHARGE OF SPRING FARM WORK.

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS AGRICULTURE

1. REPORTS FROM HOPEI, CHEKIANG, KWANGSI, KIANGSI, AND HUPEH OF MEETINGS SPONSORED BY PROVINCIAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND DIRECTIVES ON SPRING FARM WORK SUGGEST THAT PLA HAS ASSUMED MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION OF SPRING FARM TASKS. USE OF PLA AS PRIMARY CHANNEL FOR TRANSMITTING CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIRECTIVE ON SPRING FARMING INTO ACTION IS INDICATIVE OF BREAKDOWN OR DISTRUST OF NORMAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT CHANNELS RESULTING FROM CULTURAL REVOLUTION. REPORTS MAKE CLEAR THAT PLA OR MILITIA WILL TAKE LEAD, OR PARTICIPATE, IN WORK MEETINGS TO BE CONVENED AT ALL SUB-PROVINCIAL LEVELS. CONCERN OVER DEMORALIZATION AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF RURAL CADRE CORPS IS REFLECTED IN STATEMENT BY HOPEI PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMANDER THAT IN CASES WHERE COMMUNES, BRIGADES AND PRODUCTION LEADING GROUPS SHOULD BE FORMED BY "RELIABLE FULL-TIME ARMED FORCES CADRES,"

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MICROFILMED BY RSL

2

021b

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

REVOLUTIONARY CADRES, AND PEASANT AND MILITIA REPRESENTATIVES. THE REPORTS ALL EVINCE CONCERN OVER DELAYS IN LOCAL PLANNING OF 1967 FARM TASKS.

2. REPORTS ALSO SUGGEST THAT PLA IS UNDERTAKING TASK OF COORDINATING ASSISTANCE TO AGRICULTURE FROM FIELDS OF INDUSTRY, FINANCE, TRADE, ETC.; THIS CARRIES POSSIBLE IMPLICATION FOR ECONOMY THAT MILITARY INFLUENCE WILL EXTEND BEYOND AGRICULTURE INTO OTHER ECONOMIC SPHERES. HOPEI REPORT, FOR EXAMPLE, CALLS FOR SETTING UP OF "POWERFUL AND EFFICIENT ORGANS" AT COUNTY LEVEL AND ABOVE, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE PLA MEMBERS AND WOULD "LEAD INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND FINANCE AND TRADE WORK." MORE SPECIFICALLY RADIO WUHAN FEB 27 REPORTS ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORMAL PLA ORGANIZATION WITH GENERAL ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES: A "GRASP REVOLUTION AND BOOST PRODUCTION" OFFICE WITH SUB-DIVISIONS FOR AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, WATER CONSERVANCY, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE AND TRADE.

3. COMMENT: WHILE PLA HAS TRADITIONALLY PLAYED PROMINENT ROLE IN LOCAL DISASTER SITUATIONS AND HAS HELPED DURING PEAK FARM WORK PERIODS, THIS IS FIRST OCCASION WE KNOW OF SINCE 1958-1959 WHERE PLA APPEARS TO BE TAKING OVER WIDESPREAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIRECTION OF FARM WORK. QUESTION IS RAISED WHETHER PLA HAS REQUISITE KNOW-HOW AND PERSONNEL RESOURCES FOR SUCH BROAD RESPONSIBILITIES. DEVELOPMENT RAISES PROSPECT OF ADVERSE LOCAL REACTION TO PLA INTRUSION. THIS MOVE UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTS DEEP CONCERN OVER EFFECT ON AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT OF RECENT DISORDER AND BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY IN RURAL AREAS AND, MOREOVER, IS THE CLEAREST EXAMPLE OF OTHER CURRENT INDICATIONS THAT PLA IS PLAYING MAJOR ROLE IN RE-ESTABLISHING ORDER AND PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER THROUGHOUT CHINESE SOCIETY.

DECON-3/1/68
RICE
BT

0217

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

POL 7 MAURITANIA
XR AID 6 MAURITANIA
XR POL CHICOM

Munakchott 244

(11)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

Action
AF
Info

NNNNVZCZCFHE494GG HLA963
RR RUEDPSA RUEHC RUEHCR RUMJDH
DE RUFNCR 244NN 0511240
ZNY CCCCC
R 021230Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR
RUMJDH/AMCONGEN HONG KONG
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE USCINCMEAFSA
STATE GRNC
BT

002257
1967 MAR 2 PM 1 39

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 244

SUBJ: FONMINISTER'S VISIT TO PEKIN

1. FOLLOWING EMERGED FROM CONVERSATION MARCH ONE WITH FON MINISTER WANE BIRANE CONCERNING RECENT VISIT PEKIN:

A) MAO CONSIDERABLY AGED, BUT APPEARED MENTALLY ALERT AND PHYSICALLY WELL. SMOKED CONTINUALLY THROUGHOUT NINETY-MINUTE MEETING WITH MAURITANIANS, GESTURED FREELY AND WALKED ACROSS ROOM.

B) MAURITANIANS ACCORDED RED CARPET TREATMENT AND SAW NO EVIDENCE CULTURAL REVOLUTION DISORDERS. (BUT WANE ADMITTED

RSR

PAGE 2 DE RUFNCR 244NN C O N F I D N T I A L
THEY HAD NOT TRAVELED OUTSIDE PEKIN AND HAD SEEN LITTLE OF CITY "BECAUSE THERE WAS NO TIME.")

C) CHICOMS OFFERED CREDIT EQUALLING FOUR MILLION DOLLARS UPON WHIC MAURITANIANS CAN DRAW DURING NEXT FIVE YEARS TO OBTAIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND/OR MATERIEL FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS APPROVED BY CHINESE. ONLY SPECIFIC ONE SO FAR AGREED IS RICE GROWING ALONG SENEGAL RIVER (EMBAIR A-33, SEPT 13, 1966). CREDIT BEARS NO INTEREST AND REPAYABLE OVER 20-YEAR PERIOD IN MAURITANIIN PRODUCTS WHICH NOT YET SPECIFIED.

AID 6

2. RE CHICOM OFFER CONSTRUCT YOUTH CENTER NOUAKCHOTT (EMBAIR A-128, FEB 28, 1967), WANE THOUGHT LIAL LABOR

(3)

MICROFILMED BY RSR CONFIDENTIAL

0218

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

G/PM:RLGarthoff:pep 3-2-67
(Drafting Office and Officer)

CONFIDENTIAL

RSR
FILE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

45

DATE: March 2, 1967

SUBJECT: Communist China

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Boris N. Sedov, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Raymond L. Garthoff, G/PM

COPIES TO:
G/PM - Mr. Kitchen cc
EUR/SOV - Mr. Toon cc
INR/RSB - Mr. Sonnenfeldt cc
EA/ACA - Mr. Jacobson cc
INR/REA - Mr. Greene cc
INR cc

POL CHICOM

In a luncheon conversation, Mr. Sedov remarked that the sitation in China had considerably improved. He felt that Mao had taken the measure of the opposition and found it too strong to suppress at this time. Therefore, he had given Chou En-lai the green light to restore order and discipline. In addition, the fall in economic production had become serious. However, he was sure that Mao remained in control, and would again resume an offensive against the Party machine whenever he felt able to do so. He regarded this year's agricultural crop as the critical turning point; if the crop was satisfactory, Mao would again turn on the heat. If it was disastrous, Mao would be in trouble.

In a discussion of Sino-Soviet relations, I asked Mr. Sedov if he were familiar with Harold Hinton's theory that Khrushchev had been removed from power because he was on the verge of launching a military strike against the Chinese Communist nuclear facilities. Sedov remarked that he was slightly acquainted with Hinton, but was not familiar with his recent book or thesis. He rejected the Hinton theory, but then went on to say that one of the main reasons that Khrushchev was removed was because he did have a propensity for undertaking measures that had not been approved, or even that had been disapproved by the Party Presidium. He said that he was not denying that Khrushchev may have had some such idea, but it would certainly have never been done.

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

FORM DS-1254 3-61

CONFIDENTIAL

0219

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

ORIGIN/ACTION

EUR-6

RM/R	REP	AF
1		EA CFE 4
ARA	EUR	
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P 2	IO
L	FBO	AID
S/S 1	ACDA 14	
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 5
ARMY 3	CIA 20	NAVY 5
OSD 33	USIA 10	NSA 3
	N.S 1	NSC 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 17-8 US
XR Pol CHICOM

FOR RM USE ONLY
XR Pol 27 VIETS
XR Pol CAN US

HANDLING INDICATOR

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 6 8 35 AM 1967
ANNEX BRANCH

A-874 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Department of State

FROM : Amembassy OTTAWA

DATE: 2 March 1967

SUBJECT : Conversation with Soviet Embassy Officer

REF :

Enclosed is a report of a conversation of February 14, 1967 between FSO E. C. BITTNER, Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy, and Youri PERFILIEV, Second Secretary and Press Officer of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa.

BUTTERWORTH

Enclosure:
Memcon 2/14/67

RECEIVED MAR 6 PM 12 51
COPYFLO-P8R

FORM DS-323 4-62

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:WMJohnson:sn 2/27/67
Clearances: ECON:ECBittner

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM: JWScott

0220

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

146

3310

COPIES FROM S/S TO EA EUR RF

MICROFILMED BY S/S: CMS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

RS/R FILES

Attention Mulley

Keep this study together.

March 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from Mr. James Fitzsimmons regarding book by Harrison Salisbury on China.

In response to Mr. Popple's request of February 21, 1967, a copy of the Department's reply to Mr. Fitzsimmons is enclosed.

Sherrod McCall, Jr.
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

S/S BHR
A True Copy

Enclosures:

1. Reply to Mr. Fitzsimmons.
2. Original Correspondence

DECLASSIFIED BY S/S

EA/ACA:KCDougall:ced 3-1-67 Clearances: EUR/AIS - Mr. Foley
ACA - Mr. Jacobson

(2)

Letter to Mr. Fitzsimmons mailed from CMS on 3/1/67. BHR

POL 1 CHI COM

0221

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

46

3310

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from Mr. James Fitzsimmons regarding book by Harrison Salisbury on China.

In response to Mr. Popple's request of February 21, 1967, a copy of the Department's reply to Mr. Fitzsimmons is enclosed.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. **Reply to Mr. Fitzsimmons.**
2. **Original Correspondence**

Redrafted and retyped in S/S:SMcCall:sd:3/1/67

WH 2 Pol

0222

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

MICROFILM
DO NOT REMOVE
FROM
FILE

46

3310

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from
Mr. James Fitzsimmons Regarding
Book by Harrison Salisbury on China

In response to Mr. Popple's request of February 21, 1967, there is enclosed a copy of the Department's reply to Mr. James Fitzsimmons' letter of February 18 to the President urging that the President consider the ideas about Communist China expressed in Mr. Harrison Salisbury's new book.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Reply to Mr. Fitzsimmons.
2. Original correspondence.

EA/ACA:KCDougall:ced 3-1-67

ACA - Mr. Jacobson

Clearances: S/S-
EA -
EUR/AIS - Mr. Foley

POL CHI COM

0223

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/05

46

March 7, 1967

Mr. James Fitzsimmons, Editor
Art International
Via Maraini 17-A
6900 Lugano, Switzerland

Dear Mr. Fitzsimmons:

The President has asked me to reply to your letter of February 18, 1967, and to express his appreciation of your kind remarks concerning him. In your letter you urge consideration of the ideas about Communist China which Mr. Harrison Salisbury expresses in a new book, of which you have read a review.

The Department of State appreciates your interest in this subject. We are informed that the book is scheduled for public sale on March 15, 1967. A copy is on order for the Department, and we shall examine it carefully at the earliest opportunity.

In view of your interest in United States policy toward Communist China, I am enclosing copies of some speeches in which our aims are outlined in some detail. I am enclosing, also, an excerpt from a statement of Secretary of State Rusk on this subject made before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Sincerely,

Harald W. Jacobson
Director
Office of Asian Communist Affairs

Enclosures:
As stated.

EA/ACA:KCDougall:ced 3-1-67 Clearances: EUR/AIS - Mr. Foley

ACA - Mr. Jacobson

pol 27 CH

0224

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION SLIP
WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL

CONTROL NO. 3310

TO EA - Mr. Blackburn

DATE February 24, 1967

SUBJECT Ltr to LBJ fm James Fitzsimmons, urging consideration of ideas abou China ~~xxxx~~ that Harrison Salisbury Expresses in his book on VN.

___Prepare a Read to _____ memo enclosing or containing:
_____Draft reply for President's signature.
_____Draft reply for signature by _____.
_____Memo for use as enclosure to reply by White House.
_____Comment or recommendation.

___Direct reply:

_____Furnish information copy under cover of a Read to _____ memo.
_____Comeback copy required for S/S.

XXx Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling:
_____Furnish information copy of reply, if any, under cover of a Read to _____ memo.

XX Refer to White House request of Mr. Popple, 2/21/67.

___FYI
cy, ~~xx~~ if ~~any~~,
XX/Due in S/S by February 27, 1967.

NOTES

1. White House referrals must be answered within 48 hours unless otherwise noted. If deadline cannot be met, inform S/S immediately at extension given below.

2. Direct replies to White House mail must be signed at the Assistant or Acting Assistant Secretary level.

3. Unless otherwise noted, direct replies, depending upon the addressee of the incoming letter, must begin: "The President has asked me to reply" or "Mr. _____ has asked me to reply".

4. Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum or comment or comeback copy for the White House is requested.

Letter to Mr. Fitzsimmons and Read to ... drafted by ... Rostow ... 2/24/67 ... EA/ACA

REMARKS Clear with EUR

COPIES TO:

P - Mr. Raicht (w/att)

Robert L. Bruce per RL

Secretariat Staff
Ext. 4155

0225

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03



46

ART INTERNATIONAL
VIA MARAINI 17-A
6900 LUGANO

His Excellency The President,
Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D.C.

February 18, 1967

Mr. President,

I take the liberty of addressing you partly because I feel that probably every citizen should express his views on matters that concern the national destiny; partly because The White House has had a subscription to this magazine for some years, which gives me the illusion of having some contact, however remote, with its occupant; and partly because, if I may say so, I have a great feeling of admiration and sympathy for you, in the most trying situation in which you find yourself, receiving brickbats from all sides over this wretched war in Vietnam.

But I will be brief, Mr. President. I am writing to urge you to please consider the ideas about China that Mr. Harrison Salisbury expresses in the book he has just published, of which I happened to read a review today. I realize that Mr. Salisbury's reports from Hanoi may have been somewhat, shall we say, naive. But I think there can be no doubt of his sincerity, his concern, and his capacity for disinterested reasoning. And the book on China is quite another matter from his Hanoi despatches.

Briefly, as I understand it, Mr. Salisbury argues that at present the United States and China are travelling along a road that sooner or later must lead to a nuclear war, a war which, despite our overwhelmingly superior military power, might drag on for decades, even, because of China's immense size and population -- a population so large that even if half of it was eliminated, it would still be far greater than our own. Mr. Salisbury further states that China is prepared to face a 50% population loss, and that China is steadily girding for war because 1) she is convinced (believing her own propaganda) that we, perhaps together with Russia, mean to attack her. (Any American knows this is nonsense : that does not mean the Chinese know it.) And 2), the population explosion there is so disastrous, so far beyond China's ability to cope, that China must someday expand, chiefly in search of food, but also in search of employment for her people. (It might even be argued that at some time in the next ten or twenty years, a war in which half of China's population would be wiped out would be a blessing in disguise for that unfortunate country. But that would be a pretty desparate way of viewing things !)

Mr. Salisbury asks if there exists any alternative to nuclear war

POL CHI COM

0226

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

FITZSIMMONS

ART INTERNATIONAL
VIA MARAINI 17-A
6900 LUGANO

He believes there does, and it is this part of his argument that I permit myself (I hope not impertinently) to call to your attention, Mr. President.

One might say that Mr. Salisbury urges us to pacify China and win her over "by love" -- by helping her to solve the problems that she is manifestly incapable of solving for herself. Those hundreds of millions of people must somehow be fed. A mammoth program of relief and, at the same time, of agrarian reform and scientifically planned agricultural development on a nation-wide scale would need to be set in motion. Parallel with this, vast technological development, industrialization, is needed to give work to the immense non-farming population.

One might also say that Mr. Salisbury is arguing that people who are adequately fed and housed, who are busy, and who have some future to look forward to, are less likely to explode in acts of desperation and violence. (I think our own experience with the underprivileged in America tends to confirm this view.)

One might also call Mr. Salisbury's argument that of the social worker or psychiatrist who works with problem children : does one slap them down (difficult when they are big and set in their ways) or does one re-educate them, give them a chance, and gradually win them over ?

It must be admitted that Mr. Salisbury's alternative to war with China would pose enormous problems. China's first reaction to our friendly overtures would doubtless be an insolent, insulting rejection : we must somehow get around their suspicion, their absolute distrust of our motives. (Here, too, there is an obvious parallel with the relations of the well-meaning adult and the juvenile delinquent.) And then the cost of any program of aid and development for China would be astronomical. But surely it would be less than the cost of a nuclear war -- perhaps less, even, than the cost of a really effective program of development of anti-missile missiles to protect ourselves against Chinese attack. And finally, if such a program could be got going, after ten years or so our industrialists might begin to initiate jointly-owned projects in China (as is beginning to happen in Eastern Europe). What a market for American products China might become, once it became open and once the income of the average Chinese rose to a decent level !

With my apologies, Mr. President, for such a long letter, and my best wishes for all your undertakings,

Yours sincerely,

0227

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

POL CHICOM

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

49
Action

CONFIDENTIAL

EA

Info

SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
SAB
EUR
NEA
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA
E

VZCZCMJA202JDA396
PP RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFHRO RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6075 0601120
ZNY CCCCC
P R 010935Z MAR 67
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUFUBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUMJSN/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

000391

1967 MAR 1 AM 7 52

HONG KONG 6075

3-1-67

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 6075

RSR

REF: STATE 144624 CIRCULAR

1. I WISH TO EXPRESS ADMINRATION FOR SUMMATION OF THE PRESENT STATUS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS CONTAINED REFTEL PREPARED FOR NATUS.

2. AS WAS OBSERVED IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF THAT TELEGRAM MAO--WHO SEEMED TO BE SIGNALLING A LET-UP IN HIS PURGE LAST NOVEMBER AND WHO THEN TURNED THE HEAT WAY UP IN DECEMBER --WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH CONTINUING STAND-DOWN OF HIS CULTURAL REVOLUTION, BOTH BECAUSE HE UNDOUBTEDLY REGARDS ITS TASKS AS UNCOMPLETED AND BECAUSE IT IS IN HIS NATURE TO ENJOY FERMENT. I ACCORDINGLY AM LEARY OF CONCLUDING HIGH POINT OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION HAS OR HAS NOT PASSED.

1

CONFIDENTIAL

0228

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03

3. REFTEL ENDS BY RAISING INTRIGUING QUESTIONS OF WHETHER CHOU AND THE MILITARY WILL COOPERATE QTE AGAIN UNQTE WITH MAO AND INDEED WHETHER HE WILL TRUST THEM. THE MILITARY'S RESPONSE, DURING THE PHASE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION JUST PASSED, COULD HARDLY BE CHARACTERIZED AS FULL COOPERATION WITH THE MAOISTS. CERTAINLY THE ANARCHIC CHARACTER OF THE REBELLION THEY WERE CALLED ON TO SUPPORT MUST HAVE BEEN ABHORRENT TO ORDERLY MILITARY MINDS. IN THIS RESPECT CHOU EN-LAI, WITH HIS INSISTENCE ON ORDERLY PROCEDURES, WOULD FIND THEM A NUOURAL AS WELL AS A NEEDED ALLY.

4. IF MAO IS TO RESUME THE OFFENSIVE, I WOULD SUBMIT, HE WILL NEED THE ARMY AT LEAST TO HOLD THE RING. HE ALSO WILL NEED CHOU EN-LAI TO HOLD THINGS TOGETHER, THOUGH HE MAY PROVE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO RECOGNIZE THAT FACT. CHOU HAS IN EFFECT BEEN FIGHTING MAO TENACIOUSLY; HE HAS NEVERTHELESS SURVIVED THROUGH UNPARALLELED ADROITNESS-AND AN UNFLAGGING ENERGY WHICH MAO'S REAL HENCHMEN APPEAR UNABLE TO MATCH.

5. I WONDER WHAT UNUSED ORGANIZATIONAL CARD MAO STILL HAS UP HIS SLEEVE, AS THE ACTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF HIS CULTURAL REVOLUTION, NOW THAT HE HAS HAD OVERT RECOURSE IN HIS PURGE SUCCESSIVELY TO THE PARTY ITSELF, THE YOUNG RED GUARDS, THE MORE MATURE REVOLUTIONARY REBELS, AND THE ARMY. THERE PRESUMABLY IS, OF COURSE, A SECRET POLICE ORGANIZATION WHICH HE MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT NEED TO USE IF HE DECIDES TO EMPLOY HARSHER METHODS.

6. SO FAR AS WE KNOW MAO HAS NOT, AT LEAST SINCE THE EARLY DAYS OF HIS STRUGGLE FOR POWER WITHIN THE PARTY, HAD RECOURSE TO THE EXECUTION OF OPPONENTS. (THERE HAVE BEEN SUSPICIONS THAT KAO KANG WAS DONE IN, BUT WE KNOW OF NOTHING TO PROVE HIS DEATH WAS NOT BY SUICIDE AS REPORTED IN THE MAINLAND PRESS IN 1955.) BUT IF OFFICIAL MEDIA CONFIRM RECENT WALL POSTER ACCOUNTS THAT SOME OF THE PRESENT LEADING OPPONENTS OF MAO HAVE NOW BEEN BRANDED COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY, THAT COULD BE THE TIP-OFF THAT THE MAOISTS WANT SEE THEM ACCORDED PUNISHMENT HARSHER THAN THAT METED OUT TO PREVIOUS OPPONENTS WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP. OTHERS HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF ANTI-PARTY PLOTTING BUT NONE, INSOFAR AS OUR MEMORY AND RECORDS SERVE, WAS EVER ACCUSED OF THE FAR WORSE AND MOST HEINOUS CRIME OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION. PERHAPS MAO INTENDS TO MAKE A FEW HEADS ROLL HOPING THEREBY TO SO INTIMIDATE OTHER OPPONENTS AS TO BRING THEM ON BOARD. IF SO, I DOUBT IT WILL SUFFICE TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF HIS GRAND DESIGN.

RICE
BT

0229

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/08

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POL CHICOM

51
Action

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCMJB387JDA404

EA
Info

RR RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUMJDH 6083 0681220
ZNY CCCCC

000423
1967 MAR 1 AM 8 41

HONG KONG 6083 3-1-67

SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
SAB
EUR
NEA
P
CU
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA

R 011025Z MAR 67
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUABFB/BFIS OKINAWA
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 6083

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN HONAN

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

RSR

1. PERSISTENT THOUGH YET UNCONFIRMED WALL POSTER REPORTS INDICATE EXISTENCE OF FACTIONAL CONFLICT IN HONAN REQUIRING PLA INTERVENTION. LATEST OF THESE IS FEB 27 PRESS REPORT OF PEKING WALL POSTERS ASSERTING CHOU EN-LAI PERSONALLY DESPATCHED TROOPS TO OCCUPY ALL NEWSPAPER PREMISES IN HONAN. CHOU REPORTEDLY ACTED FOR MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND ALSO ISSUED URGENT APPEAL TO HONAN "REACTIONARY GROUP," TO CEASE FIGHTING AND SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO PEKING FOR TALKS. TANJUG FEB 27 REPORTS THAT OTHER WALL POSTERS IN PEKING ACCUSE CHENGCHOW UNIVERSITY RED GUARDS OF INCITING CONFLICT.

MICROFILMED BY RS/H
1

2. PEKING WALL POSTERS HAD EARLIER INDICATED TROUBLE IN HONAN WITH VARIOUS CLASHES REPORTED IN EARLY FEBRUARY. IN CHENGCHOW, KAIFENG, AND ELSEWHERE LOCAL PLA COMMANDERS, PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICIALS AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES WERE ACCUSED OF INCITING PEASANTS TO THWART RED GUARD EFFORTS TO TAKE OVER ENTERPRISES. AND IN

CONFIDENTIAL

0230

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By nt NARA Date 9/10/03

GENERAL OF CONSPIRING TO SUPPRESS THE REVOLUTION. REFERRING TO "WHITE TERROR," REPORTS TOLD OF MANY WOUNDED, HUNDREDS ARRESTED AND SCORES MISSING. ALTHOUGH SOME POSTERS DEPLORED PLA FAILURE TO STAND ON SIDE OF REVOLUTIONARY REBELS, MOST ACCUSED PLA OF VIOLENCE ON BEHALF OF ENTRENCHED AUTHORITIES, AND SOME REFERRED TO HONAN MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDER CHANG SHU-CHIH AS "BUTCHER CHANG."

3. ASIDE FROM POSTER REPORTS, RECENT FAILURE NATIONAL OR LOCAL MEDIA TO REPORT ON HONAN DEVELOPMENTS REINFOCES IMPRESSION OF UNSETTLED CONDITIONS IN PROVINCE.

4. COMMENT: AVAILABLE INFORMATION DOES NOT INDICATE WHETHER ALLEGED TROOP MOVEMENTS INVOLVE OUTSIDE REINFORCEMENTS. IF ANY EVENT, PLA INVOLVEMENT IN HONAN MAY BE LARGELY EFFORT MAINTAIN PEACE AND ORDER IN PROVINCE WHOSE FRACTIOUS TENDENCIES AMPLY DEMONSTRATED IN LEAN YEARS FOLLOWING GREAT LEAP FORWARD. SUCH PLA ROLE LIKELY BE INTERPRETED BY MAOIST FORCE, AND PROBABLY WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION, AS PROTECTION OF EXISTING AUTHORITY AND CONTRARY MAO'S CALL ON PLA TO ASSIST REVOLUTIONARY REBELS. HOWEVER, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING REVERSAL RULES ON POWER SEIZURE OUTLINED LATEST RED FLAG EDITORIAL, SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE EFFECTIVENESS OF REVOLUTIONARY REBEL COMPLAINTS AND PROVIDE EVEN GREATER LEEWAY FOR PLA TO ACT IN ESSENTIALLY CONSERVATIVE ROLE OF PROTECTOR OF LAW AND ORDER.

5. ALLEGED CHOU EN-LAI EFFORT TO CONTROL SITUATION AND ARRANGE NEGOTIATIONS SEEMS TO PARALLEL SIMILAR APPROACH BY HIM IN INNER MONGOLIA. IT HIGHLIGHTS CHOU'S CURRENT ROLE WHICH, IF POSTER REPORTS TRUE, INCLUDES UNACCUSTOMED ONE OF ACTING FOR MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION, A FUNCTION WHICH EXPECTEDLY SHOULD FALL TO LIN PIAO.

GP-3
RICE
BT

0231

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NARA Date 9/10/03

POC CHICOM

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POC / USSR-VIET N

91-83

CONFIDENTIAL

VA POC 27 VIET Sup

Action

000940

EA

VV DKA549V THA291
RR RUALOT RUEHC RUMJDH RUMJIR
DE RUDKTH 2164 PYPQUER
ZNY CCCCC
R 011604Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
STATE GRNC
BT

1967 MAR 1 PM 2 5

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAGUE 2164

JAPANESE AMB USHIROKU TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT TOKYO SINOLOGISTS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET ROLE IN RELATION TO HANOI AND VIETNAM WAR OF CURRENT PATCHING OVER INTERNAL CHICOM SPLIT. ARGUED THAT ASSUMING CHINESE CONSOLIDATE DOMESTIC COMPROMISE, NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL FEEL CORRESPONDINGLY MORE VULNERABLE TO CHINESE PRESSURES CONTINUE FIGHTING AT ANY COST. SOVIET UNION WILL, ON ITS PART, FEEL POSSIBILITIES EXERT INFLUENCE ON HANOI CORRESPONDINGLY DIMINISHED. USHIROKU SEEMED TO BE TRYING TO SAY THAT ANY EXISTING INCLINATION ON PART SOVIET UNION AND HANOI FIND WAY TO BRING HOSTILITIES TO AN END LIKELY TO BE STRONGEST

SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
H
EUR
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
NIC
ACDA

RSR

PAGE 2 RUDKTH 2164 C O N F I D E N T I A L
DURING REMAINING TIME WHILE CHINESE STILL PRIMARILY PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL READJUSTMENTS.

GP-3. TYLER
BT

(3)

MICROFILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

0232

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By NT NARA Date 9/10/03